Korean War

The Korean War (1950-53) was a major Cold War military clash fought up and down the peninsula of Korea, finally leading to a stalemate in 1950 that restored the boundaries to nearly what they were at the start, along the 38th parallel. The Communist states of North Korea, China and the Soviet Union were arrayed against South Korea, supported by the United States and a multinational United Nations force. The war began with an invasion by North Korea in June 1950, followed by unexpected American and entry. North Korean forces had pushed the South Koreans and Americans back into a small perimeter when, in September 1950, an amphibious landing at Inchon turned the tide. The North Korean army disintegrated as the allies moved north, with UN approval, to unify the country. Unexpectedly the Chinese then sent in large numbers of infantry, and in the bitter cold of November-January 1950-51 pushed the UN forces out of the north. Communist supply lines were fragile, especially in the face of heavy American bombing, so the lines stabilized close to the 38th parallel in 1951. Two more years of static warfare followed, with the issue of returning reluctant Communist prisoners of war held by the UN the major sticking point. Finally an armistice was reached in summer 1953; the prisoners were exchanged and fighting ended in an uneasy truce that continues into 2008.

The war was limited in size and scope but casualties were heavy on both sides. In the U.S. political reverberations helped cause the fall of the Truman administration and his Democratic party in the landslide 1952 election of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate who promised to end the war. For Americans and Chinese it is a "forgotten war", neglected on the timeline between the twin cataclysms of World War II and Vietnam. For the Koreans it is the central event of their modern history, and efforts to reunify the land continue.

Background

Historically an independent nation, Korea had been seized by Japan in 1910 and cruelly treated as a colony. The Koreans came to hate the Japanese violently, and were overjoyed at their liberation by Soviet and American soldiers in September, 1945. The division of Korea was set at the Pottsdam Conference in July 1945, when Joseph Stalin for the Soviet Union and Harry S. Truman for the U.S. agreed to divide the Japanese-controlled Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel. The Korean people wanted to throw off the Japanese and become united, but the second goal was only vaguely promised at Yalta. The assumption was that postwar amity between the USSR and US would lead to a reasonable solution at some indefinite future time. As the Cold War started, the two superpowers sponsored rival government, Communist in the North and anti-communist in the South. Given the fierce determination of Koreans to unite their homeland, a civil war was inevitable.

In the North, Kim Il Sung, leader of the Korean Communist party, came to power in 1945. His ruthless totalitarian regime crushed all opposition and promoted guerrilla warfare in the south.

Ruling the south was a right-wing government headed by Syngman Rhee, who had been converted to Christianity during his exile, and then earned a PhD in theology from Princeton. Although Rhee's authoritarian regime crushed pro-Communist uprisings, he did allow the emergence of a civil society in the south. That is, there were multiple independent sources of thought and power, like corporations, local businesses, universities and churches, in contrast to the north where the Communist party controlled all activity whatever, down to the neighborhood level.

Kim sought support from his two northern neighbors, Mao's China and Stalin's Soviet Union. At the time Washington considered both Mao and Kim to be Stalin's puppets; historians now see China as a largely independent actor, but Kim was heavily dependent on the Soviets. Until the release of many Soviet and Chinese documents in the 1990s, historians believed that Mao did not want war with the US, and intervened in Korea only when the onrushing UN armies appeared poised within weeks to cross the Yalu and begin rolling back Communism inside China. The new evidence clearly shows that Mao's highest goal was to drive capitalism/America out of Asia. China began preparations to enter Korea in July and August, 1950, well before the Inchon landings. Mao, who had just taken control of China needed to "save face"; he also feared counterrevolutionary forces inside China and wanted to fire up revolutionary ardor through a war. By encouraging anti-imperialistic revolutionary nationalism and socialist solidarity at home, he thought that intervention in Korea would help maintain the momentum and purity of his revolution within China.

Kim, Stalin and Mao were all committed to their own versions of aggressive, anti- western Marxist-Leninism. Kim was overconfident of success and afraid of falling hopelessly under Chinese influence, so he initially refused Chinese aid and would not openly share information with Beijing. He reversed course when his army collapsed and the UN invaded in October, 1950. Even so he repeatedly bickered with the Chinese regarding tactics, railroad use, negotiations with the enemy, and the makeup of the Korean-Chinese joint command structure, and the Soviets sometimes had to intervene to force an agreement.

Both Mao and Stalin were committed to revolution in Asia, and both concluded after America's failure to send troops into the Chinese Civil War that Washington would ignore an invasion of South Korea. Mao advised North Korean leaders that "solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small country.".

Military strengths

Most of the 20 million Koreans in the South and the 10 million in the North were subsistence farmers living in the western half of the peninsula. Travel was a chore in the west (except on the good railroad system), and quite difficult in the mountainous east. The industrial level was low and the people were extremely poor. Nevertheless Kim built a powerful military machine in the North.

The US Army considered the peninsula indefensible and, in line with severe budget restraints, removed its soldiers in 1949. It left small arms and ammunition behind for ROK, the new South Korean army, but no tanks, no warplanes and no medium or heavy artillery. The North Koreans were much better armed, having leftover Japanese weapons, and second-hand equipment sold them by Moscow. Frustrated that internal subversion had not toppled the anticommunist government in Seoul, Kim decided to invade.

North Korea invades

Kim ordered his NKPA (North Korean People's Army) to invade on June 25, 1950. Spearheading 9 divisions with 80,000 men were elite units with 100-150 excellent Soviet T-34 battle tanks, backed up by 100 aircraft. The South Koreans had only 100,000 soldiers (65,000 in combat roles) and little equipment. Moscow's military experts figured that the North had a 2:1 advantage over the South in troops, 2:1 in artillery; 7:1 in machine guns; 6.5:1 in tanks; and 6:1 in aircraft--ratios quite adequate for a successful conquest if South Korea received no American help.

The ROK generals were mediocre political appointees; it lost half its combat effectiveness quickly. The NKPA blitzkrieg burst through the four ROK divisions along the border, captured the capital of Seoul on the third day, and kept hurtling south. The North's generals lost communications with front line units because of inexperience and because they were moving unexpectedly fast. Kim expected that Koreans in the south would welcome his invaders and the Seoul regime would vanish overnight. He was wrong--the southerners resisted invasion as best they could, fled to regroup, and supported their government even as the invaders systematically identified and executed anti-communists. Kim, intent on unifying Korea on a Communist basis with himself in charge, apparently ignored the likelihood of UN condemnation and the possibility of American intervention--for example, he made few diplomatic overtures and did not bother to set up anti-aircraft defenses. The North Korean general staff quickly lost control of the battle, even though it was winning; (because its Russian advisors had done a poor job in establishing a command and communication system). The Communist divisions and regiments fought with enthusiasm, but made poor use of their artillery and tanks. These weaknesses would prove fatal once they opposed a real army.

U.S. and UN entry

President Harry S. Truman immediately asked General Douglas MacArthur, commander of American forces in Japan, Forces in the Far East, for his evaluation. MacArthur flew to South Korea on June 27. The same day Truman ordered MacArthur to provide air and naval support. MacArthur reported that the ROK (South Korean) forces were too weak to hold.

Truman was as surprised as everyone else but, remembering the dithering in the late 1930s that encouraged Hitler, he moved fast. Although there were no treaties involved, and the Pentagon advised against the use of ground forces, he declared that American ground soldiers would fight to save South Korea. He called it a "police action" and legally it was not a war. Truman decided not to ask Congress for a declaration of war or any other official approval--a political blunder that would later cost him dearly. He did go to the United Nations. The Soviet foreign ministry wanted to veto UN intervention, but Stalin--probably astonished that the US decided to resist--rejected the advice and insisted his delegate not take part in the Security Council decision. "We are not ready to fight," Stalin exclaimed. Officially the USSR remained neutral throughout the war. The Security Council then authorized a UN defense force to repel North Korean aggression and made the US and thus President Truman (as Commander in Chief), its agent to make all its military decisions. President Rhee gave control of his armed forces to the UN, and Truman named MacArthur to the UN command. "The buck stops here," Truman often said. He and Acheson made the decision to intervene under the assumption that Stalin was deliberately probing for weaknesses, and that any sort of appeasement or surrender to aggression would destroy America's credibility and leadership in Europe.

In the entire war the U.S. provided 50% of land, 86% of naval and 93% of UN air power; ROK forces came next, followed far behind by Britain, Turkey, Canada, Australia and ten other nations. Truman vetoed MacArthur's recommendation to use Nationalist Chinese troops and they played no role in the war. No one (especially not the Japanese) wanted an Imperial Japanese Army marching in Korea and so Japan's role was as a supplier and staging base, a function that helped reinvigorate the Japanese economy.

The containment policy of the Truman administration called for a military response to Communist military invasion, no matter how difficult conditions were. The American entry surprised the Communists; North Korea realized it was unequipped to handle the Americans.

On July 19, Truman asked Congress for an emergency defense appropriation of $11 billion. Truman, like Roosevelt before him in 1940, wanted 50,000 war planes built a year. Congress appropriated $8 billion for aircraft production for 1951.

Holding the Pusan perimeter

On July 1, an advance party of 440 American infantrymen from "Task Force Smith" landed in Korea with the mission of slowing the North Korean juggernaut; on July 5 they were overrun by NKPA tanks, with one third taken prisoner. The war would have many surprises in store for the Pentagon--which had been planning in terms of a global war. The Army's how-to-fight-a-war blueprint, Field Manual FM 100-5 (1949) explained the war strategy was for the US to employ its strategic bombers against an enemy's industrial capacity. Then airborne units would seize forward bases suitable for tactical bombers. Finally, after many months for buildup, training and shipment, heavy assault forces amply supplied with artillery and armor would invade the enemy homeland and force surrender. The Pentagon had ignored the possibility of a limited war in which critical targets were off limits, only a fraction of the nation's firepower could be used, and the goal was diplomatic advantage, not victory on the battlefield or conquest of an enemy nation.

Perhaps it did not matter, for the US was not ready to fight any kind of war in 1950. because there were only 110,000 combat troops in 10 understrength Army and Marine divisions; about the same as North Korea. Four of the combat divisions (comprising the "Eighth Army" under General Walton Walker) were nearby in Japan. Their mission had been to guarantee there would be no revival of Japanese militarism. Although most officers and NCOs had extensive combat experience, occupation duty had left them soft, overweight and unready for combat. Giving the excuse there were no open spaces, the divisions had completely neglected large formation training. Not expecting to fight anywhere, the Eighth had closed down its two corps headquarters, which were necessary for directing combat. Infantry regiments lacked their third (reserve) battalion. Only three tanks worked, and units had not trained with them. Equipment consisted of rusting World War II items hurriedly scrounged from supply dumps; salvage teams went to old Pacific battlefields like Iwo Jima to find replacement parts. Light bazooka shells that had bounced off German tanks were just as ineffective against Russian armor in Korea.

Advance units rushed to Korea were relentlessly pushed back by the NKPA. Some units fought well; however the 34th US Infantry Regiment fell apart and performed badly. The victors of World War II were being rolled back by a third rate army from a small impoverished country. Truman was forced to increase the draft, issuing a call for 50,000 men in September; they would not be ready for combat for many more months. The entire 33,000-member Marine Corps Reserves was called up in order to rebuild the First Marine Division for combat. The President risked public outrage when he decided not call up organized Army Reserve units, but rather to reactivate World War II veterans who had nominal membership in the "Inactive Reserves." MacArthur needed four National Guard divisions in December; Truman called them to federal service reluctantly because their involvement would affect communities across the land, and would necessitate Congressional approval. The unpreparedness forced Truman to fire his incompetent Defense Secretary, Louis Johnson, and recall the old workhorse retired General George Marshall from retirement. Marshall, aged 70 was long past his prime, but he answered the summons to duty and served as a figurehead, with his deputy (and successor) Robert Lovett in actual control.

Tactical air power

Outnumbered American and ROK troops had the mission to delay the enemy until reinforcements could arrive from Japan and the States. They fell back to a small perimeter around the port of Pusan, where their lines held firm. A critical factor was the US Far East Air Force (FEAF), commanded by George Stratemeyer. Tactical air power had been one of the decisive weapons of World War II, but it had been cut over 90% in size, a victim of very tight budgets and a commitment by top Air Force officials to a doctrine of strategic bombing. Fighter pilots were trained to gain air supremacy so the bombers could get through, not to undertake ground attacks on supply lines or soldiers. Worldwide the Air Force had 48 combat wings of which 30 were in FEAF. The main weapon comprised 365 Lockheed F-80 "Shooting Star" jet fighters, with a combat radius of only 225 miles, barely enough to cover South Korea. FEAF promptly seized air supremacy from the North Korean Air Force, and began systematic tactical bombing targeted at the enemy's long, vulnerable supply line. Hundreds of 1945-vintage P-51 Mustangs piston fighters (renamed "F-51") were taken from storage and shipped by carrier to FEAF. The most severe shortage was in photographic intelligence; no reserve units had been created to preserve this valuable wartime skill, and the upshot would prove to be a major disaster. Simultaneously, the US Navy blockaded the coast line and provided Navy, Marine and Royal Navy tactical air sorties from two carriers. Enemy forces had to hide during the daytime; they could only attack at night. MacArthur rushed in three more divisions, stabilizing the defense along the Naktong River on August 1; Pusan was safe. The Air Force relearned the techniques of tactical air power; together with Navy and Marine air forces they knocked out of action 50,000 invading troops, and over half of their tanks, trucks and artillery.

Inchon landing

The North Koreans, stretched thin, with very poor logistics, outnumbered, outgunned, and lacking an air force or navy, were highly vulnerable. MacArthur had far more soldiers and firepower in Korea than the enemy, plus complete air supremacy and unhindered logistics. He had no intention of merely holding a small enclave. He planned a masterstroke to win the war and roll back Communism throughout the peninsula. His plan was an amphibious invasion far behind the North Korean lines at Inchon on the west coast of South Korea, just west of the capital city of Seoul. He started planning a few days after the war began. Working closely with admirals who were masters at organizing amphibious landings, he and his chief of staff Major General Edward Almond hurriedly readied the First Marine Division for an invasion. MacArthur said his idea was for "a turning movement deep into the flank and rear of the enemy that would sever his supply lines and encircle all his forces south of Seoul."

The Inchon landing was an audacious scheme--not least because of the very high tides at Inchon--and it alarmed the Marine commanders and especially the top brass at the Pentagon. MacArthur's amazing personal persuasiveness converted the skeptics who met with him in Tokyo, but Washington still said no. The Chiefs of Staff were afraid something would go wrong, including J. Lawton Collins of the Army, Hoyt Vandenberg of the Air Force, and especially the weak and vacillating Chairman, Omar Bradley. Their careers had been defined by victory in huge land battles in Europe; they consequently underestimated the Navy and Marines, distrusted MacArthur, and were baffled by his thesis that Asia was just as vital to America's future as Europe. They had been reluctant to defend Korea in the first place. MacArthur received vigorous support from Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman, and finally won JCS approval for his bold plan to win the war outright.

MacArthur activated X Corps under General Almond to land at Inchon in "Operation CHROMITE". X Corps comprised 70,000 troops of the 1st Marine Division, and the 7th Army division (augmented by 8,600 Korean troops). Almond led 25,000 Marines and soldiers to a perfect landing on 15 September 1950; casualties were 200, with 21 killed. Inchon was immediately hailed as one of the most brilliant and decisive tactical moves in military history as X Corps rolled east over the few defenders and threatening to trap the main North Korean army. MacArthur quickly recaptured Seoul. The North Koreans, almost cut off, raced north; about 25,000 to 30,000 made it back.

The combat capability and logistics of the NKPA had already been ruined by air power; now it were in imminent danger of encirclement. Kim Il Sung, under the illusion that he was about to conquer the Americans at Pusan, kept up his hopeless attack. The Russians demanded he retreat and finally, after stalling a week, Kim turned his invaders north and desperately raced back home under the steady hail of bombs. He rescued his all-important political cadres, leaving behind nearly all their equipment and most of their soldiers. The Communists did defend Seoul, at least long enough to massacre thousands of civilian political enemies and delay the closing of the trap. 20,000 North Koreans made a last ditch stand in Seoul until they were killed or captured; the capital was recaptured on September 27. American and ROK troops reached the 38th parallel in early October. Just 90 days after the invasion the battle of South Korea was a smashing UN victory. Victory appeared to be in sight, as the Communists retreated pell mell and MacArthur's staff told of sending the men home by Christmas. The war, however, had just begun round three.

Rollback or containment?

The initial objective of Truman and his top advisor Secretary of State Dean Acheson was to repel the North Korean invasion, restore the Rhee regime, and contain Communism along the 38th parallel. Containment was the administration's main Cold War policy. However, after victory at Inchon, Truman and Acheson changed to "rollback" --that is expelling all Communist forces and unifying the peninsula, with elections to be held by the UN. In the State Department George F. Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff insisted that even though the USSR was behind the war, it was nevertheless a civil conflict and containment policy did not apply; Kennan was ignored. And UN forces raced north across the 38th, with official UN approval. MacArthur previously had suggested that Korea had little strategic importance; after Inchon he advocated unifying Korea through annihilating the North Korean army. After Chinese intervention Truman and Acheson reverted to a containment position, arguing rollback was now too expensive. However in early 1951, MacArthur proposed to continue the rollback strategy by cutting off Chinese reinforcements (by bombing their bases north of the Yalu River, inside China), and by using fresh soldiers on offer from the anti-Communist Chinese government in Taiwan. Truman, Acheson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected this plan as "the wrong war" -- that is, the real war was against the Soviets--and fired MacArthur when he kept up his advocacy.

Moving North

MacArthur put General Walton Walker in charge of the main US force, the 8th Army, and loaded Almond's X Corps for a landing at Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. Almond, who had commanded the all-black 92nd infantry division in Italy, worked vigorously to recruit Korean troops. Some ("KATUSA") were "Koreans Attached" directly to US Army companies. Others went into the reconstituted ROK I Corps (part of Eighth Army), which raced across the border on October 1 and liberated Wonsan. As the Marines landed on the Wonsan beaches, Bob Hope invited them to his big show that night--he had arrived overland with the fast-marching Korean army. In the west the Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel on October 9, two days after the UN authorized reunification of Korea. It raced north, capturing the enemy capital of Pyongyang and sending tens of thousands of prisoners to POW camps in the rear. On Nov 21 advance elements reached the Yalu River, which marked the border with China.

China's entry

As early as July 5, 1950, as American forces began arriving, Stalin recommended to Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai that China be ready to intervene with 9 divisions, and promised Soviet air support. China, fearful of a capitalist Korean state on its borders, warned neutral diplomats in India that it would intervene. Truman regarded the warnings as "a bald attempt to blackmail the UN". On October 15, 1950, Truman went to Wake Island in mid-Pacific for a short, highly publicized meeting with MacArthur. The CIA had previously told Truman that Chinese had the resources to intervene but was unlikely to do so. MacArthur, saying he was speculating, saw little risk. The general explained that the Chinese had lost their window of opportunity to help the invasion. He estimated the Chinese had 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria, with between 100,000-125,000 men along the Yalu; half could be brought across the Yalu River. But the Chinese had no air force; hence, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter." MacArthur basically assumed that Chinese wished to avoid heavy casualties. However Truman did not all MacArthur to fly reconnaissance planes over Chinese airspace north of the Yalu, and the thus the huge Chinese buildup was underestimated.

In Peking, Mao Tse Tung and his Communist high command were in a quandary. They had just defeated Chiang Kai-sheck's Nationalists, who been supported financially by the hated capitalistic Americans. Chiang had fled with several hundred thousand troops to the island of Formosa (Taiwan); the logical next step for Mao would be an invasion of Taiwan that would forever end the risk of an anti-communist comeback.Striving for international recognition, Mao was outraged that Chiang was allowed to keep China's seat in the UN. The failure of North Korea's invasion came as a shock; MacArthur's advances meant that hostile capitalistic forces would soon be on China's Yalu boundary, close to the industrial plants of Manchuria. If Korea became integrated into western capitalism, it would provide an alternative model of social and economic development that Communism would have great difficulty matching. Many Korean Communists had fought in the Chinese civil war, and the spirit of worldwide Communist solidarity mandated rescuing Kim. UN reassurances that no harm to China was intended, and that air and ground forces would not cross the Yalu proved irrelevant. Stalin washing hard for China's entry, promising munitions; Stalin said, however, that the Soviets were not yet ready to provide air cover. Mao could not tolerate any Americans anywhere in Korea; the peninsula had to be unified under Communist control. Sooner or later, Mao concluded, there would be war between China and the USA--so the question was where to fight: in Korea, in Formosa, in Vietnam? Korea, he decided, provided "the most favorable terrain, the closest communication to China, the most convenient material and manpower backup...and the most convenient way for us to get Soviet support." Peng Dehuai, slated to command the troops, helped sway the Politburo's devision to intervene.

The dangers to China were enormous: at best, severe damage to the economy and permanent American hostility, at worst an all-out war with the Yankee superpower that might terminate the fledgling Communist experiment. Washington misread Mao's intentions: it concluded that China was only bluffing, and failed to issue a stiff warning against intervention. Stalin had approved Kim's invasion beforehand, sold North Korea some munitions, provided military advisors, and helped mine the harbor at Wonsan. Russia also sold thousands of its best MIG-15 jets to the Chinese. Moscow strongly supported the war but was reluctant to become too directly engaged--Stalin feared the American Air Force. After the Americans landed at Inchon he ordered his air force to prepare to send combat units and ground support units to defend the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. He sent senior Russian generals to give advice to (or maybe take charge of) North Korea's faltering army. At a critical point in the first two weeks of October, 1950, with Chinese troops poised on the border but Beijing hesitating whether to unleash them, Stalin pushed Mao hard, saying a decisive entry now was the best way China could recover Taiwan and prevent Japan from militarizing. He claimed the U.S. was unprepared for a big war and even with its allies was weaker than the USSR and China. Stalin exhorted, "If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored." Stalin was willing to let China play the dominant role in Korea because it was too dangerous for the USSR.

In late September, a week or two after the Inchon landing, Mao had ordered 12 divisions ready to invade Korea. When Russia failed to provide the aviation that Stalin had promised, Mao realized his small air force would be unable to challenge America's devastating air superiority. His strategy was to endure the air attacks (including possible American raids on Chinese cities), and overwhelm MacArthur by 4-to-1 in ground combat soldiers, and (if Stalin provided the howitzers) by 3 to 2 in artillery. Stalin, though repeatedly urging Mao to attack, was late in providing the equipment; when it finally arrived,

Chinese policy

China's intervention proved a dreadful mistake; while there were no air raids on Chinese cities, China's "volunteers" suffered upwards of a million casualties. America was not driven out of Korea, the peninsula remained divided; China saw its economic development retarded for decades, and Mao became a pariah in the international community. Before entry into the war, the Chinese Communists had been working with millions of middle class merchants and managers to rebuild the war-torn domestic economy. Mao used the war emergency to impose a ruthless totalitarianism and execute millions of potential opponents (anyone who once had Western contacts, for example-- including many of the cultural and business leadership); Mao needed the war to consolidate power at home regardless of the risks. Washington, meanwhile, gave London something of a veto power over responses to China. Britain had sent some combat units troops at the UN's behest. Its main goal was to protect its colony in Hong Kong from seizure by China; for London, the Cold War had to be fought in Europe against the Soviet Union, not in Asia against China.

Chinese forces enter Korea

Undetected by UN intelligence, China slipped infiltrating some 300,000 of its best soldiers by mid-November; at night they crossed the six bridges spanning the Yalu; after late November they could walk across the frozen river. Supply dumps were a high priority in preparation for interdiction by UN air forces.

After the decision for war on October 13, 1059, Mao immediately sent 9 poorly armed divisions across the Yalu. In the next few months China sent about one million combat troops into Korea, plus another million soldiers to handle logistics, all backed up by large forces and supply bases in Manchuria. Casualties were heacy, and required a steady stream of replacements. North Korea rebuilt its army to about 340,000 soldiers. Thus 1.3 million Communist combat soldiers faced 280,000 American troops (only about one-third of whom were in combat roles) and 380,000 South Koreans, plus some Turkish, British and other Allied units. In terms of front-line combat soldiers, the Allies were outnumbered at least 4-1. (The Allies of course were backed by large American naval, air, ground and logistics forces based in nearby Japan.)

Chinese Tactics

Under the command of Marshal Peng Dehuai, the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) and NKPA troops launched 18 divisions (180,000 men) against 2 ROK and one US division, and threatened to envelop the Eighth Army. Their new tactic was moving very close up (so the Yanks would not call in air power), with a night-time human wave assault using hand grenades. The Chinese suffered extraordinary casualties, but replacements moved in and they attacked again the next night. UN soldiers were exposed "from hell to breakfast" along narrow roads at the bottom of mountain valleys. Suddenly instead of an easy rout of NKPA remnants, the war turned deadly serious. If the UN forces had taken the threat seriously and prepared some defenses, they could have held. However, everyone expected to go "home by Christmas" if they just finished the job quickly. MacArthur therefore had just launched new attacks, and his forces were in undefended positions and lacked a fallback plan.

Allied defeat

Surprised, stunned, and lacking adequate defensive positions, the UN forces fell back in disarray. Chinese intelligence reported that American "Infantrymen are weak, afraid to die, and haven't the courage to attack or defend. They depend on their planes, tanks and artillery....they are not familiar with night fighting or hand-to-hand combat." The ROK units crumbled, and the Eighth Army, outnumbered 2 to 1, could not hold. Unable to help or be assisted by X Corps, which was across the mountains, Eight Army began a 130-mile forced retreat that ended below Seoul. Casualties were moderate but morale had been shattered and the retreating units abandoned vast stores of supplies and weapons. In worse trouble was X Corps on the east, hit by an additional 120,000 soldiers in 12 Chinese divisions. Its ROK units also disintegrated, and it was nearly encircled at Chosin Reservoir. The bitterly cold November weather and heavy snow caused motors to freeze up and weapons to jam. Frostbite was common. (On the Chinese side, an amazing lack of winter gear or even blankets caused the loss of tens or even hundreds of thousands of soldiers.) Ordered to relieve pressure on the Eighth Army 50 miles to the west, 3,200 men of the 7th Infantry's Task Force MacLean counterattacked east of Chosin. To their horror, they crashed into the CCF Ninth Army Group, over 100,000 men strong. The task force was annihilated, with fewer than 400 survivors in one of the worst defeats ever suffered by an American unit. Many blamed Almond's brashness, tactical incompetence, and callousness, others said MacArthur was to blame for splitting his forces. The First Marine Division was surrounded by 8 divisions at Chosin and had to "attack in another direction," pausing only to evacuate 4,300 casualties by air. After a two-week retreat, X Corps reached safety, reporting some 700 dead, 3,300 wounded, 4,800 missing (most were captured), and 7,300 frostbite victims. The Navy then smoothly evacuated X Corps from Wonsan, moving 105,000 UN soldiers, 98,000 civilian refugees, 18,000 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies back to the west, where they became the Eighth Army reserve. At least this was not another Dunkirk or Bataan. MacArthur was given primary responsibility for the debacle, which reflected the downside possibility of his overoptimistic strategy. He thought the Chinese would behave like the Japanese he had demolished so easily in 1944-45; instead they fought like the Germans. He blamed the restrictions imposed by Washington. Some retreat was necessary in the face of the unexpected Chinese attack, but the UN forces fell back too far, and lost too much control; ROK divisions in particular crumbled away. Perhaps a strong defensive line could have been established north of Seoul, but Walker mistrusted the ROK divisions that anchored his right.

Ridgway holds and pushed back

When General Walker died in a jeep accident on December 23, 1950, General Matthew Ridgway, the operations manager for the war based at the Pentagon, flew in to take over the psychologically shattered Eighth Army. MacArthur remained theatre commander, but gave up all operational control. Ridgway, wearing a hand grenade on his uniform, had long complained that GIs nowadays were not up to World War II standards; in a dramatic turnaround, he rebuilt the morale of the UN forces. Ridgway realized the Chinese would not crumple up; they had to be outfought mile by mile, like the Germans he opposed in 1944-45. He stiffened morale and insisted on elemental tactics: like stay off the roads and control the ridges instead. In February and March, 1951, Ridgway launched counterattacks, aptly named "Operation Killer" and "Operation Ripper." Get nicer codenames, the Pentagon said. No, retorted Ridgway. "I am by nature opposed to any effort to 'sell' war to people as an only mildly unpleasant business that requires very little in the way of blood." Seoul, utterly devastated, changed hands a fourth time as UN forces reached near the 38th parallel, and the lines virtually froze in place in late May,

Attrition warfare

Ridgway's strategy was now attrition, with American technology pitted against Chinese manpower. Avoiding infantry combat, American forces relied on a vast artillery superiority (about 10-1), and heavy use of tactical airpower to cut the supply lines leading to the static battlefront. Chinese capabilities were strictly limited by its logistics problems. Although the Chinese traveled very light, they still needed 50 tons per day per division (compared to 600 tons for the Americans.) Their main supply dumps were just north of the Yalu River, and Washington gave strict orders that no warplanes were to cross that river, lest the war escalate out of control.

Air war

The Soviets now introduced their air force, painted in Chinese colors and flown from Chinese air bases by Russian pilots. Several hundred MIG-15 fighters, high-performance Soviet jets with a short range, based just north of the Yalu, provided the first significant Communist air power of the war. The swept-wing MIGs flew circles around the old Mustangs and were faster and more powerful than the straight-wing F-80s "Shooting Star" jets. The slower American jets however had better hydraulics (and so were more maneuverable), and had better cockpit designs (allowing the pilots to see better). This allowed the American pilots to race through their cycle of observation/orientation/decision/action faster than the Russians. Better training plus more sensitive controls and better vision gave the Americans an information advantage that overcame speed and power deficits. The Air Force rushed in 150 North American F-86 swept-wing Sabrejets. They proved slightly better aircraft than the MIGs and the much better trained American pilots quickly controlled the air. Much of the air-to-air combat occurred in "Mig Alley" in far northwest Korea, near the Manchuria airfields. UN pilots claimed 950 kills versus a loss of only 147, but there were many moments (especially in the fall of 1951) when it was feared the Chinese and Soviet enemy might gain air superiority. Three dozen aces--older men with World War II experience--accounted for a third of the kills. Flak downed 1,200 UN tactical bombers and other planes.

The UN air war was primarily one of interdiction of supplies. In defense, the Chinese proved remarkably adept at repairing bridges, and getting maximum advantage from their trucks and ox-carts. They sent in tens of thousands of porters, who every night hand carried 80-100 pound loads on poles or A-frames. (Humans were more efficient than oxen because they ate less and could hide more easily in the daytime.) Using this extremely labor-intensive, high-casualty system they could support 1,000,000 troops along the Yalu, 600,000 through Pyongyang (120 miles south of the Yalu), but only 300,000 at the 38th parallel (175 miles south) and fewer than 200,000 at their point of furthest advance 45 miles south of Seoul (250 miles below the Yalu). So frightening were the continuous UN air attacks that by the time enemy reinforcements reached the front line they were already suffering from combat fatigue. Consequently Ridgway's counterattacks pushed the CCF back to the 38th parallel and a bit further. Finally the Chinese reached equilibrium between its logistics capability and the number of casualties it was willing to endure to teach the Yankees a lesson. Ridgway's success was based on a restoration of morale, aggressive tactics, air supremacy, systematic interdiction of the enemy logistics system, very heavy use of artillery, and a good logistics system to supply UN forces.

Stalemate

Ridgway and Van Fleet had been selected for command because of their aggressiveness, and during the drawn out peace talks they demonstrated it. Instead of concentrating on logistics, bombers started targeting high value installations, like electric power generating plants, mines, and civilian population centers. The purpose was to make the enemy hurt enough to want to negotiate. Washington, however, refused to allow any attacks on Chinese territory. The ground war had come to resemble the static Western Front of World War I, with both sides dug in and very little movement. The Americans aggressively sent out several thousand patrols a week along its narrow (125-mile) front. Van Fleet increasingly substituted massive artillery barrages for infantry attacks. The Communists went underground in literal fashion to avoid the continuous UN air and artillery barrages. Air raid shelters, command posts, communication links, supply dumps, barracks, even civilian agencies and munitions factories were built into caves and hillsides. Both sides used massive amounts of artillery, which generated a steady stream of casualties. Much more frightful were the battles for specific hills, like Heartbreak Ridge and Pork Chop Hill. They lacked any strategic value, but if the other side attacked they had to be recaptured else prestige would be lost--it was like Verdun (1916) on a mercifully smaller scale. At Heartbreak Ridge in the fall of 1951, the US 2nd Infantry Division blasted away with 700,000 rounds of artillery and mortar shells (not to mention 842 close air support sorties). It suffered 3,700 casualties (half of them by the French battalion), compared to an estimated 25,000 Chinese killed or wounded. while It became common practice for all the artillery of a division (72 guns) to fire in support of a twelve-man patrol. The Battle of Pork Chop Hill in spring 1953 was just as bloody, and just as pointless.

Public opinion

Twenty months of useless stalemate had zero impact on the peace talks, but did produce 36,000 Americans killed. Before they decided to intervene, the Chinese had predicted, "A prolonged war of attrition will naturally increase the difficulties of the Korean people but it will increase the difficulties of the American imperialists much more." Indeed, public opinion did not support a war of attrition with no clear goal other than the hazy one of containment, and Truman was forced out of the presidential race in 1952. "Korea has become a meat grinder of American manhood," lamented one of one Democrats. Eisenhower, by promising to go to Korea personally to solve the stalemate, easily won the mandate from a frustrated electorate.

In the view of public opinion, especially after 1970, the true heroes were the doctors and nurses of the division-level evacuation hospitals and the new corps-level Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH). While the M*A*S*H film of 1970 and the television characters voiced cynical antiwar sentiments more appropriate to the Vietnam era, the MASH units did indeed save many lives because of their immediate surgical care of wounded soldiers. Medical care, always a long suit of the US military, continued to improve. In World War II 28% of wounded soldiers died; now it was only 22%. Because of advances in medicine and vascular surgery, amputation was far less necessary as a treatment for wounds. No American died from gangrene. Battle fatigue cases were not sent to rear area hospitals, but were treated (psychologically) at regimental clearing stations with hot food, hot showers, and rest. The recovery rate was much higher than a decade before. The most dramatic medical advance was the helicopter, which was 26 experimental in 1950 and in 1951 became a critical device for speedy evacuation to MASH units. The average evacuation time was only five hours. Serious cases required treatment in the States; 43,000 casualties were evacuated by air across the Pacific. 85% of the wounded returned to duty. For the entire war, 33,400 Americans were killed in battle or died of wounds, another 21,000 died of accidents or disease, and 103,000 were wounded. The Army suffered 75% of these casualties, the Marines 23%. UN allies suffered about 1,800 killed and 7,000 wounded. The ROK suffered about 59,000 dead and 290,000 wounded. Communists still keep their casualties secret, but probably amounted to about one half million dead and 1 million wounded.

US Politics

The war had reached a stalemate. MacArthur said he could defeat the Chinese by hitting their base camps, airfields and supply dumps in Manchuria, preferably with tactical atomic bombs. The British were aghast--Prime Minister Clement Atlee rushed to Washington and got Truman to promise that no nuclear weapons would be used. MacArthur's repeated requests for permission to win the war caused a political crisis in Washington. Finally Truman, after securing reluctant consent from the JCS, fired MacArthur on April 11 and replaced him at theater commander with Ridgway. Command of the Eighth Army went to James Van Fleet, a combat veteran from Europe and most recently a key figure in defeating the Communists in the Greek civil war. MacArthur returned home (for the first time since 1937) and took his case to the public. Large majorities blamed Truman for the overall failure in Korea and treated the returning general as a superhero. A "Great Debate" ensued in the halls of Congress, as the Senate heard extended testimony. MacArthur blasted defeatism in Washington, arguing that Communism had to be and could be defeated on the battlefield. The future of Asia was critical to the United States. "There can be no substitute for victory."

Administration spokesmen tried to minimize the damage to Truman by blaming the nation's troubles on MacArthur's oversized ego; they blamed the Chinese intervention on MacArthur's failure to predict it; they insisted that the Korean war was merely a diversion engineered by Stalin to distract Americans from the main arena, Western Europe. Since the status quo ante had been achieved (i.e. South Korea was safe) and containment was a reality, it was time to disengage, said Truman supporters, while holding together the NATO alliance. Fighting China, General Bradley told the country, would be "The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy." The right war he implied (but did not say) would be fought in Europe against the Soviet Union in a few years. The debate became a defining moment in the Cold War. The Republican conservatives, lead by Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft, discarded their isolationism and made a 180° turn to support MacArthur and his plans for a rollback of Asiatic Communism. Truman's supporters, on the other hand, abandoned their previous near-unanimous support for rollback (their position as late as November, 1950) and called instead for a policy of containment. The Pentagon secretly calculated that reconquest of the north would require eight new Arny divisions and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Holding the line at the 38th parallel, interposing the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits, comprised the containment of both Korea and China. (To contain China on the south, the Truman Administration decided to help the French defend Indochina.) The Democratic party became inextricably committed to a policy of containment, and opposition to rollback--a commitment whose meaning would unfold in Vietnam in the 1960s and ruin the party's chances of winning the presidency.

In 1952 Truman, after losing the New Hampshire primary, ended his reelection campaign. General Dwight D. Eisenhower defeated the anti-war isolationist Robert A. Taft for the Republican nomination, and electrified the country by promising, "I shall go to Korea," -- that is he would end the war. In his farewell address on January 15, 1953, Truman said:

"In Korea our men are fighting as valiantly as Americans have ever fought—because they know they are fighting in the same cause of freedom in which Americans have stood ever since the beginning of the Republic. . . . Now, once in a while I get a letter from some impatient person asking, Why don’t we get it over with? Why don’t we issue an ultimatum—make all-out war, drop the atomic bomb? For most Americans, the answer is quite simple: we are not made that way. We are a moral people. Peace is our goal, with justice and freedom."

Eisenhower, however, threatened to use nuclear weapons unless the Chinese came to terms, which they did. An armistice was signed by North Korea, the United States, and China on July 27, 1953, and remains in effect in 2008.

33,629 American soldiers were killed in action on the battlefield in the Korean War, mostly by Chinese—not North Korean—divisions. 110,000 Americans were wounded or missing-in-action. The UN forces lost 60,371. The U.S. Army estimate of enemy killed exceeded one million, the majority Chinese troops. The war-torn landscape of the Korean peninsula, after three years of ground fighting and saturation bombardment by American air power, was in ruins.

Armistice

The final challenge was to settle the war. With the two armies stalemated along a line that was quite close to the original 38th parallel, peace seemed within reach; formal negotiations opened in July, 1951. Astonishingly, the talks dragged on for two years. The obstacle involved 112,000 North Korean and 20,000 Chinese prisoners of war held by the UN. On tense occasions at the front lines, American combat soldiers might shoot an enemy trying to surrender. That always happens in warfare; the vast majority of enemy prisoners were well treated. It was UN policy (dictated of course by Truman) that all prisoners should have the option of declining repatriation to their homeland. The goal was to demonstrate the superior appeal of the West, and to avoid a repeat of the horrible fiasco of 1945 when the Allies liberated hundreds of thousands of Soviet POWs held by Germany and forcibly sent back to Stalin, who executed most of them. In 1951 50,000 Communist prisoners held by the Allies rejected repatriation home, a humiliating result China could not accept. The UN policy therefore produced an usually costly stalemate, as 12,000 additional GIs died in battle and five thousand more rotten in POW camps waiting for a solution. (10,200 American had been captured, of whom only 3,700 survived the war). The North Koreans had a cruel policy; they killed prisoners whenever convenient. Most of the surviving Americans were taken by the Chinese, who treated prisoners exactly like their own soldiers--that is, with a severe shortage of food, medicine, clothing, heat, and protection from air raids. The Chinese saw the prisoners as propaganda assets, and attempted to brainwash them into confessions of guilt and recognition of the superiority of Communism. A few were brainwashed, causing a firestorm of criticism regarding the "softness" of American schools. Finally in 1953, after President Eisenhower warned China he might use tactical nuclear weapons, the armistice was signed and the prisoners exchanged,

Bibliography

<-- keep bibliography here until it is finished; then move to bibl page. RJ -->

Overview and reference

• Edwards, Paul M. The A to Z of the Korean War. (2005). 305 pp. historical dictionary; also published as Korean War Almanac (2006)
• Halliday, Jon and Bruce Cumings. Korea: The Unknown War (1988); hostile to US & ROK; well illustrated
• Heller, Francis H. ed. The Korean War (1977)
• James, D. Clayton with Anne Sharp Wells, Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953 (1993)
• Malkasian, Carter. The Korean War (Essential Histories) (2001), brief summary excerpt and text search
• Matray, James I. Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (1991), the nest encyclopedia on political, biographical, and non-US subjects
• Millett, Allan R. The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning (2005), major history by leading scholar excerpt and text search
• Sandler, Stanley. The Korean War (1995), the best encyclopedia on military-operational-weaponry subjects
• Sandler, Stanley. "The Korean War: An Interpretive History," in Richard Jensen et al., eds. Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe and Asia in the Twentieth Century (2003) excerpt and text search; also complete edition online
• Sandler, Stanley. [The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (1999) excerpt and text search
• Summers, Harry G. Korean War Almanac (1990), not fully reliable
• Tucker, Spencer C. et al. Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History (3 vol; 2002 also one-vol edition) the best reference source; 600 entries; vol 3 contains primary documents
• Varhola, Michael J. Fire and Ice: The Korean War, 1950-1953, (2000) excerpt and text search

Koreas

• Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, (1981), ISBN 0-691-10113-2; The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, Princeton University Press, 1990, ISBN 0-691-07843-2, prewar; stress on internal Korean politics
• Lankov, Andrei, and A. N. Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960 (2002) excerpt and text search</ref>
• Zhihua, Shen. "Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution During the Korean War." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 2003-2004 (14-15): 9-24. online edition

Diplomacy and national policy

• Chen, Jian. China's Road to the Korean War (1995) excerpt and text search
• Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, (1981), ISBN 0-691-10113-2; The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, Princeton University Press, 1990, ISBN 0-691-07843-2, prewar; stress on internal Korean politics
• Dingman, Roger. "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War." International Security 13 (1988-89)
• Foot, Rosemary. The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (1985)
• Foot, Rosemary. A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (1990).
• Foot, Rosemary, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," Diplomatic History 15 (Summer 1991): 411-31
• Goncharov, Sergei, John Lewis, and Litai Xue. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (1993)
• Hu, Wanli. "Mao's American Strategy and the Korean War." PhD dissertation U. of Massachusetts 2005. 247 pp. DAI 2005 66(2): 716-717-A. DA3163675 Fulltext: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses
• Hunt, Michael H. "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 107, No. 3 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 453-478 in JSTOR
• Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges In Crisis, Credibility And Command (1996)
• Malkasian, Carter. Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Journal of Military History 2004 68(3): 911-942. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: Project Muse
• Matray, James I. "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," The Journal of American History, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Sep., 1979), pp. 314-333 in JSTOR
• Roe, Patrick C. The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June-December 1950 (2000). 466 pgs. online edition
• Shen, Zhihua. "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East," Journal of Cold War Studies Volume 2, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp. 44-68 in Project Muse
• Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (1959).
• Stairs, Denis. The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (1974), esp ch 4 on containing America's militarism
• Stueck, William. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (2004) excerpt and text search
• Stueck, William. The Korean War (1997) excerpt and text search
• Stueck, William, ed. The Korean War in World History (2004) excerpt and text search
• Whiting, Allen. China Crosses the Yalu (1960), out of date
• Wilkinson, Mark F., ed. The Korean War at Fifty: International Perspectives. (2004). 297 pp.

