Embargo of 1807

The Embargo of 1807 was a series of laws passed by the U.S. Congress 1806-1808, during the second term of President Thomas Jefferson. The goal was to use economic coercion to avboid war, punish Great Britain, and force it to respect American rights.

It was brought upon by the Chesapeake incident involving Britain attacking a U.S. warship. Britain and France were at war; the U.S. was neutral and trading with both sides. Both sides tried to hinder American trade with the other. Jefferson's goal was to use economic warfare to secure American rights, instead of military warfare. Initially, these acts sought to punish Britain for its violation of American rights on the high seas; among these was the impressment of those sailors off American ships, sailors who claimed to be American citizens but not in the opinion or to the satisfaction of the Royal Navy, ever on the outlook for deserters. The later Embargo Acts, particularly those of 1807-1808 period, were passed in an attempt to stop Americans, and American communities, that sought to, or were merely suspected of possibility wanting to, defy the embargo. These Acts were ultimately repealed at the end of Jefferson's second, and last, term. A modified version of these Acts would return for a brief time in 1813 under the presidential administration of Jefferson's successor, James Madison.

Background

On June 21, 1807 the American warship USS Chesapeake was attacked and boarded on the high seas off Boston by the British warship HMS Leopard. Three Americans were dead and 18 wounded; the British impressed four seamen with American papers as alleged deserters. The outraged nation demanded action. and President Jefferson issued a proclamation ordering all British ships out of American waters.

The Embargo Act of December 22, 1807

Immediately Congress passed a new Embargo Act. Unlike the previous non-importation act, this law was aimed at American shippers and their vessels. The new law required, among other things,

1) American vessels were prohibited from landing in any foreign port unless specifically authorized by the President himself.

2) Trading vessels were now required to post a bond of guarantee equal to the value of both the ship itself and its cargo, in order to insure compliance with the law. Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin was against the entire notion, foreseeing -- correctly, as it turned out -- the nightmare of trying to enforce such a policy, not to mention the public's reaction. "As to the hope that it may...induce England to treat us better," wrote Gallatin to Jefferson shortly after the bill had become law, "I think is entirely groundless...government prohibitions do always more mischief then had been calculated; and it is not without hesitation that a statesman should hazard to regulate the concerns of individuals as if he could do better than themselves" Gallatin's concerns were to no avail.

The Embargo Act of January 1808

On January 08, 1808, within weeks of the first embargo act being law, a second one was passed. As historian Forrest McDonald wrote, "A loophole had been discovered in the first act, namely that coasting vessels, and fishing and whaling boats had not been required to post bonds guaranteeing that they would not sail for foreign ports."

The new embargo act now required that all U.S. ships post a bond of twice the value of the ship and cargo. Failure to do so would:

• Lead to the forfeiture of said ship and cargo
• Result in "permanent and absolute" refusal in permission to use credit in regard to custom duties
• Declaration that the oath of the ship's owner and/or captain would henceforth be inadmissible before any custom's officer.

Meanwhile, Jefferson requested authorization from Congress to raise 30,000 troops from the current standing army of 2,800. Congress refused.

With their harbors for the most part unusable in the winter anyway, New England and the north ports of the mid-Atlantic states, had paid little notice to the previous embargo acts. That was to change with the spring thaw, and the passing of yet another embargo act.

The Embargo Act of March 12, 1808

With the coming of the spring thaw, the effects of the previous acts were immediately felt throughout the coastal states; none more so than in New England with economic downturn devolving into a depression, and spiraling unemployment. Loud protests came from up and down the seaboard; merchants and shippers simply ignored that laws. On the Canadian border with New York and Vermont, the embargo laws were openly flouted. By March an increasingly frustrated Jefferson was resolved to enforce the embargo to the letter.

On 12 March 1808 Congress passed, and Jefferson signed into law, still another embargo act. This one:

1) Prohibited, for the first time, the export of any goods, either by land or by sea.

2) Subjected violators to a fine of $10,000, plus forfeiture of goods, for each offense.

3) Granted the President broad discretionary authority to enforce, deny, or grant exceptions to the embargo.

Still the embargo was ignored, violated, and flouted; still the protests continued and continued to grow; and so it was that the Jefferson administration requested and Congress rendered yet another embargo act.

The Embargo Act of April 24, 1808

On March 30, 1808 Jefferson submitted to Congress a proposal for yet another law regarding the American embargo. This act was to be known simply, and unofficially, as "The Enforcement Act". Signed into law on 24 April, this was to be the last of the many embargo act to become law during Jefferson's presidency. The "Enforcement Law" decreed:

• That port authorities were allowed to seize cargoes without a warrant, and/or to bring to trial any shipper or merchant who was thought to have merely contemplated violating the embargo.
• That the President of the United States had both the right and the duty to use both the Army and the Navy to enforce the embargo laws.

In seeking to punish the British the Jefferson administration had declared war on the citizens of America.

Reactions

The entire series of events was ridiculed in the press as Dambargo, Mob-Rage, Go-bar-'em or O-grab-me (embargo spelled backward); there was a cartoon ridiculing the Act as a snapping turtle grabbing at American shipping, labeled "Ograbme".

