Stovepiping

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Stovepiping is a term of art in intelligence cycle management and intelligence analysis, which prevents proper analysis by preventing objective analysts from drawing conclusions based on all relevant data. It has acquired a broader meaning of manipulating information to prevent cross-checking that might not support a prejudgment.

Intelligence termm of art

The traditional meaning keeps the output of different collection systems separated from one another. It prevents one discipline from cross-checking another. In the Second World War, both sides doubled clandestine agents and used them to send disinformation back to their own countries.[1] While the content of the clandestine human-source intelligence (HUMINT) they sent might seem reasonable, direction finding, a discipline of signals intelligence (SIGINT) might have shown they were transmitting from Gestapo or MI5 headquarters. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) on the style of their radio procedure could have indicated that an impostor, or perhaps the real agent but under duress, was sending.

When first put under a loosely common management in the National Reconnaissance Office, the extremely expensive U.S. intelligence satellite programs suffered from stovepiping. The three major programs were organized by the military service that created the satellite program, rather than designing around a specific kind of information needed by each of the services and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Manipulation of intelligence

Second, a newer usage of stovepiping is bypassing the regular analysis of raw intelligence, and sending only raw intelligence that supports a particular position to the highest national leadership. Specifically, allegations were made that a large part of the justification from the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in 2003, came from the Office Of Special Plans, a new office in the Department of Defense, under Donald Feith,[2] which effectively bypassed the intelligence review process and reported to Dick Cheney.[3] Certain of the points that OSP supported were consistent with the policies of the Project for a New American Century,[4] which Cheney and Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld had been active. [5]

A 2007 report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, [6] released by Sen. Carl Levin, said it "was predisposed to finding a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda."

According to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Feith's briefings, given to the White House, National Security Council, and Office of the Vice President, contained a slide not presented to the CIA, entitled "Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community is Assessing Information". described what he sarcastically called "Feith-based intelligence", which he said mischaracterized the intelligence, selecting information that "confirmed preconceived notions."[7] Tenet said that much of the connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda ws "cherry-piicked, selective data that Feith, Libby and others had been enamored of for so long...Vice President Cheney...cited the leaked Feith memo as 'your best source of information' on possible ties." Tenet said the best source was a January 2003 CIA paper saying "there was no Iraqi authority, direction, or control over al-Qaida."[8]


References

  1. Masterman, J. C. (1972). The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945. Yale University Press. 
  2. Katzman, Kenneth (August 15, 2008), Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links, Order Code RL32217, p. CRS-4
  3. Barry, Tom (February 12, 2004), Decentralizing U.S. Intelligence: Office of Special Plans, IRC Right Web
  4. History Commons, Profile: Project for the New American Century (PNAC)
  5. Borger, Julian (July 17, 2003), "Special investigation", Guardian
  6. Walter Pincus and R. Jeffrey Smith (February 9, 2007), "Official's Key Report On Iraq Is Faulted: 'Dubious' Intelligence Fueled Push for War", Washington Post
  7. Tenet, George (2007). At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. HarperCollins, pp. 347-349. ISBN 9780061147784. 
  8. Tenet, pp. 357-358