Ontology (philosophy): Difference between revisions
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For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the ''usage'' of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.<ref name=Hirsch/> Such phrases are called ''quantifier expressions''.<ref name=Westerstahl/> | For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the ''usage'' of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.<ref name=Hirsch/> Such phrases are called ''quantifier expressions''.<ref name=Westerstahl/> | ||
For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of [[mereology]]. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'sensible' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?<ref name=Putnam/> Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, true or false, are about ''something''?<ref name=Orenstein/> | For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of [[mereology]]. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'sensible' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?<ref name=Putnam/> Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, true or false, are about ''something''?<ref name=Orenstein/> Another large arena for discussion is the existence of ''properties'' and other ''universals'' that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one.<ref name=Swoyer/> | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
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{{cite book |author= Hilary Putnam |year= 1987 |pages=p. 33 |title=The Many Faces of Realism |publisher=Open Court |url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=TCG-Ua27FoLPywHngoHwBw&id=32ENAQAAMAAJ&dq=%22The+Many+Faces+of+Realism+%22&q=%22another+way+of+insisting+that+mereological+sums+really+exist+%22#search_anchor |edition=2nd |isbn=0812690427 |edition=2nd}} | {{cite book |author= Hilary Putnam |year= 1987 |pages=p. 33 |title=The Many Faces of Realism |publisher=Open Court |url=http://books.google.com/books?ei=TCG-Ua27FoLPywHngoHwBw&id=32ENAQAAMAAJ&dq=%22The+Many+Faces+of+Realism+%22&q=%22another+way+of+insisting+that+mereological+sums+really+exist+%22#search_anchor |edition=2nd |isbn=0812690427 |edition=2nd}} | ||
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<ref name=Swoyer> | |||
{{cite web |date=September 12, 2011 |author=Swoyer, Chris and Orilia, Francesco |title= Properties |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta, ed |url= = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/properties/}} | |||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
Revision as of 10:42, 19 July 2013
In philosophy the field of ontology considers what things exist, and what existence implies.[1]
For some philosophers, called 'deflationist', this question is linguistic, that is, it concerns the usage of expressions like 'At least one such-and-such exists'.[2] Such phrases are called quantifier expressions.[3]
For other philosophers, ontology concerns the actual existence of real things in the universe. The subject is complicated by discussion of issues like whether compound objects really exist, a question of mereology. For example, does a 'book' exist or only the 'pages' of the book. How do we draw the line between 'sensible' compound objects and silly ones like 'my nose and the Eiffel tower'?[4] Another confusion called 'Plato's beard' considers whether a statement like 'Pegasus is a flying horse' implies a belief in the existence of Pegasus. In general terms, is it true that statements, true or false, are about something?[5] Another large arena for discussion is the existence of properties and other universals that appear to be instantiated in multiple objects, rather than a particular one.[6]
References
- ↑ Tony Lawson (December, 2004). A concept of ontology. Retrieved on 2013-07-19.
- ↑ Eli Hirsch (2011). “Introduction”, Quantifier Variance and Realism : Essays in Metaontology. Oxford University Press, p. xii. ISBN 0199732116.
- ↑ Dag Westerståhl (April 19, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed:Generalized Quantifiers. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition).
- ↑ Hilary Putnam (1987). The Many Faces of Realism, 2nd. Open Court, p. 33. ISBN 0812690427.
- ↑ Alex Orenstein, Petr Kotatko (2001). “Plato's beard and Quine's stubble”, Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Springer, p. 210. ISBN 140200253X.
- ↑ Swoyer, Chris and Orilia, Francesco (September 12, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed:[= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/properties/ Properties]. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition).