Moral responsibility: Difference between revisions
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'''Moral responsibility''' is a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. The classification of 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for [[ethics]] and [[metaethics]] and, from an anthropological standpoint, the particularities vary considerably from one group to another. | '''Moral responsibility''' is a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. The classification of 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for [[ethics]] and [[metaethics]] and, from an anthropological standpoint, the particularities vary considerably from one group to another. | ||
A large part of the discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon whether or not humans can actually control their actions, and if they can, to what extent and under what circumstances.<ref name=Vargas/> That issue is the subject of [[free will]], a debate that began millennia ago and seems destined to continue indefinitely. Evidently, should it be decided that | A large part of the discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon whether or not humans can actually control their actions, and if they can, to what extent and under what circumstances.<ref name=Vargas/> That issue is the subject of [[free will]], a debate that began millennia ago and seems destined to continue indefinitely. Evidently, should it be decided that humans' control over their actions is severely limited in some circumstances, any requirement attributing moral responsibility where there is only curtailed agency is mitigated. While awaiting the (probably very nuanced) resolution of this issue, we can inquire what else can be said about the nature of 'moral responsibility' | ||
==Moral relativism== | ==Moral relativism== | ||
Revision as of 12:41, 6 February 2014
Moral responsibility is a duty or obligation to behave in a 'good' manner and refrain from behaving in a 'bad' manner. The classification of 'good' and 'bad' is a subject for ethics and metaethics and, from an anthropological standpoint, the particularities vary considerably from one group to another.
A large part of the discussion of 'moral responsibility' is focused upon whether or not humans can actually control their actions, and if they can, to what extent and under what circumstances.[1] That issue is the subject of free will, a debate that began millennia ago and seems destined to continue indefinitely. Evidently, should it be decided that humans' control over their actions is severely limited in some circumstances, any requirement attributing moral responsibility where there is only curtailed agency is mitigated. While awaiting the (probably very nuanced) resolution of this issue, we can inquire what else can be said about the nature of 'moral responsibility'
Moral relativism
The implications of anthropology for moral philosophy largely fall under the topic of moral relativism.[2] According to Gowans, moral relativism concerns two broad categories:[2]
- Descriptive Moral Relativism: As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be.
The last claim about the significance of disagreement is controversial, but the first claim is not. The other form of moral relativism is:[2]
- Metaethical Moral Relativism: The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.
This position can be contrasted with moral objectivism, the view "that moral judgments are ordinarily true or false in an absolute or universal sense, that some of them are true, and that people sometimes are justified in accepting true moral judgments (and rejecting false ones) on the basis of evidence available to any reasonable and well-informed person.
References
- ↑ Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, p. 10. ISBN 0191655775. “For example, one could be worried about the consequences of reductionism of the mental (including whether our minds do anything, or whether they are epiphenomenal byproducts of more basic causal processes). Alternately, one might be worried that specific results in some or another science (usually, neurology but sometimes psychology) show that we lack some crucial power necessary for moral responsibility....”
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Chris Gowans (Dec 9, 2008). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Moral Relativism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition).