De-Ba'athification

After Saddam Hussein took control of Iraq in 1980, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, Baa'th in common use, because the only political party; removing the problems of Saddam's regime also meant extirpating the leadership of the party, in the process of debaathification. The term is drawn from the denazification in the occupation of Nazi Germany after WWII.

Debaathification was clearly US policy, but, as with Nazi Germany, it was also recognized that some party members were nonpolitical but had to be members to hold jobs in the nation's infrastructure. There were, however, disconnects between the policy and implementation of debaathification, and some of the implementation may have contributed to delays in restoring Iraqi infrastructure.

Preparation

When L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer prepared to leave for Iraq, on May 9, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld had given him a general directive, "The coalition will actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers — the Baath Party, the Saddam Fedayeen, etc. We wil make it clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime." According to Bremer, Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith showed him a more sweeping order, and suggested Bremer issue the order that day. Bremer responded "Hold on a minute, I agree it's a very important step, so important it should wait 'til I get there." Feith emphasized Rumsfeld's directive that it was to be carried out "even if implementing it caused administrative inconvenience." Bremer saw this as potentially more than inconveience.

Party outlawed

On April 16, 2003, GEN Tommy Franks announced the end of combat. He recommended that only the senior Ba'ath Party leadership be blacklisted, on the assumption, much as with the Soviet Communist Party, that Party members ran most of the basic government services.

Nevertheless, the Party was dissolved on May 12, and CENTCOM was faced with the job of creating a new civilian infrastructure.

LTG (ret) Jay Garner said that he had protested full debaathication to Bremer, who said "These are the directions I have. I have directions to execute this...""

Garner had experience running humanitarian operations in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. Garner said that he always considered himself in a temporary role. He said that Franks had been promised a large number of constabulary from other nations; his immediate goal, before debaathification, was "...setting up to pay the civil servants and the police and the pensioners. ORHA, however, never really was operational. It was caught, in part, in bureaucratic fighting principally between State and Defense, with some separate positions from Cheney and Rice.