Nuclear attacks against Japan

See also: Surrender of Japan

Nuclear weapons have never been used except twice by the United States against the Japanese at the very end of the Second World War in August, 1945. They were developed in a highly secret wartime program, the Manhattan Project during the war. That Project dealt with the technology, not initially policy or targeting, and did much of its work expecting the weapons to be used against Germany. Weapons were ready, however, only after Germany surrendered.

The decision was controversial at the time, with the decisionmakers knowing less than we do today, both on the effects of nuclear weapons, and on the internal Japanese arguments about conditions under which they would surrender. Further, the decision was made largely outside the regular strategic process, due to the combination of secrecy about development and uncertainty if the bomb would work. President Harry S Truman was unaware of the Manhattan Project until after he became President, and was briefed on 25 April. At least wwo groups, the Interim Committee of civilian advisers and a scientific advisory panel, recommended use of nuclear weapons. The orders were issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Pacific theater commanders Chester W. Nimitz and Douglas MacArthur were informed of the decision rather than consulted, although strategic air warfare against Japan was also outside their control; the JCS commanded it directly through the Twentieth Air Force.

It has been suggested that the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey said the Japanese would have surrendered without the use of nuclear weapons, but the actual report emphasizes that opinion is made with the benefit of hindsight. The Report said:

Certain of the United States commanders and the representatives of the Survey who were called back from their investigations in Germany in early June 1945 for consultation stated their belief that, by the coordinated impact of blockade and direct air attack, Japan could be forced to surrender without invasion. The controlling opinion, however, was that any estimate of the effects of bombing on the Japanese social fabric and on the political decisions of those in control of Japan was bound to be so uncertain that target selection could safely be made only on the assumption that ground force invasion would be necessary to force capitulation.

The Survey continued,

With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the twin objectives of surrender without invasion and reduction of Japan's capacity and will to resist an invasion, should the first not succeed, called for basically the same type of attack. Japan had been critically wounded by military defeats, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The proper target, after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants, either to bring overwhelming pressure on her to surrender, or to reduce her capability of resisting invasion, was the basic economic and social fabric of the country. Disruption of her railroad and transportation system by daylight attacks, coupled with destruction of her cities by night and bad weather attacks, would have applied maximum pressure in support of either aim.

Some "revisionists" have suggested Hiroshima was supposed to be an unmistakable signal to Stalin to play along diplomatically with the Americans who planned to rule the postwar world. Many have asked whether some sort of demonstration explosion should have been made, in order to frighten Tokyo without killing so many people. The option was considered, but with only two bombs available Truman decided instead to drop millions of leaflets upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki warning people to leave immediately, and at the Potsdam Conference he explicitly warned Japan it must surrender immediately or be hit with terrible force.

The civilian government in Tokyo wanted peace on conditional terms, but that was impossible because of Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender (Second World War), and because the civilians did not control Japan's decisions. Only the unprecedented direct intervention of the Emperor changed the balance of power.

Many factors led to the surrender of Japan. The nuclear bombings certainly were a part. The declaration of war by the Soviets, however, ended any hope for a negotiated peace. Even after Hiroshima and the invasion of Manchuria the Army and Navy wanted to fight on, while the civilians wanted to give up. With Roosevelt gone, the Americans redefined "unconditional" to allow continuance of the Emperor. Hirohito then broadcast an order to the nation and its armed forces to surrender, which was immediately obeyed.

Nuclear weapons development

President Harry S. Truman had been unaware of any specifics of the Project. While in the Senate, he had become aware of the extremely large expenditures in the project, but, after General George C. Marshall, a man of unquestioned integrity, told Truman it was a real, critical, and utterly secret project, Truman called off further investigations.

The first bomb to be used, a uranium fission device of the "gun" type code-named LITTLE BOY, had not been tested; only theoretical calculations of effect were available. Physicists involved in its development were certain it would work, but less so about the plutonium implosion technology in the second bomb. In the TRINITY test in New Mexico, an implosion device of the type used on Nagasaki was tested, and better data was available.

The decision to use nuclear weapons

There was no consensus, among the small number of senior military leaders aware of the bomb development, about the separable issues of military effectiveness of such attacks, and the ethics thereof. While the casualties that would actually be caused by nuclear attacks were not known, the fire-bombing of Tokyo probably caused a greater number of casualties.

From the TRINITY experience, however, it was clear that a nuclear explosion would be qualitatively different than any previous attack, and would have great psychological impact. Nevertheless, there were both military commanders, and scientists that worked on the bombs' development, that preferred such measures as an initial demonstration, for the Japanese, on an uninhabited target. Other commanders and scientists believed that the shock value of the weapons would contribute to the ending of the war. Further complicating the situation was that the new President, Harry Truman, had not been informed of the bomb development while Vice President, and had a short time to make the decision.

The U.S., in anticipation of a possible nuclear attack, had avoided heavy bombing of four cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This had two purposes: allowing better assessment of the weapon effects, and also having a greater shock value.

Alternatives to nuclear attack

An argument against using these weapons was that Japan was clearly struggling under conventional bombings and the submarine blockade. Unfortunately, the U.S. had no sources inside the Japanese government, which would confirm that there was a stalemate between a hard-line faction that believed it appropriate to fight to the last Japanese, and a faction that was willing to examine a peace. The peace faction had come into significance with victory in the Battle of Saipan and the resultant fall of the Tojo government, but the Allies had no hard information.

The primary argument was to use a radically different attack with the purpose of breaking the will of Japan, which actually was unlikely to affect the hard-liners. A secondary consideration was that the U.S. was planning a land invasion of Japan, with the first phase, Operation OLYMPIC scheduled in October 1945, with the target of Kyūshū, which was under the command of Second General Army. That organization, a major part of the Japanese Operation KETSU-GO defensive plan, had its headquarters in Hiroshima Castle.

In July 1945 the Army Air Force saw its doctrine of conventional strategic bombing working as intended. The original plan was to have used B-29 bombers, from high altitude, with greater precision than the B-17 and B-24 bombers used in Europe. Unexpected high-altitude winds proved this was impossible, and Gen. Curtis LeMay, newly commanding the strategic bombers, on his own authority changed to low-altitude incendiary bombing. He shed the machine guns and gunners, and the gasoline no longer needed to lift the planes to 30,000 feet. The result was a doubling of the bomb load, and very scared fliers who were greatly relieved to discover their losses were less using the new tactics. From the first raid on March 9, the new tactic was devastating. working to perfection. The B-29 dropping conventional high explosives and incendiaries was the perfect instrument to destroy the infrastructure of Japan's larger cities. The great bombing campaign had just started; it was planned to peak a year later. The atomic bomb was not part of AAF doctrine; the AAF generals had not been consulted, knew very little about the bomb and even demanded a direct order from President Truman before they agreed to explode it.

The U.S. Navy had very little to do with the atomic bomb decision. It had gotten reluctant Air Force support to lay large minefields in the inland waterways of the Home Islands. The blockade combined mines, submarine operation, air strikes from aircraft carriers, and some surface warships. It argued that the blockade was working well, cutting off nearly all oil, food and troop movements to and from Japan. It expected that the blockade would eventually lead to surrender.

The Army agreed that the combination of blockade and strategic bombing would eventually destroy every Japanese city, but felt it could not destroy the Japanese Army, which was widely dispersed and dug in.

Other uses for the weapons

General Marshall worried that the American people might grow weary of more years of warfare, and might even demand some sort of compromise peace in order to bring the soldiers home. (Marshall underestimated the intense determination of nearly all Americans to destroy Japan.) Furthermore he objected to dropping the bombs on cities on moral and political grounds (Japan might become an enemy forever). Most of all, he had a tactical rather than strategic use in mind. Only a handful of bombs were being built, (two to four per month) and MacArthur's invasion forces ought to have all of them. Nine bombs had been allocated to "Operation Olympic". Marshall and his planners concluded that Japan would surrender only after ground troops captured Tokyo. The invasion of Kyushu was scheduled November 1; all bombs available then (probably seven) should be used there. They would give invading infantry forces enough firepower to destroy defensive ground installations, communications facilities, kill exposed enemy soldiers, and also block the arrival of reinforcements. To waste the precious bombs on irrelevant civilians would cause more American casualties, and like all the high American officials Marshall was committed to minimizing American--not Japanese-- losses.

Nuclear operations

The decision on where and when to use the weapons had been delegated to the field commander.

Preparation

Nuclear weapons were ready on Tinian by mid-July.

Given the need for the military to prepare the raids, the effective order was issued by President Truman on 25 July, before the Potsdam Declaration.

In orders issued on 25 July and approved by Stimson and Marshall, Spaatz was ordered to drop the "first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki." He was instructed also to deliver a copy of this order personally to MacArthur and Nimitz. Weather was the critical factor because the bomb had to be dropped by visual means, and Spaatz delegated to his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the job of deciding when the weather was right for this most important mission.

The bombings

Four cities, Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki, had been left relatively undisturbed, so both the weapon effects could be measured and that they would be psychologically more devastating. Kyoto was taken from the list as a cultural treasure.

So that the aiming and measurements could be most precise, the mission doctrine called for bombing targets that were clearly visible. Under this guidance, if a bomb could not be dropped, it would have to be jettisoned in the sea. Nagasaki was bombed by radar rather than lose the bomb, a decision made aboard the bomber and later accepted by higher authority.

Attack on Hiroshima

The Potsdam Declaration had included a warning that must surrender unconditionally or face "prompt and utter destruction." No other more specific warning was given of the nuclear attacks. Hiroshima was bombed on 6 August, and Truman's announcement came afterwards.

The first attack was on the city of Hiroshima. While it was unquestionably a populated city, it also contained dispersed industry, and the headquarters of the Second General Army, which commanded the Japanese defense of Kyushu within the overall Operation KETSU-GO defensive plan. Operation OLYMPIC, the first phase invasion, was targeted at Kyushi.

Actually dropping the bomb was a B-29 named Enola Gay, piloted by Col. Paul Tibbets, who commanded the 509th Composite Group. It was accompanied by two other B-29's taking scientific observations.

The aiming point for the bomb was the Aoki Bridge, selected because it was easily recognized from the air, and near Hiroshima Castle. At 8:15 AM, it detonated 1800 feet/580 meters in the air. The actual ground zero, or surface point under the explosion, was Shima Hospital, which is near the present "A-Bomb Dome" memorial, the former Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall. The Hall was the only building in the central blast area that was not totally destroyed, and is now a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Estimated explosive yield was 12.5 kilotons, smaller than the Nagasaki bomb that caused fewer casualties. The target areas, however, were quite different: the Hiroshima bomb went off in the center of a flat city, while the Nagasaki weapon exploded over a valley with constraining hills.

Evaluating the effect of a nuclear weapon, based on blast alone, is misleading. A very significant portion of the short-term casualties at Hiroshima were not directly from blast, but from fire. Some of the fires were indirectly caused by blast, as in those that overturned cooking stoves or broke gas lines. The bulk of the firestorm, however, came from the direct thermal effect of the nuclear explosion. It should be noted that major thermal effect is characteristic of airbursts, and should not be applied to plausible nuclear terrorisn scenarios.

Attack on Nagasaki

Kokura was actually the primary target for the second attack, but weather conditions prevented a bomb delivery there. Nagasaki was the secondary target, and was still largely covered by clouds. The drop was aimed by radar, rather than visual sighting.

The Nagasaki area has more hills than Hiroshima, which channeled the bomb effects. Even though the weapon used was higher in yield (20-22 kilotons) than that used at Hiroshima (12.5 KT), casualties were fewer although the local damage was more intense. Besides the topography, casualties were lower because the bomb was not dropped in the central part of a city, but in a distinctly industrial area. It detonated 1,840 feet above and approximately 500 feet south of the Mitsubishi Steel and Armament Works.

Impact on Japan

The Strategic Bombing Survey did confirm that the weapons had a major psychological effect on the populace:

Prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs, the people of the two cities had fewer misgivings about the war than people in other cities and their morale held up after it better than might have been expected. Twenty-nine percent of the survivors interrogated indicated that after the atomic bomb was dropped they were convinced that victory for Japan was impossible. Twenty-four percent stated that because of the bomb they felt personally unable to carry on with the war. Some 40 percent testified to various degrees of defeatism. A greater number (24 percent) expressed themselves as being impressed with the power and scientific skill which underlay the discovery and production of the atomic bomb than expressed anger at its use (20 percent).

A discussion between Navy Minister Mitsumasu Yonai and Deputy Chief of Staff Sokichi Takagi, two days after Hiroshima, indicates that Yonai, a member of the inner cabinet and peace faction, was more concerned with the threat of a domestic uprising than the impact of the nuclear attack. Yonai mentioned Hiroshima in the context of aggravating the domestic situation, not as a primary event.

Ethics debate on Strategic Bombing

During the war prewar pacifists and a few churchmen (especially Catholics troubled over the bombing of Catholic cities like Rome and Cologne) began to question the morality of bombing cities. After Hiroshima the issue focused on the atomic bomb, with much of the discussion echoing the fears of the interwar period about flotillas of enemy bombers dropping poison gas on New York City.

This time the technology was capable of mass destruction; everyone had genuine fears of a nuclear war that would kill tens of millions of Americans within minutes. Only the United States had ever used atomic weapons--and in both cases the victims were civilian populations. Many of the top soldiers thought the atomic bomb was unnecessary--that their particular strategy would have won the war eventually.

Each of the alternative strategies, however (such as the Army invasion of Kyushu and Honshu, the Navy's tight blockade, the Air Force's relentless firebombing) would have produced more American casualties--and probably far more Japanese killed. Some historians, starting form the assumption that the bomb was "unnecessary" have speculated that it must therefore have been used for some motivation other than military victory.