Stovepiping: Difference between revisions
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''Stovepiping''' is a term of art in [[intelligence cycle management]] and [[intelligence analysis]], which prevents proper analysis by preventing objective analysts from drawing conclusions based on all relevant data. | '''Stovepiping''' is a term of art in [[intelligence cycle management]] and [[intelligence analysis]], which prevents proper analysis by preventing objective analysts from drawing conclusions based on all relevant data. | ||
The traditional meaning keeps the output of different collection systems separated from one another. It prevents one discipline from cross-checking another. In the [[Second World War]], both sides doubled clandestine agents and used them to send disinformation back to their own countries.<ref>{{cite book | author = Masterman, J. C. | | title = The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 | publisher = Yale University Press | year = 1972.}}</ref> While the content of the [[clandestine human-source intelligence]] ([[HUMINT]]) they sent might seem reasonable, direction finding, a discipline of [[signals intelligence]] ([[SIGINT]]) might have shown they were transmitting from [[Gestapo]] or [[Security Service (U.K.)|MI5]] headquarters. [[Measurement and signature intelligence]] (MASINT) on the style of their radio procedure could have indicated that an impostor, or perhaps the real agent but under duress, was sending. | The traditional meaning keeps the output of different collection systems separated from one another. It prevents one discipline from cross-checking another. In the [[Second World War]], both sides doubled clandestine agents and used them to send disinformation back to their own countries.<ref>{{cite book | author = Masterman, J. C. | | title = The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945 | publisher = Yale University Press | year = 1972.}}</ref> While the content of the [[clandestine human-source intelligence]] ([[HUMINT]]) they sent might seem reasonable, direction finding, a discipline of [[signals intelligence]] ([[SIGINT]]) might have shown they were transmitting from [[Gestapo]] or [[Security Service (U.K.)|MI5]] headquarters. [[Measurement and signature intelligence]] (MASINT) on the style of their radio procedure could have indicated that an impostor, or perhaps the real agent but under duress, was sending. | ||
Revision as of 23:41, 19 June 2008
Stovepiping is a term of art in intelligence cycle management and intelligence analysis, which prevents proper analysis by preventing objective analysts from drawing conclusions based on all relevant data.
The traditional meaning keeps the output of different collection systems separated from one another. It prevents one discipline from cross-checking another. In the Second World War, both sides doubled clandestine agents and used them to send disinformation back to their own countries.[1] While the content of the clandestine human-source intelligence (HUMINT) they sent might seem reasonable, direction finding, a discipline of signals intelligence (SIGINT) might have shown they were transmitting from Gestapo or MI5 headquarters. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) on the style of their radio procedure could have indicated that an impostor, or perhaps the real agent but under duress, was sending.
When first put under a loosely common management in the National Reconnaissance Office, the extremely expensive U.S. intelligence satellite programs suffered from stovepiping. The three major programs were organized by the military service that created the satellite program, rather than designing around a specific kind of information needed by each of the services and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Second, a newer usage of stovepiping is bypassing the regular analysis of raw intelligence, and sending only raw intelligence that supports a particular position to the highest national leadership.[2]
References
- ↑ Masterman, J. C. (1972.). The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939–1945. Yale University Press.
- ↑ Barry, Tom (February 12, 2004), =Decentralizing U.S. Intelligence: Office of Special Plans, IRC Right Web