David Kilcullen

From Citizendium
Revision as of 00:40, 3 November 2008 by imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (New page: '''David Kilcullen''', a former Australian infantry officer who has become a analyst of insurgency and counterinsurgency, for both the Australian and U.S. governments. At present,h...)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

David Kilcullen, a former Australian infantry officer who has become a analyst of insurgency and counterinsurgency, for both the Australian and U.S. governments. At present,he is a strategic advisor to the Multi-National Force-Iraq. He has had field experience in East Timor, Bougainville and the Middle East,and wrote his doctoral dissertation, in 2000, on "The political consequences of military operations in Indonesia 1945-99 : a fieldwork analysis of the political power-diffusion effects of guerilla conflict"[1]

His visual metaphor of the three pillars of insurgency is often cited.[2]

Kilcullen has long distinguished between militant insurgency and the tactic of terrorism: "We must distinguish Al Qa’eda and the broader militant movements it symbolises – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself."[3] Drawing a distinction between terrorism and those that use it as a means of fighting war does contrast with a simple view of a war on terror.

References

  1. Kilcullen, David J. (2000), "The political consequences of military operations in Indonesia 1945-99 : a fieldwork analysis of the political power-diffusion effects of guerilla conflict", University of New South Wales - Australian Defence Force Academy
  2. Kilcullen, David (28 September 2006). Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency. U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C..
  3. Kilcullen, David (2004), Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism