Global stagnation: Difference between revisions

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'''Global stagnation''' is generally considered in late 2011 to be a possible short-term prospect, involving a large part of the world economy. Of 30 countries surveyed by the [[International Monetary Fund]], the growth rates of the economies of 20 were classified as "below trend and moderating"; of 8 as "below trend and rising"; and of 2 as "above trend"<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf ''Slowing Growth, Rising Risks'', World Economic Outlook, IMF, September 2011, Fig 1.4 p6]</ref>.  
'''Global stagnation''' is generally considered in late 2011 to be a possible short-term prospect, involving a large part of the world economy. Of 30 countries surveyed by the [[International Monetary Fund]], the growth rates of the economies of 20 were classified as "below trend and moderating"; of 8 as "below trend and rising"; and of 2 as "above trend"<ref>[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf ''Slowing Growth, Rising Risks'', World Economic Outlook, IMF, September 2011, Fig 1.4 p6]</ref>.  


The general slowdown of economic growth that occurred in 2011, following the strong growth of 2010, is thought to be attributable to a range of factors, including:<br>
The global slowdown of economic growth that occurred in 2011, following the strong growth of 2010, is thought to be attributable to a range of factors, including:<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(a) the completion of the stockbuilding phase of the [[inventory cycle]] that normally follows a [[recession (economics)|recession]];<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(a) the completion of the stockbuilding phase of the [[inventory cycle]] that normally follows a [[recession (economics)|recession]];<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(b) the [[Shock (economics)|economic shock]] caused by the [[tsunami|Japanese tsunami]] of March 2011;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(b) the [[Shock (economics)|economic shock]] caused by the [[tsunami|Japanese tsunami]] of March 2011;<br>
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&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(f) the reduction in the availability of [[credit (finance)|credit]] resulting from precautinary action by European banks in anticipation of the [[restructuring of debt|restructuring]] of the Greek government's debt;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(f) the reduction in the availability of [[credit (finance)|credit]] resulting from precautinary action by European banks in anticipation of the [[restructuring of debt|restructuring]] of the Greek government's debt;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(g) losses of investor and consumer confidence due to fear of a global financial crisis resulting from  a [[sovereign default]] by a major developed country<ref>[http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf ''Global Financial Stability Report'', IMF, September 2011]</ref>.<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(g) losses of investor and consumer confidence due to fear of a global financial crisis resulting from  a [[sovereign default]] by a major developed country<ref>[http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf ''Global Financial Stability Report'', IMF, September 2011]</ref>.<br>
Assessments of the relative importance of (a) to (g) differ, but it is evident that factors (a) and (b) were transient effects with no implications for current prospects. Factors (c) and (d), on the other hand, may be expected to exert a continuing but diminishing influence. The prospect of stagnation (or a second [[downturn (ecnomics)|downturn]]) is thought to depend mainly on factors (e), (f), and  (g). In a "worst case scenario", a general reduction in investor and consumer confidence could exert [[positive feedback]] and initiate a cyclical reduction in economic activity and international trade, affecting both mature and developing economies.
Assessments of the relative importance of (a) to (g) differ, but it is evident that factors (a) and (b) were transient effects with no implications for current prospects. Factors (c) and (d), on the other hand, may be expected to exert a continuing but diminishing influence. The effects of factors (e), (f), and  (g) are expected to persist into 2012 and possibly beyond.  


In the absence of further downside developments, the major forecasters expect world growth to continue, although at a more subdued rate, through the next two years - but at a rate, in the developing countries, at which [[output gap]]s and [[unemployment]] will to persist. The downside developments that could halt or reverse that growth include:
In the absence of further downside developments, the major forecasters expect world growth to continue, although at a more subdued rate, through the next two years - but at a rate, in the developing countries, at which [[output gap]]s and [[unemployment]] will to persist. The downside developments that could halt or reverse that growth include:
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In a "worst case scenario", a general reduction in investor and consumer confidence could exert [[positive feedback]] and initiate a cyclical reduction in economic activity and international trade, affecting both mature and developing economies.
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Revision as of 06:44, 12 November 2011

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Global stagnation is generally considered in late 2011 to be a possible short-term prospect, involving a large part of the world economy. Of 30 countries surveyed by the International Monetary Fund, the growth rates of the economies of 20 were classified as "below trend and moderating"; of 8 as "below trend and rising"; and of 2 as "above trend"[1].

The global slowdown of economic growth that occurred in 2011, following the strong growth of 2010, is thought to be attributable to a range of factors, including:
   (a) the completion of the stockbuilding phase of the inventory cycle that normally follows a recession;
   (b) the economic shock caused by the Japanese tsunami of March 2011;
   (c) the loss of output due to the continuing deleveraging by banks and the consequent restriction of credit to companies;
   (d) the effect on demand of continuing deleveraging by companies and households;
   (e) the effect on demand of the reductions in public expenditure and the other fiscal adjustments in the fiscal aftermath of the Great Recession;
   (f) the reduction in the availability of credit resulting from precautinary action by European banks in anticipation of the restructuring of the Greek government's debt;
   (g) losses of investor and consumer confidence due to fear of a global financial crisis resulting from a sovereign default by a major developed country[2].
Assessments of the relative importance of (a) to (g) differ, but it is evident that factors (a) and (b) were transient effects with no implications for current prospects. Factors (c) and (d), on the other hand, may be expected to exert a continuing but diminishing influence. The effects of factors (e), (f), and (g) are expected to persist into 2012 and possibly beyond.

In the absence of further downside developments, the major forecasters expect world growth to continue, although at a more subdued rate, through the next two years - but at a rate, in the developing countries, at which output gaps and unemployment will to persist. The downside developments that could halt or reverse that growth include: