Joint warfare in South Vietnam 1964-1968
A new situation arose due to the overthrow of Diem, the two coups shortly following, [1] the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and increasing intensity in the war.
Note that Minh was exiled within the same month as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, with its obvious ramifications of increased U.S. involvement.
Roughly until mid-1965, the SVN-US strategy still focused around strategic hamlets, but they were increasingly irrelevant in the face of larger and larger VC conventional attacks.
Politically, 1966 had its Buddhist crisis, but, at the end of the year, some steps toward constitutional government in the South. From the military standpoint, the pace kept intensifying, with six major sweeps in January, but the Communists responded with frequent raids, bombings of third-country and senior government facilities, and gradual employment of heavier weapons.
1964
January 1964: Minh falls to Khanh
"Big" Minh was bloodlessly overthrown by Nguyễn Khánh on January 31, 1964. Khanh, at first, presented his government as more aggressive against the VC.
Minh held power until January 1964. At the time his government fell, the American embassy applauded the takeover, believing Minh had been too weak against the VC. The Pentagon Papers quote Douglas Pike's puzzlement:
Had the NLF leadership wished to do so, it could have used its impressive struggle machine to launch in the name of the Buddha a nation-wide struggle movement that conceivably could have ended with its long-pursued General Uprising . . . Knowledgeable Vietnamese attributed its refusal to act an unwillingness to involve itself in an alien struggle movement. The NLF and the communists, ran the argument, avoid activities over which they do not exercise total control. . . . The Buddhist leadership made it clear it did not seek NLF help since it wished at all costs to avoid the Communist stigma. Another popular explanation for the NLF's "sit-tight" policy during the Buddhist troubles was that the NLF was going to allow the bourgeois revolutionary forces to succeed in toppling Diem, after which it would capture the Revolution as the Kerensky Government was captured in the Russian Revolution. ... A slanderous but widely bandied explanation among Vietnamese at the time was that the NLF did not want Diem removed, that he and his brothers and sister-in-law were far more valuable to the NLF in office than out. In truth, the NLF posture during this period remains something of a mystery.[2]
According to Robert McNamara, however, the Minh group had been following a strategy, but underestimated the insistence on the U.S. of having an anticommunist government. Minh described his group as noncommunist rather than anticommunist, which Minh described as an important distinction. They apparently sought incremental political improvements with the NLF, but this appears to have been the last chance, as coup after coup followed, of a neutralist solution.[3] McNamara saw Ho Chi Minh also in favor of a neutral solution.[4]
February 1964: new government in Saigon; U.S. intensifies air operations
A coup against Khanh failed in early February, but he left the country within a few weeks, with the Armed Forces Council back in charge. Just before Khanh left, the Council did set up a new civilian government headed by Phan Huy Quat. INR saw the Quat government as evidence of a temporary stability between the military and the Buddhist, but one that could be broken by a power play of factions on either side.[1]
May 1964: Sabotage and attempted sabotage
A rather spectacular, although eventually repaired, underwater attack by VC divers disabled and partially sank, in the Saigon River, the USNS Card, a former small escort carrier being used as an aircraft ferry. The day after the May 2 sinking, an improvised explosive device injured 8 people at the dock.
There were incidents between ARVN and Cambodian forces through May and June, eventually leading to a UN investigation. Charges and countercharges include the Cambodians interfering with hot pursuit of a VC unit that entered Cambodia (5/7); Cambodian jets attacking RVN troops (5/12); RVN air attacks along the Cambodian border (6/5).
June 1964
Following additional combat along the SVN-Cambodian border, a UN investigating team left New York on the 21st.
September 1964: Khanh allows civilian governmet
Under Khanh, the start of a civilian government, called the High Legislative Council, started in September, with Pham Khac Suu as head of state and Tran Van Huong as Premier and head of government. This Buddhist-dominated government may have wanted a neutral Vietnam as a solution. [5] INR, however, did not believe this council would gain traction unless it was perceived as representative by both the populace and the military.
December 1964: Civilian Huong government falls
Khanh dissolved the council in December, in the face of new demonstrations, although he temporarily retain Suu and Huong, dismissing them in December. Khanh, according to INR, created a new tension with the Buddhists that Huong had not, and also may have been approaching Hanoi much as he had accused Minh.
1965
Some fundamental decisions about U.S. strategy, which would last for the next several years, took place in 1965. Essentially, there were three alternatives:
- Bombing, enclave and rural security, principally supported by U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, GEN (U.S. Army, retired)
- Attrition of VC bases and secondarily personnel, the focus of GEN William Westmoreland, commanding general, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Westmoreland, in a March 26 message, said that it would take six months for air attacks to take effect, and third-country ground troops were needed immediately. Westmoreland stated "search and destroy" as a goal in May
- Emphasis on rural security, from a number of U.S. Marine Corps officer including then-LTG Leonard Cushman, then-MG Victor Krulak, and others
Even with these three approaches, there was still significant doubt, in the U.S. government, that the war could be ended with a military solution that would place South Vietnam in a strongly anticommunist position. In July, two senior U.S. Department of State officials formally recommended withdrawal to President Lyndon B. Johnson; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, at the same time, saw the situation as bad but potentially retrievable with major escalation.
February 1965: VC attacks on U.S. facilities
On February 6, the VC attacked U.S. facilties at Pleiku, killing 8 and destroying 10 aircraft. President Johnson, on February 7-8, responded with the first specifically retaliatory air raid, Operation FLAMING DART (or, more specifically, FLAMING DART I), of the broader Operation ROLLING THUNDER plan, which had not yet officially started.
The Pleiku attack seems to have been a vital decision point for the U.S. While the introduction of U.S. ground troops had been discussed for years, there were no specific plans. Bundy's memorandum to Johnson about the attack, on 7 February, did not propose the introduction of combat troops. [6]
Johnson made no public announcements, although the U.S. press reported it. The attack was carried out by U.S. Navy aviators from an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea. FLAMING DART II was a response to an attack on Qui Nhon on March 10. In response, initially unknown to the U.S., the North Vietnamese received their first S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA-2 GUIDELINE) surface-to-air missiles, starting an upward spiral of air attack and air defense.
It must be emphasized that for most of the war, the bulk of the attacks on the North came, at first, from Navy carriers offshore. When the bombing escalated, they were joined by U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers flying from bases in Thailand. While there were occasional strikes on the DMZ and the southern part of the DRV from bases in the South, especially when South Vietnamese aircraft participated, the U.S. bases in the RVN primarily supported operations there. Da Nang was the primary South Vietnamese base for such strikes.
Bases in SVN, however, were accessible to the VC, by ground attack, or with rockets and mortars of only a few miles' range. As FLAMING DART progressed and the detailed planning for the major air escalation of ROLLING THUNDER, Westmoreland was concerned about the security of the exposed U.S. air bases in the south. On February 22, he sent his deputy, LTG John Throckmorton, to inspect the Marine aviation base at Da Nang; Throckmorton reported that a full Marine Expeditionary Brigade, with three infantry battalions and supporting elements, were needed to ensure its defense. Westmoreland, according to Davidson, believed a two-battalion MEB was more politically acceptable, but submitted that request.
The President approved sending two Marine battalions on February 26. Other than possibly Westmoreland, they were seen purely as defensive troops. Westmoreland denies assuming they would be available for missions outside the base.[7] The Pentagon Papers suggest he did see a wider mission, but there is no strong evidence that he did. [8]
Ambassador Taylor, a retired general with extensive combat experience, objected. His calculation was that one battalion would protect the base from any plausible direct VC ground attack, but that six, not three, battalions would be necessary to establish a sufficiently large area to prevent the VC firing on Da Nang with standard and easily portable 81mm mortars.[9] The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed, and forwarded Westmoreland's request, with their agreement, on 26 February.
ROLLING THUNDER buildup, March
Shortly before Johnson approved the sustained Operation ROLLING THUNDER plan on March 13, the Da Nang security force arrived on March 8. in response to Westmoreland's request of February 22 reflecting a concern with VC forces massing near the Marine air base at Da Nang, 3500 Marine ground troops arrived, the first U.S. large ground combat unit in Vietnam.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs sent a key memo to McNamara. [10] His "70%" justification for staying in Vietnam was to protect U.S. reputation, with a lesser role of preventing major Chinese intervention, the latter not having been documented. Essentially, he saw no way to extricate the U.S. The memo also said there was a "50% chance of coup within 3 weeks," and, SVN has been cut in two with GVN control in north reduced to enclaves.
President Johnson ordered Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Harold Johnson to assess the situation, already doubting the air offensive before it seriously began. GEN Johnson reported, in Vietnam between March 5 and 12, reported back on 14 March. He was seriously concerned about the situation, and proposed external forces be brought in to free the ARVN for offensive action because "what the situation requires may exceed what the Vietnamese can be expected to do." [8] He proposed a U.S. division be sent preferentially to the Central Highlands (II Vietnamese corps area; Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac provinces) or to the Bien Hoa/Tan Son Nhut area nearer to Saigon. McNamara, however, did not think such action would make enough ARVN troops available and preferred that a Republic of Korea division be sent rather than U.S. troops. GEN Johnson also suggested a four-division force be raised under the SEATO treaty and used to block infiltration.
GEN Johnson said a decision was needed "now to determine what the Vietnamese should be expected to do for themselves and how much more the U.S. must contribute directly to the security of South Vietnam." Secretary McNamara noted in the margin: "Policy is: anything that will strengthen the position of the GVN will be sent. . ."
Carrot and Stick, April
Johnson's main public announcement at the time, however, was an April 7 speech, in which he offered economic support to North Vietnam, and Southeast Asia in general, if it would stop military action. [11] This offer was quite in keeping with his goals for development, the Great Society, in the United States, and was likely a sincere offer. That he saw such an offer as attractive to the enemy, however, is an indication of his lack of understanding of the opposing ideology.
More elaboration of the proposal was in National Security Action Memorandum 329 [12] This initially classified (but at the lowest level) document, among other things, asked for specific recommendations of a "reviews of the pros and cons" of increasing U.S. aid even before a regional development program started.
The Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to McNamara and others that the ROLLING THUNDER campaign was not a serious deterrent to the DRV, and warned against putting more U.S. troops into combat roles. McCone said that this would merely encourage the Soviets and Chinese to take a low-risk course of supporting infiltration.[8]
As these proposals were made to the North, on 13 April 1965, joint RVN-US discussions agreed that the ARVN force levels were inadequate. The manning level was increased, to increase RVN infantry battalions from 119 (93 infantry, 20 Ranger, and 6 airborne) to 150. The new battalions were generally added to existing regiments, to avoid the need of creating more headquarters units. By the end of 1965, twenty-four were either in the field or in training areas.[13]
In April, Johnson authorized the deployment of an additional two Marine battalions and up to 20,000 support personnel. Again without public announcement, he changed the rules of engagement to permit the Marines to go beyond static defense, and to start offensive sweeps to find and engage enemy forces.
RVN reverses in May
A VC unit, estimated to be in two-regiment strength, fought the Battle of Song Be, the capital of Phuoc Long province, about 100 miles from Saigon, on 11 May. Song Be was primarily defended by irregular ARVN units, although supported by a Special Forces team and several miscellaneous units. An unprecedented amount of air support, including the first use of a company-sized armed helicopter unit,[14] allowed a successful defense. Higher command, however, was concern that this large a VC unit could take an initiative.[8]
Much farther in the north, later in the month, they ambushed an ARVN force in the north, near Quang Ngai, badly hurting ARVN relief troops and leaving two battalions combat ineffective.
Westmoreland obtained Taylor's agreement on a plan for reinforcement.[8] It had three phases, the first two establishing security for Allied bases and then an offensive strategy, beginning with enclaves on the cost, and moving inland.
The first phase extended the security perimeter of the bases so that the facilities were out of range of light artillery. In the second stage, the U.S. forces, in coordination with the RVN, would make deep patrols and limited offensives, still centered on the bases, to pre-empt direct threats.
Phase III defined "Search and destroy plus reserve reaction operations." Westmoreland proposed improving the security of coastal enclaves, then, as a second phase, patrolling from those enclaves. Once the coastal areas were being patrolled, the next two phases would repeat the process inland: establish bases, then patrol from them.
Westmoreland assumed he would have III Marine Expeditionary Force, the new airmobile division, a Republic of Korea division replacing the Marines in central Vietnam, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade for the Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area near Saigon. Early, CINCPAC had objected to the use of the 173rd, since it was the primary strategic reserve for Pacific Command.
Further ARVN deterioration, June
Westmoreland, on June 7, sent a message to CINCPAC that a VC summer offensive was underway, not yet at its full potential, both to destroy RVN forces and isolate (but not hold) key towns. He doubted the South Vietnames capability to cope was in grave doubt, largely due to recent troop losses.
On June 10, the VC made another two-regiment attack on Dong Xoai, north of Saigon, using one regiment against the town and Special Forces camp, while preparing an ambush for an ARVN relief force with the other. The area also held a U.S. aviation unit, advisory team, and Naval Construction team; the fighting was sufficiently savage that two Medals of Honor were bestowed on U.S. troops, one posthumously.
The VC ambushes were extremely effective against ARVN relief forces, which were committed one battalion at a time, until the ARVN ran out of reserves. Among the forces destroyed was the 7th Airborne Battalion, one of the best units in the ARVN.
The civilian government under Premier Phan Huy Quat and Head of State Phan Khac Suu, both Buddhists, had been challenged by Catholics, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. There were also accusations that the military forced them out for entertaining a neutralist solution. [15] While they stayed in office as "caretakers", power returned to the military on June 12. Air Force Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky became the effective center of power.
McNamara proposes escalation, July
On July 1, both George Ball and William Bundy, of the U.S. Department of State, sent memoranda to President Johnson saying the war could not be won on U.S. terms; they proposed different exit strategies. At Defense, McNamaara agreed the situation was worse, but believed the situation might be retrieved: "The situation in SVN is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. . . . The central highlands could well be lost to the NLF during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken...The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals."[16]
McNamara saw the correlation of forces between the ARVN and the VC is quite unfavorable. "The Govt-to-VC ratio overall is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat battalions little better than 1.5-to-1." A historical rule of thumb for counterinsurgency has been that a 10 to 1 ratio is desirable, but, like all rules of thumb, it is not applicable to all situations. Even a critic of that generalization, "indeed, that ratio was often cited by critics of the U.S. policy in Vietnam", who cite a number of other revolutionary wars where the insurgency was defeated by less overwhelming ratios (e.g., Eritrea against Ethiopia) or where an acceptable goal was partition (e.g., Second Sudanese Civil War), cite the conventional wisdom as primarily relevant to situations of ideological insurgency against a central government, such as the Communist takeover of Vietnam, where the insurgents want complete victory.[17] The current U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency also recognizes there is no simple ratio, "During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN...A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants...Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation." [18] None of these sources, however, see a 3:1 to 1.5:1 as favorable.
McNamara also observed that the Administration's approach to air war against the North, Rolling Thunder, had not " produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that SVN is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than complete takeover."[16]
Autumn and winter, First Airmobile Battles: Ia Drang and Bong Son
Giap's new plan was to use three regiments, but with a new controlling divisional headquarters, across the neck of SVN, cutting the country in two. The division threatened the Plei Me special forces camp with one regiment, but put a second regiment across the road over which South Vietnamese forces, without helicopters, would have to drive to Plei Me from the larger base in Pleiku. Intelligence identified the presence, but at first not the position, of a third regiment, which could attack Pleiku if the reserve based there went to the assistance of Plei Me.
The PAVN preferred hit-and-run ambushes, or what they called "catch and grab." When their retreat was blocked, their next tactic was called "hugging the belt" [19] the Americans hesitated to use artillery and gunships because of the risk of friendly fire casualties. The surprise attack would give a short window of opportunity before superior American mobility could be brought to bear. Moore's after-action reports suggested that "danger close" air and artillery could be a reasonable calculated risk when used competently.
The South Vietnamese recognized they were stretched too thin, and asked for U.S. help. The U.S. Field Force (corps equivalent) commander for the area, MG Stanley Larsen, told GEN Westmoreland that he thought the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was ready, and got permission for it to use its mobility to bypass the road ambushes. Since the PAVN along the road had planned to ambush trucks, there was not an issue of not being able to find the relieving troops. Helicopters could be heard, but their landing zones were unpredictable until they actually landed — fake landings were not uncommon. In the Battle of the Ia Drang, the first true airmobile force met PAVN regulars.
It should be noted that the PAVN's practice of listening for helicopters was realized by Harold Moore, promoted to brigade command after leading a battalion in the Ia Drang. In the larger Battle of Bong Son approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, Moore used obvious helicopters to cause the PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans — but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes.
1966
1966 was the year of considerable improvement of command relationships, still under Westmoreland, for what Westmoreland considered the less interesting "other war" of rural development. There were frequent changes of names of aspects of this mission, starting in 1964, but eventually, the GVN and US agreed on the term Revolutionary Development (RD), which was to continue in a variety of development activities. The term, apparently coined by Premier and general Nguyen Cao Ky, was agreed to be defined as
RD is the integrated military and civil process to restore, consolidate and expand government control so that nation building can progress throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It consists of those coordinated military and civil actions to liberate the people from Viet Cong control; restore public security; initiate political, economic and social development; extend effective Government of Vietnam authority; and win the willing support of people toward these ends.[20]
"Search and Destroy" gave way after 1968 to "clear and hold", when Creighton Abrams replaced Westmoreland.
Strategic
Pacification/Revolutionary Development
Westmoreland was principally interested only in overt military operations, while Abrams looked at a broader picture. MACV advisors did work closely with 900,000 local GVN officials in a well-organized pacification program called CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development.) It stressed technical aid, local self government, and land distribution to peasant farmers. A majority of tenant farmers received title to their own land in one of the most successful transfer projects in any nation. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of peasants entered squalid refugee camps when CORDS moved them out of villages that could not be protected.[21]
In the Phoenix Program (part of CORDS with a strong CIA component) GVN police identified and arrested (and sometimes killed) the NLF secret police agents engaged in assassination.
Political
On January 15, Premier Ky annouces, at the 2nd Armed Forces Congress in Saigon:
- There will be a national constitutional referendum in October
- General elections will be held in 1967
On February 20, Deputy Ambassador Porter becomes the overall chief of US participation in Revolutionary Development.
The Buddhist crisis of 1966
On March 10, Ky removed LTG Nguyen Chanh Thi as I Corps Commander. Thi was considered Ky's major political rival; this event triggered substantial demonstrations in Da Nang on the 11th. Topmiller described a number of possible theories for Ky's action, which triggered what became known as the 1966 Buddhist crisis. First, Ky had just returned from a conference with Lyndon Johnson, and certainly felt strengthened by that recognition. Tension had been growing between Ky and Thi, with a February 1966 Time magazine story that the more dynamic Thi could take power whenever he chose.[22]
Ky argued that Thi had been abusing his power, comparing him to Diem's I Corps chieftain brother Ngo Dinh Can. Further, according to Ky, Thi wanted negotiations with the NLF and left-wing Buddhists; Ky intended to fire anyone opposing a military solution. Thi himself accused Ky of being an American puppet, and that only a clique of generals, the Directory headed by Ky, wanted war.
Lodge had cautioned Ky to be sure he had the power to remove Thi, who, aside from personality, had some strong relationships. He was considered quite honest, in a government known for corruption. Tri Quang indicated that Thi was the only general he trusted. U.S. Marine LTG Lew Walt, commanding III MAF, respected Thi, and Thi's senior U.S. adviser said Thi's outspokenness caused his problems; Thi, according to COL Howard Sinclair, regarded Ky as a friend.[23]
Buddhist leaders, on March 12, called for return of the generals that overthrew Diem. This begins a period of political protest and general strikes. MG Nguyen Van Chuan, Thi's replacement and a member of the Directory, said he would not confront peaceful demonstrators.
By the 15th, Da Nang was 90 per cent paralyzed by general strike; about 1,000 ARVN personnel joined a 3,500-man protest demonstration. Ky then sent Thi back to Da Nang from Saigon on the next day, and began to give speeches in the I Corps area; Thi referred sarcastically to his removal for "health reasons". The 16th also saw the formal creation of the Struggle Movement, with which Chuan affiliated himself, denouncing the GVN.
Inside the U.S. government, INR reported that the unfolding of the Buddhist crisis, unsettling as it was, preempted Communist opportunities to exploit dissatisfaction. Further, INR expected the matter eventually to resolve with elections, which it did not see the Buddhists boycotting, but also not dominating. They saw the key issue, for the upcoming September elections, more as a matter of the size of the vote rather than the winner. [24]
Ky, on April 3, declared that Da Nang was in communist hands and troop movement to the city is imminent. The next day, President Johnson held an urgent meeting to discuss the situation, in which Ambassador Taylor said Thi was allied with Tri Quang, and the U.S. could not tolerate a Tri Quang government.[25]
On the 5th, Ky flew to Da Nang with two Marine battalions, but said that the city had been iniltrated, not taken over. The commander of the ARVN 1st Division announced his support of the Da Nang struggle; all U.S. advisors to his division went to U.S. base camps.
Demonstrations spread to Saigon and Hue, and all nonessential U.S. personnel were evacuated from Hue. The GVN sent two more battalions to Da Nang. 1st ARVN Div troops in Hue pass a resolution denouncing the Ky government but pledging to fight with US and FW troops against the communists. On the 6th, LTG Ton That Dinh took command of I Corps, previously under Chuan, and one of the battalions sent, in the show of force, left Da Nang.
On May 14, government strategic reserve battalions flew to Da Nang and take control of I Corps HQ, the Da Nang garrison, city hall, the National Police garrison, and the radio station, encountering only isolated small arms and grenade fire as the struggle forces retreat into pagodas. I Corps Commander Dinh takes asylum in III MAF HQ; GVN names MG Huynh Van Cao to replace him. Four days after becoming I Corps Commander, MG Cao also asks for asylum at III MAF HQ, claiming his life is in danger. The next command change of I Corps came on the 30th, when MG Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of the 2nd ARVN Division, becomes acting I Corps Commander.
The self-immolation of a Buddhist nun, on May 29, signaled a new round of Buddhist protests. Tri Quang, starting on June 8, began extended anti-GVN and anti-US hunger strike coupled with altars blockading the streets of Hue. A split in Buddhist opinion was signalled by a June 15 letter from Tam Chau regarding Tri Quang's actions.
Development of civil government
The September 11, 1966 elections took place, with a 80.8 percent turnout. INR interpreted this not so much as support for the GVN, but more of the absence of a serious challenger to Ky, a situation that changed in 1967. [26]
Phan Khac Suu was elected Speaker of the GVN Constituent Assembly on October 26. A prominent Assembly member, Tran Van Van, was assassinated in Saigon, on December 7, by a man claiming to be VC. GVN Constituent Assembly approved, on December 23, the first three articles of the new constitution, providing for popularly-elected President, and a Prime Minister and Cabinet appointed by the President. Elections, indeed, were held in 1967.
Military Events
The year was filled with large sweep operations, including individual U.S., ARVN, and Korean forces of division and sometimes larger size, as well as use of multinational force use. VC attacks ranged in size from local bombings to multi-regimental operations, and use of longer-range artillery.
