Military history

Military History is the study of armies, battles and soldiers, as well as strategies, tactics, technology and logistics of warfare. It includes the history of naval and air warfare, as well as the history of military thought and strategy.

Military history is sometimes disparaged as non-analytical narrative in which a popular writer provides little more than a chronology of generals and battles. Analysis of one hundred of the early 21st century's best military histories reveals that current military history goes well beyond such subject matter, incorporating social, cultural, and political history. Common areas of inquiry for contemporary historians include the impact of society, culture, and politics on a country's ability to wage war; the social, cultural, and political aftereffects of war; the society and culture of military organizations; and the relationship between military organizations and the communities from which they spring. While historians continue to devote considerable attention to the conventional militaries of Europe and the United States, many also are studying small armies, irregular forces, nonstate actors, civil wars, and non-Western armed forces. Within the military realm, historians frequently tackle subjects of much greater complexity than the generals-and-battles stereotype would suggest, to include the relationship between technological and human factors, the interdependency of land and naval warfare, and the influence of political direction on the military.

New Military History

In the United States, the so-called "new military history" evolved rapidly during the 1980s. It broadened the focus and current methodology, allowing historians to formulate new problems, find new materials, and use new methods. The interest of American academic circles in this New Military History has resulted in new lines of historical research. Among the most fruitful are the historical study of military technology, the interesting debate about the "Military Revolution" in Early Modern history, and the analysis of armed conflict and the nature of combat with particular attention to strategic, logistical, and tactical problems. The most rapid growth has been in the social history of the armed forces, which analyzes such subjects as the social composition of armies, recruitment and military training, motivation, and the effects of military service. Critics complain the new military history minimizes subject of combat and downplays famous people and battles. The new military history does place less emphasis on soldiers, weapons, tactics, and operations and more on society, economics, politics, and culture.

Lynn (1997) argues academic military history faces an increasingly hostile environment because of the current fashions in the study of history. Theoretical complexity, novelty, and even the trivial are now exalted over the traditional forms of historical studies that are at the heart of military history. The "holy trinity plus one" - race, class, and gender in the workplace and popular culture - are the preferred fields of study. Many of the faculty members on the "cutting edge" have no tolerance for interests and approaches that run counter to current trends, leading to an imbalance in hiring that restricts history departments to a narrow focus. There is hope, however, that military history can survive in the hostile academic environment, but to do so it must explore subject matter and methodologies that fit well with contemporary trends. Both gender history and the "new cultural history," for example, hold promise for military historians, even in the study of combat, the essence of military history

H-War: Military History Network

H-War: Military History Network, founded in March, 1995, is a moderated email-based discussion group and bulletin board for scholars, librarians, and teachers in the field of military history. It has an international audience of 1600 subscribers and is published daily; subscriptions are free. H-War focuses particularly on research and teaching interests, new scholarship in the field, discussions of military historiography that foster critical thinking and enhance professionalism, and the sharing of knowledge and experience about the teaching of military history, including posting and discussion of course syllabi and reading lists. The discussion logs are open. H-War post announcements from scholarly societies about their journals, conferences, fellowships, and funding opportunities; encourages organizers of conferences to send calls for papers and program content and graduate students to post abstracts of their doctoral dissertations and research papers; and provides a forum for information on bibliographic and archival sources, as well as reports on new software, datasets, or Web sites relevant to military history. H-War is operated by ten editors,[2] and is sponsored by H-Net, the umbrella group formed in 1992 that publishes over 100 such groups, including H-CivWar (on U.S. Civil War), H-Minerva (on women and the military), and H-Diplo (on diplomatic history).

Theorists

Napoleonic

Jomini

Swiss soldier and military strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was born in Switzerland, served in Napoleon's army from 1804 to 1813, and then joined the army of Tsar Alexander I. He helped to revolutionize warfare through his publications that appeared from 1807 to 1834.

Jomini used a classical, Newtonian model that saw history as a body of empirical data from which one could derive timeless principles. He stressed maps that showed the "forces" (a Newtonian concept) and stressed the importance of quantitative data. Jomini-style history emphasized maps, with every unit and its strength clearly marked, with arrows to show movement of forces. He argued the immutable geometrical principle that "to be superior to the enemy at the decisive point is the key to victory." Jomini emphasized information and the value of intelligence, based on his experience with good intelligence in the French armies. Jomini emphasized the offensive only insofar as it resulted in the capture of places—he believed the occupation of territory or strategic points more important than confronting the American army.

Jomini was highly influential in America, where his disciples Dennis Mahan and Henry Wagner Halleck taught the great majority of top commanders on both sides of the U.S. Civil War. For example, As General-in-Chief of Lincoln's armies, Halleck was determined to apply the Jomini models to the Union armies in the East. This called for concentration, both strategically and tactically, with strong interior lines of communication between the two wings of the enemy. In his attempt to enforce these principles, Halleck met with little cooperation from General McClellan, who was slow to move his armies from the Potomac to support General Pope, and from the latter, who failed to observe Halleck's warning of an enemy attack from the rear. Faced with such obstruction, Halleck's plan failed and led to the defeat of Pope's armies by Robert E. Lee. Disciples of the Jomini-inspired "places theory" argued that the Confederacy could not stand without Vicksburg, New Orleans, Corinth, Atlanta, Chattanooga, and other key points, and made their capture the highest priority.

Clausewitz

Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a German theorist who stressed the moral and political aspects of war. His great work On War was unfinished at his death. He used a romantic or Hegelian conception of warfare, stressing the dialectic of how opposite factors interact, and noting how unexpected new developments unfolded under the "fog of war" and called for rapid decisions by alert commanders. Clausewitz saw history as a complex check on abstractions that did not accord with experience. In opposition to Jomini he argued war could not be quantified or graphed or reduced to mapwork and graphs.

He stressed the primacy of national policy in war. Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, economic, and military totality involving the entire population of a nation at war. He sees war as a social act and as an extension of politics. He stressed that wars are decided by decisive battles (unlike Jomini who stressed control of central geographical locations.) However Clausewitz's emphasis on the superiority of the defense suggests aggressive attacks can be failures. Clausewitz emphasizes the fusion of the regular army with militia, or citizen soldiers, as the only effective method of national defense. This point is especially important as it ends the independence and isolation of the regular military and democraticizes the armed forces much as universal suffrage democraticized politics.

In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz largely dismissed the value of military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. . . . In short, most intelligence is false." His conclusions were influenced by his personal experiences in the Prussian Army, which was often in an intelligence fog due to the superior abilities of Napoleon's system.

Clausewitz had a strong influence on German military thought, and after 1900 on British thought. He had little influence on American military thought before 1945. . He but He influenced Lenin and the Soviet tradition, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war. Clausewitz directly influenced Chinese leader Mao Zedung. Mao read Clausewitz's On War in 1938 and organized a seminar on Clausewitz as part of the educational program for the Party leadership in Yan'an. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely secondhand knowledge, via Lenin (as many have supposed), but reflects Mao's own in-depth study.

Sea Power

Corbett

See

Martime Strategy of 1980s

Washington's so-called maritime strategy, which sought to apply US naval might against Soviet vulnerabilities on its maritime flanks, came to operation during the Reagan administration in the 1980s. The strategy, which witnessed a major buildup of US naval forces and aggressive exercising in seas proximate to the USSR, also explicitly targeted Moscow's strategic missile submarines with the aim of pressuring the Kremlin during crises or the early phases of global war.

Regional studies

Russia

The 1990s was a decade of progress and unfulfilled promise in the field of Russian military history. Broader access to previously closed archives and widespread collaboration between Russian and foreign scholars - one of the decade's most important developments - coincided with a wave of publications in military history. Varying degrees of scholarly access to the Russian State Military-Historical Archive, the Russian State Military Archive, and the Central State Archive of the Ministry of Defense made it possible for historians to construct research on both neglected and sensitive issues. For instance, freer archival access underlay Oleg Fedotovich Suvenirov's Tragediia RKKA 1937-1938 [The tragedy of the Red Army, 1937-38] (1998), David Stone's Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933 (2000), and numerous other works. The 1990s witnessed a modest revival in institutionally sponsored research, as well as a renaissance in serious scholarship on prerevolutionary Russian military history. One of the decade's more unusual developments was the exploration of hitherto taboo subjects, such as the history of military intelligence. However, only some attainments of the 1990's were genuine; others were incomplete or ephemeral. Questions also remain over fundamental issues, including problematic archival access, larger political uncertainties, and indifference toward things military.

United States

Edward M. Coffman, a military historian who taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, emphasizes the role of the individual and includes analysis of social, political, and economic ramifications as well as battles. Coffman's monographs include one on Peyton C. March, army chief of staff during World War I, one on the American military experience during World War I, and one on the Old Army during peacetime, 1784-1898. Coffman notes that historians need as much information as they can "vacuum" and need to be honest to and with their subjects. He urges careful attention be paid to the individual testimonies of soldiers, both written and oral, when doing military history and provides examples of those historians who have accomplished this.

Popular culture

The most popular 1990s American novels and movies mention military culture in only about 6% of the books and 4% of the films. Most are either reflections of the past (such as "Saving Private Ryan") or projections of the future (such as "Starship Troopers"), although they do reflect modern attitudes. This cultural gap can also be seen in works that only glance at the military ("Wag the Dog"). Military or exmilitary protagonists in popular action novels and movies see themselves as tough realists with higher standards, more technological expertise, and greater responsibility than their civilian counterparts. Contemptuous of politicians and intrusive media journalists, they like finding creative ways around constricting rules. But the more literary books and films tend to be more critical of the military's bureaucratic inertia and preoccupations with status and power. This widening gap essentially reflects a shift from an American ethic of national service toward one of self-service.

Bibliography

Historiography

• Barnett, Correlli, Shelford Bidwell, Brian Bond, and John Terraine. Old Battles and New Defences: Can We Learn from Military History? (1986). online edition
• Black, Jeremy. "Determinisms and Other Issues," Journal of Military History, 68 (Oct. 2004), 1217–32.
• Black, Jeremy. Rethinking Military History (2004) online edition
• Chambers II, John Whiteclay. "The New Military History: Myth and Reality," Journal of Military History, 55 (July 1991), 395–406
• Charters, David A., Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson. eds. Military History and the Military Profession, ed. (Westport, 1992)
• Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy. The Encyclopedia of Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present (1977), 1465pp; comprehensive discussion focused on wars and battles
• Grimsley, Mark. "Why Military History Sucks," Nov. 1996, War Historian.org, online at [2]
• Karsten, Peter. ed., Encyclopedia of War and American Society (3 vols., 2005).
• Karsten, Peter. "The 'New' American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored," American Quarterly, 36 #3, (1984), 389–418
• Kohn, Richard H. "The Social History of the American Soldier: A Review and Prospectus for Research," American Historical Review, 86 (June 1981), 553–67.
• Lee, Wayne E. "Mind and Matter—Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field," Journal of American History, 93 (March 2007), 1116–42. Fulltext: History Cooperative and Ebsco
• Lynn, John A. Battle: A Cultural History of Combat and Culture (2003).
• Lynn, John A. "Rally Once Again: The Embattled Future of Academic Military History," Journal of Military History, 61 (Oct. 1997), 777–89.
• Moyar, Mark. "The Current State of Military History." Historical Journal 2007 50(1): 225-240. Issn: 0018-246x
• Porch, Douglas. "Writing History in the "End of History" Era - Reflections on Historians and the GWOT" Journal of Military History 2006 70(4): 1065-1079. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: Ebsco, on war on terror, 2001-present
• Shy, John. "The Cultural Approach to the History of War," Journal of Military History, 57 (Oct. 1993), 13–26
• Spector, Ronald H. "Teetering on the Brink of Respectability." Journal of American History 2007 93(4): 1158-1160. Issn: 0021-8723 Fulltext: History Cooperative and Ebsco
• Spiller, Roger. "Military History and its Fictions." Journal of Military History 2006 70(4): 1081-1097. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: Ebsco

Strategic thought

• Aron, Raymond. Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. (1985). 418 pp.
• Bucholz, Arden. "Hans Delbruck and Modern Military History." The Historian vol 55#3 (1993) pp 517+. online edition
• Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, ed. by Eric J. Grove (1988),
• Frank, Willard C., and Philip S. Gillette. Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991 (1992)
• Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 1981. 473 pp.
• Gat, Azar. The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford UP 1989)
• Gat, Azar. The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford UP, 1992),
• Gray, Colin S. Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History. 2002. 310 pp.
• Handel, Michael I. "Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu." Naval War College Review 2000 53(4): 106-124. Issn: 0028-1484 Fulltext: at Naval War College Review and Ebsco
• Handel, Michael I., ed. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. 1986. 324 pp.
• Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. (2001) 482 pages. Based on comparison of Clausewitz's On War with Sun Tzu's The Art of War
• Hattendorf, J.B. The Evolution of the US Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986 (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare, 1989)
• Meilinger, Philip S. Airwar: Theory and Practice. (2003)234pp ISBN: 0-7146-8266-7
• Paret, Peter, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (1986), 940pp; influential intellectual history of all the mjor military thinkers
• Paret, Peter. Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (2007)
• Reardon, Carol. Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865-1920. U. Press of Kansas 1990. 270 pp.
• Schurman, Donald M. The Education of a Navy (1965), on British Royal Navy
• Seager II, Robert. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, 1977).
• Smith, Hugh. On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 303 pp.
• Steiner, Barry H. Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy. (1991). 367 pp.
• Terriff, Terry. The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy. (1995). 252 pp.
• Wallach, Jehuda L. The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars. (1986). 334 pp.
• Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (1973).
• Williamson, Samuel R., Jr. and Reardon, Steven L. The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953. (1993). 224 pp.

Popular culture

• Doherty, T. Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II (1999)
• Harper, Howard. "The Military and Society: Reaching and Reflecting Audiences in Fiction and Film." Armed Forces & Society 2000 27(2): 231-248. Issn: 0095-327x Fulltext: Ebsco
• Mackenzie, S. P. British War Films, 1939-1945: The Cinema and the Services. (2001). 244 pp
• Slotkin, Richard. "Unit Pride: Ethnic Platoons and the Myths of American Nationality." American Literary History 2001 13(3): 469-498. Issn: 0896-7148 in Project Muse
• Suid, Lawrence H. Sailing on the Silver Screen: Hollywood and the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, 1996)
• Suid, Lawrence H. Guts and Glory. The Making of the American Military Image in Film (2nd ed 2002)
• Suid, Lawrence H. and Haverstick, Dolores A. Stars and Stripes on Screen: A Comprehensive Guide to Portrayals of American Military on Film. (2005). 419 pp.

See also

• American Revolution, military history
• Julius Caesar
• Cold War, Bibliography
• H-War
• Homefront
• Alfred Thayer Mahan
• Military
• Napoleon
• U.S. Civil War, Bibliography
• War of 1812, Bibliography
• World War I, Bibliography
• World War II, air war
• World War II, Pacific

External links

• "Web Sources for Military History" by Richard Jensen guide to web sources for from ancient history to present day
• H-WAR, online discussion by experts
• H-MINERVA, discussions on womrn and the military
• H-CivWar, discussions on the U.S. Civil War

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