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'''The Korean War''' (1950-53) was a major [[Cold War]] military clash fought up and down the peninsula of Korea, finally leading to a stalemate in 1950 that restored the boundaries to nearly what they were at the start, along the 38th parallel. The Communist states of North Korea, China and the Soviet Union were arrayed against South Korea, supported by the United States and a multinational United Nations force. The war began with an invasion by North Korea in June 1950, followed by unexpected American and UN entry. North Korean forces had pushed the South Koreans and Americans back into a small perimeter when, in September 1950, an amphibious landing at Inchon turned the tide. The North Korean army disintegrated as the allies moved north, with UN approval, to unify the country. Unexpectedly the Chinese then sent in large numbers of infantry, and in the bitter cold of November-January 1950-51 pushed the UN forces out of the north. Communist supply lines were fragile, especially in the face of heavy American bombing, so the lines stabilized close to the 38th parallel in 1951. Two more years of static warfare followed, with the issue of returning reluctant Communist prisoners of war held by the UN the major sticking point. Finally an armistice was reached in summer 1953' the prisoners were exchanged and fighting ended in an uneasy truce that continues into 2008.


The '''Korean War''' has been called America’s “forgotten war”, neglected on the timeline between the twin cataclysms of World War II and Vietnam. <ref name=O'Neill-p110> {{citation
The war was limited in size and scope but casualties were heavy on both sides. In the U.S. political reverberations helped cause the fall of the Truman administration and his Democratic party in the landslide election of General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], the Republican candidate who promised to end the war.  For Americans it is a “forgotten war”, neglected on the timeline between the twin cataclysms of World War II and Vietnam. <ref> O’Neill, William L., ''American High: The Years of Confidence 1945-1960'' (1989), p. 110; Halberstam, David, ''The Fifties'' (1993), p. 73; Alexander, Charles C., ''Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era 1952-1961'' (1976), p. 48.</ref>  
| author = O’Neill, William L.
==Background==
| title = American High: The Years of Confidence 1945-1960
Historically an independent nation, Korea had been seized by Japan in 1910 and cruelly treated as a colony. The Koreans came to hate the Japanese violently, and were overjoyed at their liberation by Soviet and American soldiers in September, 1945. The division of Korea was set at the [[Yalta Conference]] in February 1945, when the Societs and Americans agreed to divide the Japanese-controlled Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel. The Korean people wanted to throw off the Japanese and become united, but the second goal was only vaguely promised at Yalta. The two superpowers sponsored rival government, Communist in the North and anti-communist in the South. Given the fierce determination of Koreans to unite their homeland, a civil war was inevitable. In the North, [[Kim Il Sung]], leader of the Korean Communist party, came to power in 1945. His ruthless totalitarian regime crushed all opposition and promoted guerrilla warfare in the south.  
| publisher = The Free Press
| year = 1989
| page = 110}}</ref>
<ref name=Halberstam-50s-p73>{{citation
| author = Halberstam, David
| title = The Fifties
| publisher = Fawcett Columbine
| year = 1993
| page = 73}}</ref>
<ref name=Alexander-p48>{{citation
| author = Alexander, Charles C.
| title = Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era 1952-1961
| publisher = Indiana University Press
| year = 1976
| page =48}}</ref> The stage for war was set back in the late summer of 1945, when the White House and the Kremlin agreed on a demarcation line (38° N latitude) dividing Korea into two halves, with the Communist Russians controlling the North and the United States acting as policeman for the Republic in the South. Following this agreement, the superpowers ceased to concern themselves much with the country of Korea. In 1948 and 1949 both Russia and America withdrew the majority of their forces from Korea.<ref name=Halberstam-50s-p65>{{citation
| author = Halberstam, David
| title = The Fifties
| publisher = Fawcett Columbine
| year = 1993
| page = 65}}</ref>
[[Image:BaseMapOfKorea.jpg|left|thumb|Map of the divided Korea]]
The United States was committed to a [[containment strategy]] for the [[Cold War]], based on the concepts of [[George Kennan]].
==Origins==
[[Douglas MacArthur]] did not assume he would defend Korea in the event of an invasion of the South; he saw his responsibility as defending Japan, Okinawa, and the Marianas, as well as the sea and air approaches to this area.  This was not opposed to the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], who, in January 1948, told the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), roughly the first level below the [[National Security Council]], in January 1948, that withdrawing U.S. occupation troops in Korea would lead to Communist domination. Since it still was intended to withdraw the U.S. forces, what was seen as Soviet control was inevitable. Establishing a ROK "constabulary" would merely delay the inevitable. The JCS saw Korea as totally wrong from a strategic and operational standpoint; it would be fighting in a place where all the advantages would be those of the adversary. On 4 April 1948, the President approved a policy saying <blockquote>The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a 'casus belli' for the United States.</blockquote>
The last U.S. tactical units were out of South Korea in 1949, leaving only advisors. MacArthur had no further reponsibility for defending Korea, with no troops there.  <ref name=Schnabel>{{citation
| title = United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: the First Year
| first = James F. | last = Schnabel
| publisher = Center for Military History, U.S. Department of the Army
| date = 1972
| url = http://www.history.army.mil/books/P&D.HTM}}</ref>


In mid-1949, [[Army Chief of Staff]] [[Omar Bradley]]  suggested taking the Korean question again to the National Security Council, before the last U.S. troops left. He feared that U.S. withdrawal might be followed by an invasion from the north. His recommendation was to withdraw U.S. nationals in the event of an invasion, present the matter to the [[United Nations Security Council]]. Bradley suggested a United Nations military force might be the last resort.
Ruling the south was a right-wing government headed by [[Syngman Rhee]], who had been converted to Christianity during his exile, and then earned a PhD in theology from Princeton. Although Rhee's authoritarian regime crushed pro-Communist uprisings, he did allow the emergence of a civil society in the south. That is, there were multiple independent sources of thought and power, like corporations, local businesses, universities and churches, in contrast to the north where the Communist party controlled all activity whatever, down to the neighborhood level.  


==Failure to anticipate==
Kim sought support from his two northern neighbors, Mao's China and Stalin's Soviet Union. At the time Washington considered both Mao and Kim to be Stalin's puppets; historians now see them as largely independent actors.<ref> Until the release of many Soviet and Chinese documents in the 1990s, historians believed that Mao did not want war with the US, and intervened in Korea only when the onrushing UN armies appeared poised to cross the Yalu and begin rolling back Communism inside China. The new evidence clearly shows that Mao's highest goal was to drive capitalism/America out of Asia. He began preparations to enter Korea in July and August, 1950, well before the Inchon landings. Chen Juin in CWIHP 6-7 p 41 (1996). The older view is expressed in Whiting (1960)</ref>  
Failure to anticipate the attack on the South was a failure of the CIA and State departments, which had responsibility for Korean affairs. The State department had announced that Korea stood outside the American defensive perimeter, and the Pentagon had not been ordered to prepare for a war there.
  However, all were committed to their own versions of aggressive, anti- western Marxist-Leninism. Both Mao and Stalin were committed to revolution in Asia, and both concluded after America's failure to send troops into the Chinese Civil War that Washington would ignore an invasion of South Korea. Mao advised North Korean leaders that "solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small country.".<ref> CWIHP #6-7 win 1995/6 p 39, 12 May 1950 from Soviet ambassador to NK.</ref>
The CIA in July 1949 labelled North Korea as a Soviet "puppet", and warned in October 1949 that a  North Korean attack on the South is ''possible'' citing evidence of road improvements towards the border and troop movements there. <ref name=Rose>{{citation
  | title = Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950: Perceptions and Reality
| author = Rose, P.K.
| journal = Studies in Intelligence
| url = https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/fall_winter_2001/article06.html
}}</ref>


After repeated pleas by Kim il-Sung, who was equipped with offensive tanks, planes and artillery by the Soviets, the key decisions were made in Moscow and Beijing to allow the invasion to take place. Mao Zedong was initially reluctant while Stalin promised Soviet aid.


==A surprise attack==
==Early Movements==
In hindsight, there were warnings, in May-June 1950, of a potential attack in the near future. On 10 May, the South Korean Defense Ministry publicly warned at a press conference that DPRK troops were massing at the border and there was danger of an invasion...Throughout June, intelligence reports from South Korea and the CIA provide clear descriptions of DPRK preparations for war. These reports noted the removal of civilians from the border area, the restriction of all transport capabilities for military use only, and the movements of infantry and armor units to the border area. Also, following classic Communist political tactics, the DPRK began an international propaganda campaign against the ROK ''police state.'' <ref name=NSA-Korea />


The U.S. had much smaller forces than in the Second World War. "In June 1950, the strength of the active Army stood at about 591,000 and included ten combat divisions. About 360,000 troops were stationed within the zone of the interior (ZI). The remaining 231,000 were disposed in overseas commands, most of them performing occupation duties. The largest group overseas (about 108,500) was located in the Far East..."<<ref name=Schnabel />
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of American Forces in the Far East, and seventy years old at the time, was ordered to sort out the problem. MacArthur, headquartered in Toyko, flew to South Korea on June 27. The Eighth U.S. Army in Japan was on the way by June 30. The Americans would help defend South Korea from the Communist invaders. President Truman deemed America’s effort a “police action”. It would be the first time in the post-World War II environment that America would fight communism directly, on the field.
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Location
! Strength
|-
| Zone of the Interior (USA)
| 360,000
|-
| Far East
| 108,500
|-
| Other overseas
| 122,500
|}


On 6 June, CIA informed U.S. policymakers that all East Asian senior Soviet diplomats were recalled to Moscow for consultations. Unfortunately, it was assumed this was to consult about a  new plan to counter anti-Communist efforts in the region. On 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report, based primarily on HUMINT, concluding that the DPRK had the capability to invade the South at any time. President [[Harry S Truman]], [[United States Secretary of State]] [[Dean Acheson]], and [[United States Secretary of Defense]] [[Louis Johnson]] all received copies of this report. <ref name=Rose />
On June 25, 1950, [[Kim Il Sung]], the leader of Communist North Korea, sent troops of the North Korea People’s Army (NKPA) across the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea, heading toward its capital, Seoul. According to historian David Halberstam, “South Korea became important only after the North Korean Communists struck in the night; its value was psychological rather than strategic—the enemy had crossed a border.”<ref> Halberstam, ''Fifties'', p. 62; see also O’Neill, ''American High'', p. 125.</ref>
MacArthur's headquarters "learned of the attack six and one-half hours after the first North Korean troops crossed into South Korea. The telegram bearing the news from the Office of the Military Attaché in Seoul reported:
  Fighting with great intensity started at 0400, 25 June on the Ongjin
  Peninsula, moving eastwardly taking six major points; city of Kaesong
  fell to North Koreans at 0900, ten tanks slightly north of Chunchon,
  landing twenty boats approximately one regiment strength on east
  coast reported cutting coastal road south of Kangnung; Comment: No
  evidence of panic among South Korean troops.
A message ninety minutes later gave confirmation. General MacArthur immediately informed Washington and, within a few hours, sent the first comprehensive situation report on the Korean fighting."<ref name=Schnabel />
===Early Response===
General [[Douglas MacArthur]], Commander of American Forces in the Far East, and seventy years old at the time, was ordered to sort out the problem. MacArthur, headquartered in Toyko, flew to South Korea on June 27. The Eighth U.S. Army in Japan was on the way by June 30. The Americans would help defend South Korea from the Communist invaders. President Truman deemed America’s effort a “police action”. It would be the first time in the post-World War II environment that America would fight communism directly, on the field.
===The Search for Resources===
In Washington, D.C. on July 19, President Truman asked Congress to approve an emergency defence appropriation of $11 billion. Truman, like Roosevelt before him in 1940, wanted 50,000 war planes built a year. Congress appropriated $8 billion for aircraft production for 1951.<ref> Cunningham, “Location of the Aircraft Industry in 1950”, in Simonson, G. R. (ed.), ''The History of The American Aircraft Industry'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 206. ; John S. Day, “Accelerating Aircraft Production in the Korean War”, in Simonson, ''American Aircraft Industry'', p. 223.</ref>
In Washington, D.C. on July 19, President Truman asked Congress to approve an emergency defence appropriation of $11 billion. Truman, like Roosevelt before him in 1940, wanted 50,000 war planes built a year. Congress appropriated $8 billion for aircraft production for 1951.<ref> Cunningham, “Location of the Aircraft Industry in 1950”, in Simonson, G. R. (ed.), ''The History of The American Aircraft Industry'' (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 206. ; John S. Day, “Accelerating Aircraft Production in the Korean War”, in Simonson, ''American Aircraft Industry'', p. 223.</ref>


===Early intelligence analysis===
On September 15, 1950, General MacArthur led a victorious assault on the port of Inchon on the west coast of South Korea, just west of the capital city. This victory finally broke the momentum of the North, which had maintained the upper hand in combat during July and August. The Americans routed the enemy then marched east into Seoul, subduing the invaders by September 27. The Americans had the North Koreans on the run. The war looked set to come to a quick end as the Communists were retreating back above the 38th parallel. But President Truman made a fateful decision which led to the war dragging on for two more years. He gave MacArthur orders to give chase. Chairman Mao of Communist China had warned the U.S. not to travel north of the 38th parallel, yet the American forces invaded North Korea anyway on October 7. Subsequently Chairman Mao sent Chinese troops into North Korea to help defend its Communist ally against the invading Westerners. By the end of November 300,000 Chinese troops were in combat. The Americans, in tandem with UN Forces, saw heavy fighting over the next few months. Back in America, more than a few government officials as well as journalists wondered if this was the beginning of World War III. On December 16, 1950, President Truman declared a National Emergency, warning the American people, “The increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as quickly as possible.”<ref> Andrew, Christopher, ''For the President’s Eyes Only'' (London: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 191</ref>
CIA intelligence reports, after the invasion, still treated North Korea as controlled by the USSR, but the reports did raise the possibility of Chinese involvement. On 26 June, CIA agreed with the US Embassy in Moscow that the North Korean offensive was a “... clear-cut Soviet challenge to the United States…”


<blockquote>..the perception existed that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a “client state” and that such an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step..." is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK military capabilities. The paper said that “The DPRK is a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.” </blockquote> CIA, the State Department, and the three service intelligence agencies agreed with this estimate.  
The Korean War wasn’t to be the onset of Armageddon, but it was a grim and dirty war, a prototype of the Vietnam War experience in its years of “stalemate” fighting in a rugged landscape strange to Americans.


<blockquote>"...General MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and mobilization near the border, clearly the “force protection” intelligence that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950.<ref name=Rose /></blockquote>
==Stalemate==


On 30 June 1950, [as] President Truman authorized the use of US ground forces in Korea, CIA Intelligence Memorandum 301, Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Military Aggression, warned that the Soviets could commit large numbers of Chinese troops, which could be used in Korea to make US involvement costly and difficult. This warning was followed on 8 July by CIA Intelligence Memorandum 302, which stated that the Soviets were responsible for the invasion, and they could use Chinese forces to intervene if DPRK forces could not stand up to UN forces.
The Korean War dragged on. General MacArthur was recalled back to Washington, D.C. on April 11, 1951. General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of the UN forces in the Far East and General James A. Van Fleet of the Eighth Army in Korea. America was destined for two more years of scattershot combat and futile negotiations. U.S. defense budget for 1951 was $48.3 billion; for 1952, $62.2 billion; for 1953, $53.2 billion.<ref> Mollenhoff, Clark R., ''The Pentagon: Politics, Profits and Plunder'' (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1967), p. 201.</ref>  Before the war came to a close President Truman would reach the end of his first elected term as President and chose not to run again. During his farewell radio address to the American people on January 15, 1953, Truman said this:
<ref name=Rose />
===Difficulty in collecting intelligence===
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, [[United States Army Special Forces]] did not yet exist, and there was a turf war over paramilitary actions between Willoughby's G-2 group and an interim group only partially under CIA control, the [[Office of Policy Coordination]] (OPC).   A heavily censored history of CIA operations in Korea
<ref name=CIA-CSH>{{citation
| url = http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/korea.pdf
| author = Central Intelligence Agency
| title = Clandestine Services History: The Secret War in Korea 1950-1952
|date=17 July 1968
}}</ref>
shows that "Flight B" of the Fifth Air Force supported air support for both military and CIA special operations. When CIA guerillas were attacked in 1951-1952, the air unit had to adapt frequently changing schedules. According to the CIA history, "The US Air Force-CIA relationship during the war was particularly profitable, close, and cordial." Unconventional warfare, but not HUMINT, worked smoothly with the Army. Korea had been divided into CIA and Army regions, with the CIA in the extreme northeast, and the Army in the West.


===Task Force Smith===
"In Korea our men are fighting as valiantly as Americans have ever fought—because they know they are fighting in the same cause of freedom in which Americans have stood ever since the beginning of the Republic. . . . Now, once in a while I get a letter from some impatient person asking, Why don’t we get it over with? Why don’t we issue an ultimatum—make all-out war, drop the atomic bomb? For most Americans, the answer is quite simple: we are not made that way. We are a moral people. Peace is our goal, with justice and freedom." <ref> Quoted in Koenig, Louis W., ''The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice'' (USA: NYU Press, 1956), p. 287-8.</ref>
 
===The Bugout===
Initially, the North Koreans drove South Korean and US troops back, quickly capturing [[Seoul]]. 
 
===Pusan Perimeter===
The [[United Nations]] defending forces were able to consolidate and hold the area around the port of [[Pusan]].
==September-November 1950==
This was the period when the U.S. decided to repulse the North Korean offensive. An amphibious invasion, at the difficult landing area of [[Inchon]], appears to have completely surprised by the North Koreans. They fell back, as other forces headed north out of the Pusan Perimeter, putting the DPRK in a pincers. The key decision point, however, came when MacArthur continued the pursuit aross the 38th parallel, the border between the two Koreas.
 
===Battle of Inchon===
On 8 September, the CIA issued Intelligence Memorandum 324, Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, which assumed that the Chinese were already providing covert assistance to the DPRK, including some replacements for combat troops. ... The memorandum ... noted that reports of Chinese troop buildups in the Manchurian border area made intervention well within Chinese capabilities. ... but again insisted the Soviets were not willing to risk general war. <ref name=Rose />
[[Image:InchonInvasionMap.jpg|thumb|left|Approach to Inchon Invasion]]
Bombardment of the [[Inchon]] area started on September 13, but the North Koreans were still surprised by an amphibious invasion, by U.S. and South Korean fores at the port of Inchon on 15 September. Inchon had some of the most extreme tidal range on the planet, poor beaches, and small channels. It was an unlikely target for a landing. MacArthur had argued for this specific landing, in spite of objections from senior military commanders. <ref name=USNinchon>{{citation
| title = The Inchon Invasion, September 1950 -- Overview and Selected Images
| url = http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/inchon.htm
| author = U.S. Naval Historical Center}}</ref>
 
Once the beachhead was secure, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments moved toward Seoul, taking [[Kimpo]] airfield on the 17th, after which it was used to provide [[close air support]]. In the meanwhile, 100 miles southeast of Inchon, UN forces broke out of Pusan on the 16th.
 
The Inchon and Pusan forces linked up on 27 September, and [[Seoul]] was liberated, although devastated by street fighting, on 29 September. North Korean forces were in retreat.  
 
A hundred miles to the southeast, the Pusan Perimeter's defenders went on the offensive on 16 September. After resisting for a few days, the now-isolated North Korean army retreated and progressively collapsed during the rest of the month. On the 27th, U.S. Army units moving southwards from Seoul met those coming up from Pusan.
 
ut President Truman made a fateful decision which led to the war dragging on for two more years. He gave MacArthur orders to give chase.
 
 
===The Pursuit===


The Korean War dragged on until an armistice was signed between North Korea, the United States, and China on July 27, 1953. According to the official count, 33,629 American soldiers were killed in action on the battlefield in the Korean War, mostly by Chinese—not North Korean—divisions. 110,000 Americans were wounded or missing-in-action. The UN forces lost 60,371. The U.S. Army estimate of enemy killed exceeded one million, the majority Chinese troops. The war-torn landscape of the Korean peninsula, after three years of ground fighting and saturation bombardment by American air power, was in ruins.


===Chinese intervention===
==Postscript==
On 28 July, the CIA Weekly Summary had stated that 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Korean soldiers from PLA units might soon reinforce DPRK forces." Again, the tactical warning of a Chinese force were rejected based on a strategic assessment of Soviet intentions <ref name=Rose />


Chairman Mao of the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC) warned the U.S. not to travel north of the 38th parallel, yet the American forces invaded North Korea anyway on October 7.{{fact}} By November, the nature of the war had changed.
Following the ending of the Korean War the Cold War remained at an intense boil. Joseph Stalin had died on March 5, 1953 but the Soviet Union, now under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, remained just as fearsome to the American people.
 
<blockquote>"On 12 October, CIA Office of Records and Estimates Paper 58-50, entitled Critical Situations in The Far East—Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded that, “While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950...On 13 and 14 October, the 38th, 39th, and 40th Chinese Field Armies entered Korea. The intelligence leadership in both Washington and Tokyo did not alert either President Truman or MacArthur, who were about to meet on Wake Island to discuss the conduct of the war.U S military and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American casualties. <ref name=Rose /></blockquote>
 
CIA reporting from Tokyo, based on information obtained from a former Chinese Nationalist officer sent into Manchuria to contact former colleagues now in the Chinese [[People's Liberation Army]] (PLA), stated that the PLA had over 300,000 troops in the border area. A CIA-led irregular ROK force operating on the west coast near the Yalu river reported, on October 15, that Chinese troops were moving into Korea.
 
All this information subsequently turned out to be accurate.  At that meeting, on 15 October, MacArthur told Truman there was little chance of a large-scale Chinese intervention. And, he noted, should it occur, his air power would destroy any Chinese forces that appeared.
 
The next day, the CIA Daily Summary reported that the US Embassy in [[The Hague]] had been advised that Chinese troops had moved into Korea. At this point, the analytic perspective of the Agency shifted somewhat... The Agency also abandoned the position that the Chinese had the capability to intervene but would not do so, and began to accept that the Chinese had entered Korea. But it held firm to its view that China had no intention of entering the war in any large-scale fashion.<ref name=Rose />
[[Image:KoreanWar23Nov1950.jpg|thumb|Battle lines north of the 38th Parallel, 23 November 1950]]
By the end of November 300,000 Chinese troops were in combat.  Back in America, more than a few government officials as well as journalists wondered if this was the beginning of World War III. On December 16, 1950, President Truman declared a National Emergency, warning the American people, “The increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as quickly as possible.”<ref> Andrew, Christopher, ''For the President’s Eyes Only'' (London: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 191</ref>
 
==winter of 1950-51 to the early summer of 1951==
during which time the conflict shifted from a dangerous struggle that at any moment could have expanded into a regional or even a global war to a relatively static struggle characterized at the top level on both sides by a willingness to end the fighting short of clear-cut victory.
 