Starting on the 20th, the non-Communist forces held an 84-hour ceasefire for Tet, which was the culmination of a psychological warfare program to encourage Communist defections under the Chieu Hoi program. MACV annouced 106 Communist violations of the truce.
Starting in mid-February, patrols detected indications of a pending VC attack against the A Shau Special Forces camp, whose mission was surveillance of infiltration from the nearby Laotian border. Continuous attacks on 9-10 March overran the camp, with a disorderly retreat losing several helicopters and resulting in a number of friendly personnel missing in action.
In April, ROLLING THUNDER units struck significantly closer to Hanoi and Haiphong than they ever had done, and the DRV Air Force responded with their first MiG-21 use.
There was an increasing intensity to use air power in Cambodia and Laos, accelerating in July. In some, but not all cases, the Cambodian or Laotian governments were secretly consulted, but in other cases, U.S. aircraft, especially B-52 bombers acted at direct U.S. orders.
1967
General Nguyen Van Thieu (1923-2001), a Catholic, became president (in office 1967-75). The NLF failed to disrupt the national legislative election of 1966, or the presidential elections of 1967, which consolidated Thieu-ARVN control over GVN. Thieu, however, failed to eliminate the systematic internal inefficiencies and corruption the ARVN.
Ground combat
Throughout the first five months, in I Corps, there was heavy bombardment of U.S. bases from PAVN units in the DMZ.
Search-and-destroy missions in the Saigon area began early in the year, beginning with the 19-day Operation CEDAR FALLS, in the Iron Triangle, followed by 72 days of Operation JUNCTION CITY, beginning in February.
Air war
In April, attacks began on all but one of the North Vietnamese fighter airfields; Phuc Yen, the international airport, remained off limits. Approximately half of the North Vietnamese fighters were shot down in May.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, IV. Time of Decision: November 1963-March 1965, Vietnam 1961-1968 as interpreted in INR's Production, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN4, pp. 10-18
- ↑ , Chapter 4, "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-November, 1963, Section 2, pp. 232-276, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2
- ↑ McNamara, pp. 113-114
- ↑ McNamara, p. 119
- ↑ Topmiller, Robert J., The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964-1966, University Press of Kentucky p. 28
- ↑ Davidson, Phillip B. (1991), Vietnam at War: The History: 1946-1975, Oxford University Press USp. 342
- ↑ Davidson, p. 344
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 , Chapter 4, "American Troops Enter the Ground War, March-July 1965," Section 1, pp. 389-433, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3 Cite error: Invalid
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tag; name "PntV3Ch4389-433" defined multiple times with different content - ↑ PntV3Ch4389-433, EMBTEL (Embassy Telegram) of 22 February 1965
- ↑ Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)*, March 10, 1965.
- ↑ Lyndon B. Johnson (April 7, 1965), speech at Johns Hopkins University
- ↑ Lyndon B. Johnson (April 9, 1965), Task Force on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development, National Security Action Memorandum 329
- ↑ Collins, James Lawton, Jr., Chapter I: The Formative Years, 1950-1959, Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, p. 64
- ↑ Unit History of the 334th Armed Helicopter Company
- ↑ Topmiller, p. 28
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 McNamara, Robert S. (20 July 1965), Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam,"
- ↑ Neuman, Stephanie G. (2001), Warfare and the Third World, Macmillan, p. 65-66
- ↑ Nagl, John A.; David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos et al. (December 2006), Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, US Department of the Army
- ↑ Moore, Harold & Joseph Galloway (1992), We were soldiers once, and young: Ia Drang--The Battle That Changed The War In Vietnam, Random House
- ↑ Eckhardt, pp. 64-68
- ↑ Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for pacification support (1982) online edition
- ↑ Topmiller, pp. 33-34
- ↑ Topmiller, pp. 34-36
- ↑ Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, VI. A Massive Effort to Turn the Tide: February 1966-March 1968, Vietnam 1961-1968 as interpreted in INR's Production, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN6, pp. 10-18
- ↑ Gibbons, William Conrad (1986), The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Princeton University Press, p. 280
- ↑ INR-VI, p. 10-12