Eurozone

The European Economic and Monetary Union

The decision to form an Economic and Monetary Union was taken by the European Council in December 1991, and was given legislative effect by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
Its principal features are:

- the adoption of the euro as its members' the single currency;

- the coordination of its members' fiscal policies, by the adoption of agreed limits on the magnitudes of their public debt and their budget deficits; and,

- the operation of a common monetary policy under the management of a single Central Bank.

Its principal institutions are:

- the European Council, which sets its main policy directions;

- the Council of the European Union which coordinates its policy and decides whether to admit new members;

- the European Commission, which monitors compliance with its membership rules; and,

- the European Central Bank, which determines its monetary policy.

Rationale

The adoption of a common currency as part of the Economic and Monetary Union was seen as lowering the barriers to Europe's markets by reducing transaction costs and eliminating exchange rate risks. It was generally accepted that there could be offsetting disadvantages arising from loss of control over their domestic economies, but most of the continent's governments judged the balance to be positive. Some have since come to question that judgement because of the unsymmetrical impact of recent demand shocks upon the domestic economies of member countries.

Membership

Entry criteria

The criteria for eurozone membership set out in the Maastricht Treaty were:

- an inflation rate not exceeding by more than 1.5% that of the three best-performing Member States;

- a general government budget deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP and a public debt of less than 60% of GDP;

- a long-term interest rate not exceeding by more than 2% that of the three best-performing Member States; and,

- a stable exchange rate.

Membership rules

The original version of the membership rules in the Mastricht Treaty (The Stability and Growth Pact , ) set the same limits upon member countries' budget deficits and levels of national debt. Following multiple breaches of those limits by several member countries including Germany and France the pact was been renegotiated.

The revised agreement treats a budget deficit not greater than 3 per cent of GDP, and a public debt not greater than 60 per cent of GDP as targets rather than permitted limits, and provides for:

- a "medium term budgetary objective" for each member country that specifies margins within which the target values may be exceeded;

- an adjustment path for return to the target levels;

- procedures for determining and revising the country's budgetary objectives and adjustment paths: and,

- an "excessive deficit procedure", prescribing the actions required of a country whose deficit is deemed to be excessive.

The membership rules appear to be ambiguous concerning the provision of assistance to a member government that experiences serius financial difficulties. Article 104 of the Maastricht treaty appears to forbid any financial bail-out of member governments, but article 103 of the treaty appears to envisage circumstances under which a bail-out is permitted,

Members

The original members of the eurozone are: Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland,
Greece joined in 2001;
Slovenia joined in 2007;
Cyprus and Malta joined in 2008:
Slovakia joined in 2009,

Effects of membership

A monetary union may be expected to reduce the cost of transactions among its members by eliminating both currency exchange costs and exchange rate risks - and thus to increase their growth rates. It may also be expected to improve the creditworthiness of its otherwise less creditworthy governments if potential investors expect the union's other governments to protect them from default. Their improved creditworthiness may raise their countries' growth rates further by enabling them to undertake productive investments that they would otherwise be unable to finance. On the evidence of a comparison of growth rates it appears that the economies of the eurozone members as a whole did not grow any faster than those of the other members of the European Union during the ten years following its launch. The major exceptions were Ireland and Greece and - on a smaller scale - Spain.

A further effect upon the economies of member countries arose from the imposition of a common exchange rate for transactions with non-member countries. That meant that a fall in the international competitiveness of a member country's products could no longer be offset by a compensating fall in the exchange rate that governed their price to buyers in non-member countries. Without that offset, the inevitable result of a loss of competitiveness was an increased deficit in the country's balance of payments, paid for by borroing from abroad. On the evidence of a balance of payments comparison it appears that, although there was a small surplus on the eurozone's balance of payments at the end of 2007, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy were running large balance of payments deficits, while Germany and the Netherlands were running large surpluses.

Prospect

The eurozone crisis has drawn attention to a moral hazard that is inherent in the design of the eurozone. The governments of countries such as Greece are enabled in effect to pledge the resources of the union's more creditworhy members such as Germany against their own borrowings. A no bail-out clause in the Maastricht Treaty was intended to deter abuse, but the time inconsistency of that deterrent was revealed when it was realised that the contagion costs of not bailing out the Greek government would exceed the costs of a bailout.

Europe's decision-makers are faced with a more immediate problem than the design of the Eurozone. Their bailouts have so far failed to restore the confidence of operators on the bond market and continued failure could result in a continuing spread of the crisis to an extent that could raise the cost of bailouts to beyond the feasible capacity of its providors.