Public expenditure: Difference between revisions
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benefit from reduced anxiety, better health or more enjoyable leisure - all of which are increases in economic welfare. | benefit from reduced anxiety, better health or more enjoyable leisure - all of which are increases in economic welfare. | ||
The quantification of the economic effects of public expenditure is subject to errors and uncertainties arising from the practical difficulty of determining the preferences of those affected and the intellectual obstacles to the aggregation of their gains and losses of economic welfare<ref> See "The Social Welfare Controversy"[http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Welfare_economics/Tutorials#The_social_welfare_controversy]</ref>. In contrast, social welfare is necessarily maximised, according to the theorems of [[welfare economics]], by market forces operating under conditions of ''perfect competition'' and ''flexible prices''. For those reasons, it is generally presumed that social welfare is reduced if the public sector controls the provision of goods and services that could otherwise be supplied by the private sector. That presumption is tenable only in the absence only in the absence of significant amounts of ''market power'', and it has been argued that it need not hold when there is appreciable interdependence among members of a community<ref>[http://www.questia.com/read/66063831 William Baumol: ''Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State'', Chapter 12, page 180 (summary), Harvard University Press, 1965. (accessible online to Questia subscribers)]</ref>. | The quantification of the economic effects of public expenditure is subject to errors and uncertainties arising from the practical difficulty of determining the preferences of those affected and the intellectual obstacles to the aggregation of their gains and losses of economic welfare<ref> See "The Social Welfare Controversy"[http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Welfare_economics/Tutorials#The_social_welfare_controversy]</ref>. In contrast, social welfare is necessarily maximised, according to the theorems of [[welfare economics]], by market forces operating under conditions of ''perfect competition'' and ''flexible prices''. For those reasons, it is generally presumed that social welfare is reduced if the public sector controls the provision of goods and services that could otherwise be supplied by the private sector<ref> The article on [[public goods]] deals with circumstances under which the alternative of supply by the private sector is not available, or only partially available</ref>. That presumption is tenable only in the absence only in the absence of significant amounts of ''market power'', and it has been argued that it need not hold when there is appreciable interdependence among members of a community<ref>[http://www.questia.com/read/66063831 William Baumol: ''Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State'', Chapter 12, page 180 (summary), Harvard University Press, 1965. (accessible online to Questia subscribers)]</ref>. | ||
==Political aspects== | ==Political aspects== |
Revision as of 15:38, 3 November 2009
Overview
Definitions
Public expenditure may be understood as spending by central (federal), state and local governments and by the public corporations, or simply as spending by the public sector.
(For statistical purposes, however, those terms are open to differing interpretations, and to promote comparability in the construction of national accounts, the OECD has published the following definitions[1]
- The public sector comprises the general government sector plus all public corporations including the central bank.
- The government sector consists of the following resident institutional units: all units of central, state or local government; all social security funds at each level of government; all non-market non-profit institutions that are controlled and financed by government units.
- The general government sector consists of the totality of institutional units which, in addition to fulfilling their political responsibilities and their role of economic regulation, produce principally non-market services (possibly goods) for individual or collective consumption and redistribute income and wealth.)
Categorisation
The principal categories of public expenditure are:
- government investment,
- government consumption,
- transfer payments
The effects of public spending
Social effects
Social justice
It is generally accepted that public expenditure can have a major influence upon social justice, but there is no consensus concerning the operational meaning of that term. The utilitarian criterion of welfare maximisation proposed by Jeremy Bentham [2] is implicit in the widespread application of cost/benefit criteria to investment and consumption expenditure, but it is held not to be applicable to transfer payments because it has implications for income distribution that could have damaging effects upon motivation. The philosopher John Rawls claims to meet that objection by requiring only that there should be no more inequality than would be required for the benefit of the least well off [3], but the political philosopher Will Kymlicka argues that that, too, could have averse motivational consequences[4]. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin proposes the adoption of an "equality of resources" criterion[5], and the eminent economist Amartya Sen proposed instead the criterion of "equality of capability"[6], but the libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick rejects the entire concept of redistribution on the grounds that it would infringe every person's inalienable right to benefit from the employment of the talents with which he is endowed[7].
