Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
Initial steps
Iran-Iraq War
Both sides used chemical weapons in the [{Iran-Iraq War]].
Osirak
In May 1977 Israeli intelligence determined that the nuclear complex at al-Tuwaitha was growing rapidly and that the reactor facility might soon be ready. The government debated a preemptive military attack. "In the meantime, the Mossad would take steps to buy additional time. These steps included allegedly sabotaging the reactor cores for Osirak before the French could deliver them, as well as assassinating Iraqi nuclear officials. At the same time, the IAF began contingency planning for a strike on Osirak."[1] "In October 1980, the Mossad reported to Begin that the Osirak reactor would be fueled and operational by June 1981
Use internal to Iraq
Gulf War
UN compliance
Nuclear weapons
The Niger Uranium Forgeries
In February 2002, as a result of the discovery of classified documents initially revealed by Italian intelligence in October 2001, the Pentagon sent Marine General Carlton W. Fulford, Jr. to Niger to investigate the claim that Iraq was attempting to buy uranium to revamp its nuclear WMD program. That same month, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph Wilson IV to Niger in February 2002. General Fulford and Ambassador Wilson interviewed several high-ranking Niger government officials. Neither found any evidence for the sale; Mr. Wilson concluded that the claim was “unequivocally wrong.”[2]
There was disagreement about the findings of Mr. Wilson’s report within the intelligence community. CIA analysts believed the report confirmed reports about an Iraq-Niger uranium deal, partly because Mr. Wilson’s report included a comment that an Iraqi envoy had visited the African country in 1999. However, State Department analysts decided that Niger would be unwilling or incapable of supplying Iraq with any uranium.[3] As a result of these conflicting intelligence analyses, the Bush administration remained suspicious and continued to work from the assumption that Saddam Hussein was actively trying to acquire a nuclear weapon. Because of internal disorganization, the CIA failed to obtain copies of the original classified documents, after they were finally made available to American intelligence in October 2002, and ignored warnings from State Department analysts about problems with the documents. The CIA also failed to check the the president’s 2003 State of the Union for factual errors. Consequently, the address included the infamous “sixteen words” that “the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” [4][5] It was not until March 2003 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed with conclusive proof that the documents at the basis of the allegations were forgeries.[6] However, the British government claimed it had evidence to the same effect independent of these documents, but had promised the source not to reveal its identity.
References
- ↑ Whitney Raas and Austin Long (pril 2006), “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities”, Security Studies Program, Massachussetts Insitute of Technology Working Paper
- ↑ REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ United States Senate, ordered July 7, 2004. Chapter 2-b. Retrieved May 8, 2008.
- ↑ REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ United States Senate, ordered July 7, 2004. Chapter 2-k. Conclusion 13. Retrieved May 9, 2008.
- ↑ 2003 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush, January 28, 2003. Retrieved May 8, 2008.
- ↑ Senate Intelligence Committee Report (see previous note), Chapter 2-k. Conclusions 18-19, 21.
- ↑ Transcript of ElBaradei's U.N. presentation, posted at CNN. March 7, 2003. Retrieved May 8, 2008.