Arab Spring: Difference between revisions

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==Political and constitutional change==
==Political and constitutional change==
While there is little evidence that any of the protest movements had a predominately [[religion|religious]] motivation, it is likely that religious organisations and their opponents will influence the political and constitutional changes that are to follow [[Secularism|Secularist]] groups are set to be opposed by a spectrum of religiously motivated groups who are referred to collectively as [[Islamist]]s, but in none of the Arab Spring countries is there anything in the nature of a single, coordinated, secularist or Islamist movement. In Tunisia, however, one  moderate Islamist party has enough support to assure it of victory over its fragmented opponents.<ref>[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15309152 ''Q&A: Tunisia elections'', BBC News 11 October 2011]</ref>. The dominant Islamist party in Egypt is the ''Freedom and Justice Party''<ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/al-hurriyya-wa-al-%E2%80%98adala-freedom-and-justice-party ''Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party)'', Carnegie Endowment. 2011]</ref> that advocates a Supreme Constitutional Court to oversee legislation in order to ensure its compatibility with Islamic principles of justice. It is a member of the ''Democratic Alliance'' group of Islamist and non-Islamic parties<ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/26/the-democratic-alliance ''Democratic Alliance'', Carnegie Institute, October 2011]</ref>.
While there is little evidence that any of the protest movements had a predominately [[religion|religious]] motivation, it is likely that religious organisations and their opponents will influence the political and constitutional changes that are to follow [[Secularism|Secularist]] groups are set to be opposed by a spectrum of religiously motivated groups who are referred to collectively as [[Islamist]]s, but in none of the Arab Spring countries is there anything in the nature of a single, coordinated, secularist or Islamist movement. In Tunisia, however, one  moderate Islamist party has enough support to assure it of victory over its fragmented opponents.<ref>[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15309152 ''Q&A: Tunisia elections'', BBC News 11 October 2011]</ref>. The dominant Islamist party in Egypt is the ''Freedom and Justice Party''<ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/al-hurriyya-wa-al-%E2%80%98adala-freedom-and-justice-party ''Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party)'', Carnegie Endowment. 2011]</ref> that advocates a Supreme Constitutional Court to oversee legislation in order to ensure its compatibility with Islamic principles of justice. It is a member of the ''Democratic Alliance'' group of Islamist and non-Islamist parties<ref>[http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/26/the-democratic-alliance ''Democratic Alliance'', Carnegie Institute, October 2011]</ref>.


==Projected outcomes==
==Projected outcomes==

Revision as of 07:43, 24 October 2011

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This editable, developed Main Article is subject to a disclaimer.
This article consists of:

- the summary below; a chronology of main events; notes on individual national movements; a catalogue of major personalities, and notes on the international response.

The term Arab Spring refers to the sequence of protest movements that started with the successful uprising in Tunisia that began in December 2010. The subsequent protest movements in other Arab countries were mainly motivated by a wish to put an end to what was perceived as government oppression, corruption and incompetence. Many sought to do so by introducing a measure of democratic accountability, but the various national movements had little else in common. The protests have so far resulted in regime change in Tunisia and Egypt and Libya, promises of an early election in Yemen, and promises of limited democratic change in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. They have encountered violent responses in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen.

Background: the Arab condition

The political structures of the countries involved in the Arab uprisings have (with the exception of Lebanon) been categorised as "authoritarian" (with Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia ranking among the 15 least democratic countries[1]). Five of them have suffered unusually high levels of corruption (Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Yemen appear among the upper half in the ranking of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index) [2]. Their populations are predominately ethnically Arab with small native Berber minorities. They include two mixed oil economies (Algeria and Libya); three oil economies (Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia); six diversified economies (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia); and one primary export economy (Yemen). The oil-producing countries of Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Libya are among the world's more prosperous countries. The prosperity of each of the others is below, or well below the world average in terms of GDP per head, with Syria ranking 153rd out of a total of 228. According to an estimate based upon data from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen, at least 19% of the Arab population lived below the poverty line at the end of the 1990s.[3]

The development of national protest movements

The violent mass protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt soon succeeded in ousting existing regimes with the intention of achieving democracy (although the nature of their replacement regimes has yet to be established). The governments of Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Oman responded to more limited protests with promises of political and constitutional reform. Saudi Arabia's administration sought to avoid confrontation by announcing a major programme of infrastructure investment. In Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, however, protest movements met with violent military opposition. Regime change was eventually achieved in Libya (as noted in the following paragraph) but there is little doubt that opposition to Gadaffi's government would have been violently crushed had NATO not intervened. The protest movements in Syria and Yemen have not so far been deterred by violence, and there is a continuing prospect of regime change in those countries

Civil war in Libya

In mid-February 2011, government forces opened fire on demonstrators in the Libyan second city of Benghazi. A bitter conflict ensued in which the rebels took control of the city. The government responded with an aerial bombardment that caused thousands of casualties. There was international outrage at the brutality of its actions and, on 18th March, the United Nations Security Council responded to the Arab League's request for the imposition of a no-fly zone with a resolution that authorised member states to to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack. In the course of the following week, air attacks by US, British and French aircraft destroyed the Libyan air force. In the following months there developed a civil war between government forces based in Tripoli in the west of Libya and rebel forces based in Benghazi in the east. After six months of fighting, rebel forces entered the government's Tripoli, hitherto the principal remaining government-held city. In July 2011, the USA formally recognised Libya’s Interim National Transitional Council, [4] Libya's main opposition group, as the country’s legitimate government, but doubts about its integrity were subsequently raised by the killing by a local militia of its chief of staff, General Abdel Fattah Younis.[5] With the fall of Tripoli, Libya's National Transition Council moved from Benghazi to Tripoli on August 26, and work was expected to start on the execution of the plans for a "Tripoli Task Force", which had been drawn up by the rebel National Transition Council and British diplomats.[6] Fighting continued until the fall of the town of Sirte and the killing of Gaddafi in October 2011.

International reactions

There is no evidence of non-Arab influences upon the Arab Spring uprisings, and every indication that they came as a sudden surprise to all who were not directly involved. (Among the explanations for the rapid spread of the protest movement from its origin in Tunis, Amnesty International has suggested that the leaks of candid diplomatic cables by the whistleblower organization WikiLeaks served as a trigger for the uprising.[7]) There were supportive reactions from many western governments, however, and in May, the G8 countries promised $20bn (£12bn) of loans and aid to Tunisia and Egypt over the following two years and suggested more would be available if the countries continued on the path to democracy. However, there was no support for active participation until the news of Libyan air force attacks upon the areas held by rebels. Expressions of condemnation were followed by calls for protective action.

The main support for military intervention came from the governments of the United States, France and Britain, but a crucial factor was an Arab League recommendation to the United Nations for a no-fly zone. The Libya resolutions 1970 and 1973 that were subsequently passed by the Security Council have been described as "the most wide-ranging that it had passed for more than 20 years". [8]

The European Council later declared its commitment to "the full implementation" of Security Council Resolutions,[9] but there was also opposition to military intervention, even from within the European Union. There was opposition by Germany [10] and reluctant participation by Italy.[11] Among other reactions was the condemnation of the UN resolution on Libya as comparable to "medieval calls for crusades" by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (repudiated, however, by President Dmitry Medvedev[12]). NATO air strikes were also condemned by the governments of China,[13] Venezuela and Cuba.[14]

Libya's National Transition Council has been recognised as the legitimate government of Libya by the United States, France, Britain and (according to Libya TV) by 20 African countries,[15] although not by the African Union as a whole.

Political and constitutional change

While there is little evidence that any of the protest movements had a predominately religious motivation, it is likely that religious organisations and their opponents will influence the political and constitutional changes that are to follow Secularist groups are set to be opposed by a spectrum of religiously motivated groups who are referred to collectively as Islamists, but in none of the Arab Spring countries is there anything in the nature of a single, coordinated, secularist or Islamist movement. In Tunisia, however, one moderate Islamist party has enough support to assure it of victory over its fragmented opponents.[16]. The dominant Islamist party in Egypt is the Freedom and Justice Party[17] that advocates a Supreme Constitutional Court to oversee legislation in order to ensure its compatibility with Islamic principles of justice. It is a member of the Democratic Alliance group of Islamist and non-Islamist parties[18].

Projected outcomes

A May 2011 assessment by the Economist Intelligence Unit put the most probable outcome as the creation of functioning democracies in Tunisia and Egypt, together with some relaxations of authoritarianism in the other Arab countries. Much lower probabilities were assigned to the equally likely outcomes of comprehensive maintenance of authoritarianism, or a widespread trend toward significant democratic accountability.[19] Neither the persistence of the Syrian and Yemeni protests, nor the ferocity of their armies' responses, were fully evident at that time. The BBC's security correspondent, Frank Gardner, has since reported that most analysts doubt that President Bashir al-Assad can survive in the long term, although his prospects may be improved by misgivings about his possible successors.[20]

References

  1. The Democracy Index 2010, Economist Intelligence Unit
  2. Corruption Perception :Index[1]
  3. Ali Abdel Gadir Ali: Poverty in the Arab Region: A Selective Review, (Background paper prepared for the IFPRI / API Collaborative Research Project on: Public Policy and Poverty Reduction in the Arab Region.) page 26
  4. The Libyan Interim National Council (official website).
  5. Who is in control of the Libyan opposition?, Al Jazeera, 15 August 2011
  6. Rebels and British diplomats had planned for Gaddafi collapse, The Times, 23 August 2011
  7. Peter Walker. Amnesty International hails WikiLeaks and Guardian as Arab spring 'catalysts', The Guardian, 2011-05-13. Retrieved on 2011-08-20.
  8. Mark Lyall-Grant: Is there an Arab Summer? The UN’s Response to the Arab Spring, Chatam House, 27 June 2011]
  9. EU Council conclusions on Libya, Europa, 20 June 2011
  10. Military no cure for Libya crisis: German foreign minister, Reuters, Apr 1, 2011
  11. Lamine Chikhi: Italy's Berlusconi exposes NATO rifts over Libya, Reuters, July 7, 2011
  12. Russia's Vladimir Putin denies Libya rift with Medvedev, BBC News, 22 March 2011
  13. Chris Buckley: China intensifies condemnation of Libya air strikes, Reuters, March 21, 2011
  14. Cuba And Venezuela Condemn Libya Strikes, Sky News, March 21 2011
  15. AU fails to recognise NTC, Libya TV 26 August 2011
  16. Q&A: Tunisia elections, BBC News 11 October 2011
  17. Al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party), Carnegie Endowment. 2011
  18. Democratic Alliance, Carnegie Institute, October 2011
  19. Will the Arab risings yield democracy dictatorship or disorder?" EIU May 2011 White Paper
  20. Frank Gardner: Arab Spring: Where it is now and where it may be going, BBC News 10 July 2011