International differences in income distribution are revealed by comparisons of Gini indexes, which indicate a tendency toward less inequality in Europe than elsewhere (see the tutorials subpage). However, it is the general practice in all the developed countries to provide protection against extreme poverty by means of income-support payments or food supplements. The levels of those "safety-net" provisions are generally sufficient to eliminate life-threatening poverty, but provision above that level is influenced by perceptions of the danger of dependency[8] (sometimes known as the Samaritan's dilemma).
Freedom of choice
Public expenditure can be thought of as the expression of the transfer of freedom of choice from individuals to government. The concept of a political system under which the people delegate powers to the state on condition that it uses those powers in their interest was put forward in the 17th century by John Locke [9], and the actions to be undertaken in the exercise of those delegated powers were described by Adam Smith in the 18th century as "erecting or maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, although they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could not repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain."[10]. The concept was further developed in the 19th century by John Stuart Mill, who termed it "Representative Government" [11].
It can be argued that a person's freedom of choice is not reduced when the state makes a choice that he would otherwise have made, and Kenneth Arrow has argued that state-provided insurance has the effect of increasing individual freedom of choice when market-provided insurance is not available, or when the market's provision differs from the competitive norm [12]. Arrow identifies departures from the competitive norm in the provision of medical insurance, and Akerlov has argued that such departures can occur whenever there is asymmetric information [13]
Economic effects
Public expenditure may be expected to affect a country's accounting aggregates such as its gross national product and its rate of economic growth. Investment in the infrastructure may be expected to affect transport costs, and the maintenance of publicly-owned assets may be expected to affect their future running costs. Spending on health and education may be expected to affect future output as a result of its effect upon human capital, and there is some evidence to suggest that reductions in income inequality resulting from social expenditure can increase social capital[14], although it has also been suggested that it can have output-reducing consequences arising from its effects upon motivation.
Public expenditure also has effects that are not reflected in conventional measures of economic growth because they do not involve increases in measurable output. Social expenditure and spending on health and education, in particular, generate welfare increases over and above those resulting from their effects on economic activity. No measures are available of the extent to which people benefit from reduced anxiety, better health or more enjoyable leisure - all of which are increases in economic welfare.
The quantification of the economic effects of public expenditure is subject to errors and uncertainties arising from the practical difficulty of determining the preferences of those affected and the intellectual obstacles to the aggregation of their gains and losses of economic welfare[15]. In contrast, social welfare is necessarily maximised, according to the theorems of welfare economics, by market forces operating under conditions of perfect competition and flexible prices. For those reasons, it is generally presumed that social welfare is reduced if the public sector controls the provision of goods and services that could otherwise be supplied by the private sector[16]. That presumption is tenable only in the absence only in the absence of significant amounts of market power, and it has been argued that it need not hold when there is appreciable interdependence among members of a community[17].
Political aspects
Domestic
International
Notes and references
- ↑ Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD, 2009
- ↑ Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford University Press, 1970
- ↑ John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971
- ↑ Will Kymlicka: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Clarendon Press, 1989
- ↑ Ronald Dworkin: Sovereign Virtue, Harvard University Press, 2002
- ↑ Amartya Sen: The Idea of Justice, Alan Lane, 2009
- ↑ Robert Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974
- ↑ Marion Smiley: "Dependence, Autonomy, and the Welfare State", Chapter Two (excerpted) of Welfare Dependence': The Power of a Concept, Thesis Eleven.2001; 64: 21-38[1]
- ↑ John Locke On Civil Government
- ↑ Adam Smith: An Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book 5, Chapter 1, Part 3, (first published 1776)
- ↑ John Stuart Mill Representative Government
- ↑ Kenneth Arrow: Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American Economic Review, December 1963
- ↑ Akerlof G. (1970), "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500. [2] (Google abstract)
- ↑ Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner and Prothrow-Stith. Social Capital, Income Inequality, and Mortality, American Journal of Public Health. 1997 Sep;87(9):1491-8.[3](abstract)
- ↑ See "The Social Welfare Controversy"[4]
- ↑ The article on public goods deals with circumstances under which the alternative of supply by the private sector is not available, or only partially available
- ↑ William Baumol: Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, Chapter 12, page 180 (summary), Harvard University Press, 1965. (accessible online to Questia subscribers)