Stovepiping: Difference between revisions
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When first put under a loosely common management in the [[National Reconnaissance Office]], the extremely expensive U.S. intelligence satellite programs suffered from stovepiping. The three [[National Reconnaissance Office#Original Service-Dependent Structure|major programs]] were organized by the military service that created the satellite program, rather than designing around a specific kind of information needed by each of the services and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]. | When first put under a loosely common management in the [[National Reconnaissance Office]], the extremely expensive U.S. intelligence satellite programs suffered from stovepiping. The three [[National Reconnaissance Office#Original Service-Dependent Structure|major programs]] were organized by the military service that created the satellite program, rather than designing around a specific kind of information needed by each of the services and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]. | ||
Second, a newer usage of stovepiping is bypassing the regular analysis of raw intelligence, and sending only raw intelligence that supports a particular position to the highest national leadership.<ref name=>{{citation | Second, a newer usage of stovepiping is bypassing the regular analysis of raw intelligence, and sending only raw intelligence that supports a particular position to the highest national leadership. Specifically, allegations were made that a large pat of the justification from the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in 2003, came from the Office Of Special Plans, a new office in the [[Department of Defense]], under [[Donald Feith]], which effectively bypassed the intelligence review process and reported to [[Dick Cheney]].<ref name=>{{citation | ||
| url = http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1488/osp.pdf | | url = http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1488/osp.pdf | ||
| title = | | title = Decentralizing U.S. Intelligence: Office of Special Plans | ||
| publisher = IRC Right Web | | publisher = IRC Right Web | ||
| date = February 12, 2004 | | date = February 12, 2004 | ||
| first = Tom | last = Barry}}</ref> | | first = Tom | last = Barry}}</ref> Certain of the points that OSP supported were consistent with the policies of the [[Project for a New American Century]], which Cheney and [[Secretary of State]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]] had been active. <ref name=HC>{{citation | ||
| title = Profile: Project for the New American Century (PNAC) | |||
| author = History Commons | |||
| url = http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=project_for_the_new_american_century}}</ref><ref>{{citation | |||
|title = Special investigation | |||
| author = Borger, Julian | |||
| date = July 17, 2003 | |||
| journal = Guardian | |||
| url = }}</ref><ref name=>{{citation | |||
| url = http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32217.pdf\ | |||
| id = Order Code RL32217 | |||
| author =Katzman, Kenneth | |||
| title = Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links | |||
| date= August 15, 2008}}, p. CRS-4}}</ref> | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
Revision as of 17:44, 16 October 2008
Stovepiping is a term of art in intelligence cycle management and intelligence analysis, which prevents proper analysis by preventing objective analysts from drawing conclusions based on all relevant data.
The traditional meaning keeps the output of different collection systems separated from one another. It prevents one discipline from cross-checking another. In the Second World War, both sides doubled clandestine agents and used them to send disinformation back to their own countries.[1] While the content of the clandestine human-source intelligence (HUMINT) they sent might seem reasonable, direction finding, a discipline of signals intelligence (SIGINT) might have shown they were transmitting from Gestapo or MI5 headquarters. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) on the style of their radio procedure could have indicated that an impostor, or perhaps the real agent but under duress, was sending.
When first put under a loosely common management in the National Reconnaissance Office, the extremely expensive U.S. intelligence satellite programs suffered from stovepiping. The three major programs were organized by the military service that created the satellite program, rather than designing around a specific kind of information needed by each of the services and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Second, a newer usage of stovepiping is bypassing the regular analysis of raw intelligence, and sending only raw intelligence that supports a particular position to the highest national leadership. Specifically, allegations were made that a large pat of the justification from the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in 2003, came from the Office Of Special Plans, a new office in the Department of Defense, under Donald Feith, which effectively bypassed the intelligence review process and reported to Dick Cheney.[2] Certain of the points that OSP supported were consistent with the policies of the Project for a New American Century, which Cheney and Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld had been active. [3][4][5]
References
- ↑ Masterman, J. C. (1972.). The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945. Yale University Press.
- ↑ Barry, Tom (February 12, 2004), Decentralizing U.S. Intelligence: Office of Special Plans, IRC Right Web
- ↑ History Commons, Profile: Project for the New American Century (PNAC)
- ↑ Borger, Julian (July 17, 2003), "Special investigation", Guardian
- ↑ Katzman, Kenneth (August 15, 2008), Al Qaeda in Iraq: Assessment and Outside Links, Order Code RL32217, p. CRS-4}}