Talk:Birthday paradox: Difference between revisions
imported>Peter Schmitt m (Talk:Birthday coincidence moved to Talk:Birthday paradox: moving to the more common name) |
imported>Peter Schmitt (→Misleading formulation: new section) |
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:: That's all I needed. Thanks. [[User:Sandy Harris|Sandy Harris]] 02:56, 2 November 2008 (UTC) | :: That's all I needed. Thanks. [[User:Sandy Harris|Sandy Harris]] 02:56, 2 November 2008 (UTC) | ||
== Misleading formulation == | |||
Just for the record: While the calculation is correct, it is badly explained -- persons have no probability. | |||
Needs rewrite. --[[User:Peter Schmitt|Peter Schmitt]] 23:57, 8 July 2010 (UTC) |
Revision as of 17:57, 8 July 2010
Table for data
Is there an easy way to put data, like in this article, into a table? --David W Gillette 14:55, 21 July 2007 (CDT)
- I've just put your data into a table - have a look at how it's constructed. Anthony Argyriou 10:58, 22 July 2007 (CDT)
- Thanks, it looks great.--David W Gillette 15:45, 22 July 2007 (CDT)
Is there a mathematician in the house?
I've just added an article birthday attack on a cryptographic application of the birthday paradox, with a link from here.
Part of the text there is: "In general, for a cryptographic primitive of size n bits, the attack cost is 2n/2." That's a well-known rule among crypto folk; it's in the standard references and is used in government standards, see the last paragraph of birthday attack. However, I've never seen a proof and do not know if it is a theorem or just a handy approximation. Can anyone clarify this? Sandy Harris 13:32, 1 November 2008 (UTC)
- I don't know what a cryptographic primitive is, and the article does not explain it (hint!). But I guess it is something like a hash function. If you use n-bit hash values (each of them equally likely) and then there is a 50% chance of a hash collision if you compute the hash of about 1.18 · 2n/2 pieces of data.
- With n bits there are N = 2n possibilities, so if you take k pieces of data, the probability of a hash collision is (the same formula as in the article):
- Using Stirling's approximation for the factorial and assuming that k is large and N even larger, we find the approximation
- Let me know if you're interested in the details of the computation. So the probability is 50% if
- and solving this yields
- For instance, if N = 365 (which is the case in the article) then you get k = 1.18 · N1/2 = 22.5, which is a pretty good approximation for the size of the group you need to get two people with the same birthday. -- Jitse Niesen 00:48, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
- That's all I needed. Thanks. Sandy Harris 02:56, 2 November 2008 (UTC)
Misleading formulation
Just for the record: While the calculation is correct, it is badly explained -- persons have no probability. Needs rewrite. --Peter Schmitt 23:57, 8 July 2010 (UTC)