===US analysis in the winter===
In December 1950, with the [[Korean War]] in progress, the Central Intelligence Agency issued National Intelligence Estimate 15: "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation". <ref name=NIE15>{{citation
| author = Central Intelligence Agency
| title = National Intelligence Estimate NIE-15: Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation
| date=11 December 1950
| url = http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/korea/nie15.htm
}}</ref>
 
It began with the estimate that "USSR-Satellite treatment of Korean developments indicates that they assess their current military and political position as one of great strength in comparison with that of the West, and that they propose to exploit the apparent conviction of the West of its own present weakness." At this time, there was no assumption that China and the USSR would differ on any policy "Moscow, seconded by Peiping with regard to the Far East, has disclosed through a series of authoritative statements that it aims to achieve certain gains in the present situation:
 
:a. Withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and of the Seventh Fleet from Formosan waters.
:b. Establishment of Communist China as the predominant power in the Far East, including the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.
:c.Reduction of Western control over Japan as a step toward its eventual elimination.
:d. Prevention of West German rearmament.
 
"It can be anticipated that irrespective of any Western moves looking toward negotiations, assuming virtual Western surrender is not involved, the Kremlin plans a continuation of Chinese Communist pressure in Korea until the military defeat of the UN is complete. A determined and successful stand by UN forces in Korea would, of course, require a Soviet re-estimate of the situation." Such a stand did take place, and the war ended in a stalemate.
===MacArthur recalled===
 
General MacArthur was recalled back to Washington, D.C. on April 11, 1951.
 
General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of the UN forces in the Far East and General James A. Van Fleet of the Eighth Army in Korea. America was destined for two more years of scattershot combat and futile negotiations. U.S. defense budget for 1951 was $48.3 billion; for 1952, $62.2 billion; for 1953, $53.2 billion.<ref> Mollenhoff, Clark R., ''The Pentagon: Politics, Profits and Plunder'' (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1967), p. 201.</ref>
 
==July 1951-April 1953==
"armistice negotiations, from their beginning in July 1951 through to their stalemate over the prisoner-of-war issue in the spring of 1952 and their suspension by the United States in the following autumn."
 
===Truman's farewell===
Before the war came to a close President Truman would reach the end of his first elected term as President and chose not to run again. During his farewell radio address to the American people on January 15, 1953, Truman said this:
 
"In Korea our men are fighting as valiantly as Americans have ever fought—because they know they are fighting in the same cause of freedom in which Americans have stood ever since the beginning of the Republic. . . .  Now, once in a while I get a letter from some impatient person asking, Why don’t we get it over with? Why don’t we issue an ultimatum—make all-out war, drop the atomic bomb? For most Americans, the answer is quite simple: we are not made that way. We are a moral people. Peace is our goal, with justice and freedom." <ref> Quoted in Koenig, Louis W., ''The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice'' (USA: NYU Press, 1956), p. 287-8.</ref>
==April 1953-July 1953==
The Korean War dragged on until an armistice was signed between North Korea, the United States, and China on July 27, 1953. According to the official count, 33,629 American soldiers were killed in action on the battlefield in the Korean War, mostly by Chinese—not North Korean—divisions. 110,000 Americans were wounded or missing-in-action. The UN forces lost 60,371. The U.S. Army estimate of enemy killed exceeded one million, the majority Chinese troops. The war-torn landscape of the Korean peninsula, after three years of ground fighting and saturation bombardment by American air power, was in ruins.  


President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican, formerly Allied Commander in Chief in Europe during World War II; and his vice president, Richard Nixon, both distrusted the Communists as much as President Ronald Reagan would in the 1980s, and the Cold War haunted the world political scene of the 1950s. One crisis after another threatened world stability: Chinese Communist aggression in the Formosa Straits in 1954 and 1958, Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956, unrest in Jordan and Syria in 1957, the Soviet Union shooting America’s U-2 spy plane out of its airspace in 1960. The two nuclear powers lived in constant fear and dread of one another and competed in a dangerous arms race to maintain a global balance of power. That their arsenals contained enough firepower to turn the surface of the earth into a sterile moonscape led the two superpowers by mutual fear to maintain an inhibition against the deployment of atomic bombs. The militaries of both countries were still being fortified by men and matériel for ground-based operations. The American government spent more than $50 billion in 1953 to build up its military services.<ref> O’Neill, ''American High'', p. 207; also Mollenhoff, ''Pentagon'', p. 201.</ref> The Department of the Air Force received $15 billion of that sum that year.<ref> Mollenhoff, ''Pentagon'', p. 416.</ref>  The defense industry was making a killing in order to preserve the peace.


