Talk:Nuclear proliferation

Name of this article might need changing

The term "Nuclear proliferation" should appear in the first sentence and be bolded, according to convention. But that exact phrase does not seem to appear at all, right now. So possibly, this article will need renaming. Should it be "Nuclear weapons proliferation"? Or "Nuclear weapons non-proliferation"? Just for example. At any rate, keep in mind that we'll need a bolded title appearing at the top of the article and matching the article name at some point in the near future. Pat Palmer (talk) 07:52, 10 April 2023 (CDT)

P S - It's an interesting and useful article! I look forward to seeing how it develops. Pat Palmer (talk) 07:53, 10 April 2023 (CDT)

I've added two sentences to the lead. Do we need an exact phrase match on the title? I agree we need further development, addressing the questions raised in the parent article, Nuclear power reconsidered. David MacQuigg (talk) 11:29, 12 April 2023 (CDT)

Israel

Not mentioned here, though it seems to be generally accepted they have nuclear weapons (or at least components that could be slotted together at 40 minutes notice!). Peter Jackson (talk) 05:18, 11 April 2023 (CDT)

Israel is not included in the table, because it's status as a nuclear weapons state is controversial, and adding it as a weapons state won't make much difference to the article (one more country with weapons before civilian power). If you have a reliable source on this, let me know. David MacQuigg (talk) 06:28, 26 April 2023 (CDT)

More to non-proliferation than inspections

We need some additional sections on what is being done with nations that have NOT signed the NPT, and are NOT agreeing to the IAEA non-proliferation guidelines. Has the Nuclear Suppliers Group been successful in controlling exports of nuclear technology and materials? Do the failures (India and Pakistan) have any implications as to what reactor designs we should support or oppose? Have there been any proposals on incentives for countries that comply with IAEA guidelines, so we don't have to rely only on export controls and sanctions? David MacQuigg (talk) 11:59, 13 April 2023 (CDT)

There is a good summary at Safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation World Nuclear Association, 2021. David MacQuigg (talk) 10:10, 14 April 2023 (CDT)

Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons

We need to say more about this counter-example to the general trend that weapons are developed before nuclear power. It appears that the Iranians succeeded in diverting plutonium from a power reactor. Here is the story from ThorCon's Safeguards paper.

//The Iranians in October 2012 shut down the Bushehr pressurized water reactor after only 60 days operation, and pulled the fuel elements.[3] The removal period was said to be Oct 22 to 29. WSJ received estimates of 10 to 100 kg of Weapons Grade plutonium in these fuel elements.4 After a long silence, the shutdown was blamed on “stray bolts” that had fallen to the bottom of the reactor vessel. The dropped bolts story was later denied by the Russians who said the shutdown was for “safety testing”. Others claimed it had to do with the handover from the Russians to the Iranians. The US and others protested, but did nothing. The assumption presumably was that the Iranians do not have the capability of separating the plutonium from the fission products. Maybe, but we can be confident they have a supply of Weapons Grade Pu waiting for the day they do. In mid-2013 the Bushehr reactor resumed operation.// David MacQuigg (talk) 18:48, 7 August 2023 (CDT)

Paths to the Bomb

This section needs to respond to the issues raised its parent article Nuclear power reconsidered: "Some uranium reactors have a brief period in their fuel cycle where weapons-grade Pu-239 can be extracted from the partially used fuel. Some thorium reactors with on-site fuel processing may be vulnerable to skimming of a small fraction of U-233 from the process loop.[26]"
Apparently, it is easy to "spike" the starting fuel for reactors using the Uranium fuel cycle, but what about Thorium?
See the discussion at https://www.quora.com/Why-are-molten-salt-nuclear-reactors-the-type-being-advocated-for-thorium-reactors-such-a-huge-proliferation-danger-Why-are-people-so-determined-to-ignore-or-deny-such-a-simple-and-clear-danger David MacQuigg (talk) 11:22, 23 November 2023 (CST)

Here is Tom Ledbetter's "little lesson in nuclear proliferation prevention", making the case that Thorium MSRs are 10X more risky than PWRs, and "The world will never be safe again." https://www.quora.com/log/revision/58704716
Here is a quote from Robert Steinhaus in the discussion linked above: //The key point for discussion of Thorium fuel cycle proliferation safety is that there is a well known identified method of starting with highly contaminated (220 - 400 ppm Pa232 content) reactor grade Protactinium and then economically producing weapons usable U233 with less than 50 PPM U232 (and even weapons grade U233 with some finishing chemistry to remove light elements like Lithium and Beryllium).// David MacQuigg (talk) 13:39, 29 November 2023 (CST)

See also this article on the protactinium problem in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.David MacQuigg (talk) 10:31, 1 December 2023 (CST)

The risk of diversion of fissile material varies widely, depending on the details of each design. See ThorCon's answer to the weapons proliferation problem. David MacQuigg (talk) 05:32, 9 January 2024 (CST)

See also this discussion of the possibility of making low-yield nuclear bombs from reactor-grade plutonium. David MacQuigg (talk) 09:49, 15 February 2024 (CST)