Domestic politics

• Bernstein, Barton J. "The Truman Presidency and the Korean War," in Michael James Lacey, ed. The Truman Presidency (1989) pp 410-43 online edition
• Caridi, Ronald James. "The G.O.P. and the Korean War." Pacific Historical Review 1968 37(4): 423-443. Issn: 0030-8684 in Jstor
• Casey, Steven. Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953 (2008)
• Donnelly, William M. "'The Best Army That Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances': the U.S. Army, July 1951-July 1953." Journal of Military History 2007 71(3): 809-847. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: Ebsco

Intelligence

• Knight, Peter G. "'MacArthur's Eyes': Reassessing Military Intelligence Operations in the Forgotten War, June 1950-April 1951." PhD dissertation Ohio State U. 2006. 443 pp. DAI 2007 67(7): 2722-A. DA3226313 Fulltext: ProQuest Dissertations & Theses

Biographies and memoirs

• Domes, Juergen, Peng Teh-huai (1985), Chinese commander
• James, D. Clayton. Years of MacArthur vol 3, 1945-64 (1985), the major scholarly biography
• Leitich, Keith. Shapers of the Great Debate on the Korean War: A Biographical Dictionary (2006) covers Americans only
• Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War (1986) memoir by US ground commander excerpt and text search

Ground operations

• Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961); official US Army history of fighting in 1950 online edition
• Appleman, Roy E.. East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea (1987); Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950 (1987) excerpt and text search; Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (1989); Ridgway Duels for Korea (1990). narrative and analysis of combat operations
• Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War (1988), revisionist study that attacks senior American officials
• Farrar-Hockley, General Sir Anthony. The British Part in the Korean War, HMSO, (1995), 528 pp, official British history ISBN 0-11-630962-8
• Flint, Roy K. "Task Force Smith and the 24th Division." in Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft eds. America's First Battles: 1776-1965 (1986), 266-99. A wide-ranging look at the Army and its weak fighting ability in 1950.
• Halberstam, David. The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War, (2007), oral histories excerpt and text search
• Hamburger, Kenneth E. Leadership in the Crucible: The Korean War Battles of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-Ni. (2003). 257 pp. excerpt and text search
• Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front (1966) Official US Army history of 1951-53, including combat and truce talks. online edititom
• Hastings, Max. The Korean War (1987), 416pp; British perspective excerpt and text search
• Johnston, William. A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea (2003).
• Knox, Donald. The Korean War, An Oral History (1985) excerpt and text search
• Korea Institute of Military History. The Korean War (3 vol 2000); highly detailed narrative; official South Korean history excerpt and text search
• Marshall, S.L.A. The River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces, November, 1950 in the Battle of Chongchon River, Korea (1953) based on after-action intervierws
• Millett, Allan R. Their War for Korea: American, Asian, and European Combatants and Civilians, 1945–1953. (2003). 310 pp. excerpt and text search
• Montross, Lynn et al., History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, 5 vols. (1954–72),
• Mossman, Billy C. Ebb and Flow: November 1950 - July 1951 (1990), good official US Army history online edition
• Russ, Martin. Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950 (2000), 464 pages, ISBN 0-14-029259-4 excerpt and text search
• Schnabel, James W. U.S. Army in the Korean War: Policy and Directions: The First Year (1972), official US Army history, focused on Pentagon online edition
• Stolfi, Russel H. S. "A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted." Journal of Military History 2004 68(2): 505-525. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: Project Muse argues Germans did a better job in a comparable campaign in the Baltic in 1941
• Watson, Brent Byron. Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953. 2002. 256 pp.

Air and sea operations; logistics

• Futrell, Robert Frank et al. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (1961), the best military analysis
• Hallion, Richard. The Naval Air War in Korea (1986)
• Huston, James A. Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War (1989)
• Werrell, Kenneth P. Sabres over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea. (2005). 318 pp.

Soldiers, prisoners, medical

• Bardbury, William C. et al. Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity: The Communist Soldier in the Korean War (1968)
• Biderman, Albert D. March to Calumny (1963), best on US POWs; rebuts charges (made by Eugene Kinkead) that 1/3 collaborated
• Cowdrey, Albert E. The Medics' War (GPO, 1987)
• Crane, Conrad C. "'No Practical Capabilities': American Biological and Chemical Warfare Programs During the Korean War," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 45.2 (2002) 241-249, shows the US did not develop biological weapons in Project Muse
• Hanson, Thomas E. "America's First Cold War Army: Combat Readiness in the Eighth US Army, 1949-1950." PhD dissertation Ohio State U. 2006. 224 pp. DAI 2007 67(7): 2721-A. DA3226301 in ProQuest Dissertations & Theses
• Kindsvatter, Peter S. American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. (2003). 472 pp.
• Witt, Linda, et al. A Defense Weapon Known to Be of Value: Service Women of the Korean War Era. (2005). 320 pp.
• Wubben, H. H. "American Prisoners of War in Korea." American Quarterly 22 (1970)

Historiography

• Armstrong, Charles K. "Divided Korea at Sixty." History Compass 2005 3(Asia). Issn: 1478-0542 Fulltext: [[Blackwell Synergy] considers how Korea became divided; the causes and conduct of the Korean War; the reasons for Korea's continued division; and in particular the nature and survivability of the North Korean regime.
• Brune, Lester H. The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research, (1996) 464 pp.; comprehensive annotated guide to the scholarly literature online edition
• Millett, Allan R. "A reader's guide to the Korean War," The Journal of Military History Jul 1997 Vol. 61 No. 3; pp. 583+, summarizes the main books and arguments
• Millett, Allan R. "The Korean War: A 50 Year Critical Historiography," Journal of Strategic Studies 24 (March 2001), pp. 188-224.
• Stueck, William. "The Korean War As History: David Rees' Korea: The Limited War In Retrospect," Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International History (1998) online edition

Fiction, film and memory

• Diffrient, David Scott. "'Military Enlightenment' for the Masses: Generic and Cultural Intermixing in South Korea's Golden Age War Films," Cinema Journal 45, Number 1, Fall 2005, pp. 22-49 in Project Muse
• Edwards, Paul M. To Acknowledge a War: The Korean War in American Memory (2000) excerpt and text search
• Edwards, Paul M. A Guide to Films on the Korean War (1997) excerpt and text search
• Lentz, Robert J. Korean War Filmography: 91 English Language Features through 2000. (2003). 496 pp.
• McCann, David R. "Our Forgotten War: The Korean War in Korean and American Popular Culture," in Philip West, Steven I. Levine, and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory (1998)

Primary sources

• Cold War International History Project Virtual Archive 2.0: The Korean War
• Bassett, Richard M. And the Wind Blew Cold: The Story of an American POW in North Korea. (2002). 117 pp.
• Bin Yu and Xiaobing Li, eds Mao's Generals Remember Korea (2001), 328 pages, ISBN 0-7006-1095-2
• Hershberg, James G., ed. "Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950-53." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 2003-2004 (14-15): 369-383. Issn: 1071-9652 online edition
• Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War (1967).
• Peters, Richard and Li, Xiaobing, eds. Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers. (2004). 291 pp. excerpt and text search
• Zhihua, Shen. "Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution During the Korean War." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 2003-2004 (14-15): 9-24. online edition

External links

• Bibliography
• maps (not copyright)
• US Navy photos (not copyright)
• US Naval Institute, oral histories and photographs
• maps (not copyright)
• Korean War Educator, many topics covered
• Marine Corps and Korean War

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