==Notes==


==References==
<references/>
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The Korean War (1950-53) was a major Cold War military clash fought up and down the peninsula of Korea, finally leading to a stalemate in 1950 that restored the boundaries to nearly what they were at the start, along the 38th parallel. The Communist states of North Korea, China and the Soviet Union were arrayed against South Korea, supported by the United States and a multinational United Nations force. The war began with an invasion by North Korea in June 1950, followed by unexpected American and UN entry. North Korean forces had pushed the South Koreans and Americans back into a small perimeter when, in September 1950, an amphibious landing at Inchon turned the tide. The North Korean army disintegrated as the allies moved north, with UN approval, to unify the country. Unexpectedly the Chinese then sent in large numbers of infantry, and in the bitter cold of November-January 1950-51 pushed the UN forces out of the north. Communist supply lines were fragile, especially in the face of heavy American bombing, so the lines stabilized close to the 38th parallel in 1951. Two more years of static warfare followed, with the issue of returning reluctant Communist prisoners of war held by the UN the major sticking point. Finally an armistice was reached in summer 1953' the prisoners were exchanged and fighting ended in an uneasy truce that continues into 2008.

The war was limited in size and scope but casualties were heavy on both sides. In the U.S. political reverberations helped cause the fall of the Truman administration and his Democratic party in the landslide election of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate who promised to end the war. For Americans it is a “forgotten war”, neglected on the timeline between the twin cataclysms of World War II and Vietnam. [1]

Background

Historically an independent nation, Korea had been seized by Japan in 1910 and cruelly treated as a colony. The Koreans came to hate the Japanese violently, and were overjoyed at their liberation by Soviet and American soldiers in September, 1945. The division of Korea was set at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, when the Societs and Americans agreed to divide the Japanese-controlled Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel. The Korean people wanted to throw off the Japanese and become united, but the second goal was only vaguely promised at Yalta. The two superpowers sponsored rival government, Communist in the North and anti-communist in the South. Given the fierce determination of Koreans to unite their homeland, a civil war was inevitable. In the North, Kim Il Sung, leader of the Korean Communist party, came to power in 1945. His ruthless totalitarian regime crushed all opposition and promoted guerrilla warfare in the south.

Ruling the south was a right-wing government headed by Syngman Rhee, who had been converted to Christianity during his exile, and then earned a PhD in theology from Princeton. Although Rhee's authoritarian regime crushed pro-Communist uprisings, he did allow the emergence of a civil society in the south. That is, there were multiple independent sources of thought and power, like corporations, local businesses, universities and churches, in contrast to the north where the Communist party controlled all activity whatever, down to the neighborhood level.

Kim sought support from his two northern neighbors, Mao's China and Stalin's Soviet Union. At the time Washington considered both Mao and Kim to be Stalin's puppets; historians now see them as largely independent actors.[2]

However, all were committed to their own versions of aggressive, anti- western Marxist-Leninism. Both Mao and Stalin were committed to revolution in Asia, and both concluded after America's failure to send troops into the Chinese Civil War that Washington would ignore an invasion of South Korea. Mao advised North Korean leaders that "solely military means are required to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small country.".[3]  


Early Movements

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of American Forces in the Far East, and seventy years old at the time, was ordered to sort out the problem. MacArthur, headquartered in Toyko, flew to South Korea on June 27. The Eighth U.S. Army in Japan was on the way by June 30. The Americans would help defend South Korea from the Communist invaders. President Truman deemed America’s effort a “police action”. It would be the first time in the post-World War II environment that America would fight communism directly, on the field.

In Washington, D.C. on July 19, President Truman asked Congress to approve an emergency defence appropriation of $11 billion. Truman, like Roosevelt before him in 1940, wanted 50,000 war planes built a year. Congress appropriated $8 billion for aircraft production for 1951.[4]

On September 15, 1950, General MacArthur led a victorious assault on the port of Inchon on the west coast of South Korea, just west of the capital city. This victory finally broke the momentum of the North, which had maintained the upper hand in combat during July and August. The Americans routed the enemy then marched east into Seoul, subduing the invaders by September 27. The Americans had the North Koreans on the run. The war looked set to come to a quick end as the Communists were retreating back above the 38th parallel. But President Truman made a fateful decision which led to the war dragging on for two more years. He gave MacArthur orders to give chase. Chairman Mao of Communist China had warned the U.S. not to travel north of the 38th parallel, yet the American forces invaded North Korea anyway on October 7. Subsequently Chairman Mao sent Chinese troops into North Korea to help defend its Communist ally against the invading Westerners. By the end of November 300,000 Chinese troops were in combat. The Americans, in tandem with UN Forces, saw heavy fighting over the next few months. Back in America, more than a few government officials as well as journalists wondered if this was the beginning of World War III. On December 16, 1950, President Truman declared a National Emergency, warning the American people, “The increasing menace of the forces of communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as quickly as possible.”[5]

The Korean War wasn’t to be the onset of Armageddon, but it was a grim and dirty war, a prototype of the Vietnam War experience in its years of “stalemate” fighting in a rugged landscape strange to Americans.

Stalemate

The Korean War dragged on. General MacArthur was recalled back to Washington, D.C. on April 11, 1951. General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of the UN forces in the Far East and General James A. Van Fleet of the Eighth Army in Korea. America was destined for two more years of scattershot combat and futile negotiations. U.S. defense budget for 1951 was $48.3 billion; for 1952, $62.2 billion; for 1953, $53.2 billion.[6] Before the war came to a close President Truman would reach the end of his first elected term as President and chose not to run again. During his farewell radio address to the American people on January 15, 1953, Truman said this:

"In Korea our men are fighting as valiantly as Americans have ever fought—because they know they are fighting in the same cause of freedom in which Americans have stood ever since the beginning of the Republic. . . . Now, once in a while I get a letter from some impatient person asking, Why don’t we get it over with? Why don’t we issue an ultimatum—make all-out war, drop the atomic bomb? For most Americans, the answer is quite simple: we are not made that way. We are a moral people. Peace is our goal, with justice and freedom." [7]

The Korean War dragged on until an armistice was signed between North Korea, the United States, and China on July 27, 1953. According to the official count, 33,629 American soldiers were killed in action on the battlefield in the Korean War, mostly by Chinese—not North Korean—divisions. 110,000 Americans were wounded or missing-in-action. The UN forces lost 60,371. The U.S. Army estimate of enemy killed exceeded one million, the majority Chinese troops. The war-torn landscape of the Korean peninsula, after three years of ground fighting and saturation bombardment by American air power, was in ruins.

Postscript

Following the ending of the Korean War the Cold War remained at an intense boil. Joseph Stalin had died on March 5, 1953 but the Soviet Union, now under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, remained just as fearsome to the American people.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican, formerly Allied Commander in Chief in Europe during World War II; and his vice president, Richard Nixon, both distrusted the Communists as much as President Ronald Reagan would in the 1980s, and the Cold War haunted the world political scene of the 1950s. One crisis after another threatened world stability: Chinese Communist aggression in the Formosa Straits in 1954 and 1958, Egypt’s seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956, unrest in Jordan and Syria in 1957, the Soviet Union shooting America’s U-2 spy plane out of its airspace in 1960. The two nuclear powers lived in constant fear and dread of one another and competed in a dangerous arms race to maintain a global balance of power. That their arsenals contained enough firepower to turn the surface of the earth into a sterile moonscape led the two superpowers by mutual fear to maintain an inhibition against the deployment of atomic bombs. The militaries of both countries were still being fortified by men and matériel for ground-based operations. The American government spent more than $50 billion in 1953 to build up its military services.[8] The Department of the Air Force received $15 billion of that sum that year.[9] The defense industry was making a killing in order to preserve the peace.

Notes

  1. O’Neill, William L., American High: The Years of Confidence 1945-1960 (1989), p. 110; Halberstam, David, The Fifties (1993), p. 73; Alexander, Charles C., Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era 1952-1961 (1976), p. 48.
  2. Until the release of many Soviet and Chinese documents in the 1990s, historians believed that Mao did not want war with the US, and intervened in Korea only when the onrushing UN armies appeared poised to cross the Yalu and begin rolling back Communism inside China. The new evidence clearly shows that Mao's highest goal was to drive capitalism/America out of Asia. He began preparations to enter Korea in July and August, 1950, well before the Inchon landings. Chen Juin in CWIHP 6-7 p 41 (1996). The older view is expressed in Whiting (1960)
  3. CWIHP #6-7 win 1995/6 p 39, 12 May 1950 from Soviet ambassador to NK.
  4. Cunningham, “Location of the Aircraft Industry in 1950”, in Simonson, G. R. (ed.), The History of The American Aircraft Industry (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 206. ; John S. Day, “Accelerating Aircraft Production in the Korean War”, in Simonson, American Aircraft Industry, p. 223.
  5. Andrew, Christopher, For the President’s Eyes Only (London: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 191
  6. Mollenhoff, Clark R., The Pentagon: Politics, Profits and Plunder (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1967), p. 201.
  7. Quoted in Koenig, Louis W., The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice (USA: NYU Press, 1956), p. 287-8.
  8. O’Neill, American High, p. 207; also Mollenhoff, Pentagon, p. 201.
  9. Mollenhoff, Pentagon, p. 416.