Case studies

A case study of Rhode Island shows the embargo devastated shipping-related industries, wrecked existing markets, and caused an increase in opposition to the Republican Party. Smuggling was widely endorsed by the public, which viewed the embargo as a violation of their rights. Public outcry continued, helping the Federalists regained control of the state government in 1808-09. The case is a rare example of US national foreign policy altering local patterns of political allegiance.

Despite its unpopular nature, the Embargo Act did have some limited, unintended benefits, especially as it drove capital and labor into New England textile and other manufacturing industries, lessening America's reliance on the British. In Vermont, the embargo was doomed to failure on the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River water route because of Vermont's dependence on a Canadian outlet for produce. At St. John, Lower Canada, £140,000 worth of goods smuggled by water were recorded there in 1808 - a 31% increase over 1807. Shipments of ashes (used to make soap) nearly doubled to £54,000, but lumber dropped 23% to £11,200. Manufactured goods, which had expanded to £50,000 since Jay's Treaty of 1795, fell over 20%, especially articles made near Tidewater. Newspapers and manuscripts recorded more lake activity than usual, despite the theoretical reduction in shipping that should accompany an embargo. The smuggling was not restricted to water routes, as herds were readily drove across the uncontrollable land border. Southbound commerce gained two-thirds overall, but furs dropped a third. Customs officials maintained a stance of vigorous enforcement throughout and Gallatin's Enforcement Act (1809) was a party issue. Many Vermonters preferred the embargo's exciting game of revenuers versus smugglers, bringing high profits, versus mundane, low-profit normal trade.

The New Englands merchants who evaded the embargo were imaginative, daring, and versatile. Gordinier (2001) examines how the merchants of New London, Connecticut, organized and managed the cargoes purchased and sold, and the vessels used during the years before, during, and after the embargo. Trade routes and cargoes, both foreign and domestic, along with the vessel types, and the ways their ownership and management were organized show the merchants of southeastern Connecticut evinced versatility in the face of crisis.

Gordinier (2001) concludes the versatilile merchants sought alternative strategies for their commerce, and to a lesser extent, for their navigation. They tried extra-legal activities, a reduction in the size of the foreign fleet, and the re-documentation of foreign trading vessels into domestic carriage. Most importantly, they sought new domestic trading partners, and took advantage of the political power of Jedidiah Huntington, the Custom Collector. Huntington was an influential member of the Connecticut leadership class (called "the Standing Order"); he allowed scores of embargoed vessels to depart for foreign ports under the guise of "special permission." Old modes of sharing vessel ownership in order to share the risk proved to be hard to modify. Instead established relationships continued through the embargo crisis, in spite of numerous bankruptcies.

Repeal 1809

Congress repealed the Act three days before Jefferson left office, replacing it with the Non-Intercourse Act on March 1, 1809, which lifted all embargoes except for those on Britain and France. This act was just as ineffective as the Embargo Act itself and was replaced again the following year with Macon's Bill Number 2, lifting the remaining embargoes. Contemporaries and historians have usually considered the embargo a failure<ref but see Frankel (1982)</ref> which hurt Americans and did not accomplish its goals, but helped lead to the War of 1812.

Bibliography

see also War of 1812 -- Bibliography

• Brown, Roger H. The Republic in Peril: 1812 (1964), stresses intense hostility between partisans online edition
• Burt, Alfred L. The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the War of 1812. (1940), detailed history by Canadian scholar; online
• Daniels, G. W. "American Cotton Trade with Liverpool under the Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts." American Historical Review 1916 21(2): 276-287. Issn: 0002-8762 online at Jstor
• Frankel, Jeffrey A. "The 1807-1809 Embargo Against Great Britain," The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jun., 1982), pp. 291-308 online at JSTOR
• Gallatin, Albert. The Writings of Albert Gallatin, ed. Henry Adams, (1879) online edition at Google
• Gordinier, Glenn Stine. "Versatility in Crisis: The Merchants of the New London Customs District Respond to the Embargo of 1807-1809." PhD dissertation U. of Connecticut 2001. 333 pp. DAI 2001 62(2): 739-A. DA3004842
• Kaplan, Lawrence S. "Jefferson, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Balance of Power." William and Mary Quarterly 1957 14(2): 196-217. ISSN 0043-5597 online in Jstor
• Levy, Leonard W.; Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side. (1963)
• McDonald, Forrest, The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, (1976)
• Malone, Dumas. Jefferson the President: The Second Term,(1974)
• Malone, Dumas. Jefferson the President: Second term, 1805-1809 vol 5; (1970), the standard biography
• Mannix, Richard. "Gallatin, Jefferson, and the Embargo of 1808." Diplomatic History 1979 3(2): 151-172. ISSN 0145-2096
• Muller, H. Nicholas. "Smuggling into Canada: How the Champlain Valley Defied Jefferson's Embargo." Vermont History 1970 38(1): 5-21. ISSN 0042-4161
• Perkins, Bradford. Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812. 1961. the standard diplomatic history
• Sears; Louis Martin. Jefferson and the Embargo (1927), state by state analysis of impact online edition
• Schachner, Nathan. Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (1957) 1074 pgs. online edition
• Smelser, Marshall. The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815 (1968) (ISBN 0-06-131406-4) survey of political and diplomatic history
• Spivak, Burton; Jefferson's English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution. (1979)
• Strum, Harvey. "Rhode Island and the Embargo of 1807." Rhode Island History 1994 52(2): 58-67. ISSN 0035-4619