Joint warfare in South Vietnam 1964-1968: Difference between revisions
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz (New page: {{TOC-right}} A new situation arose due to the overthrow of Diem, the two coups shortly following, <ref name=INR-VN4>{{citation | title = Vietnam 1961-1968 as interpreted in INR's Produc...) |
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz No edit summary |
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Note that Minh was exiled within the same month as the [[Gulf of Tonkin incident]], with its obvious ramifications of increased U.S. involvement. | Note that Minh was exiled within the same month as the [[Gulf of Tonkin incident]], with its obvious ramifications of increased U.S. involvement. | ||
==1964== | |||
===September 1964: SVN explores governments=== | |||
Under Khanh, the start of a civilian government, called the High Legislative Council, started in September, with Pham Khac Suu as head of state and Tran Van Huong as Premier and head of government. INR, however, did not believe this council would gain traction unless it was perceived as representative by both the populace and the military. Khanh dissolved the council in December, in the face of new demonstrations, although he temporarily retain Suu and Huong, dismissing them in December. Khanh, according to INR, created a new tension with the Buddhists that Huong had not, and also may have been approaching Hanoi much as he had accused Minh. | |||
==1965== | |||
===February 1965: new government in Saigon=== | |||
A coup against Khanh failed in early February, but he left the country within a few weeks, with the Armed Forces Council back in charge. Just before Khanh left, the Council did set up a new civilian government headed by Phan Huy Quat. INR saw the Quat government as evidence of a temporary stability between the military and the Buddhist, but one that could be broken by a power play of factions on either side. | |||
Under Khanh, the start of a civilian government, called the High Legislative Council, started in September, with Pham Khac Suu as head of state and Tran Van Huong as Premier and head of government. INR, however, did not believe this council would gain traction unless it was perceived as representative by both the populace and the military. Khanh dissolved the council in December, in the face of new demonstrations, although he temporarily retain Suu and Huong, dismissing them in December. Khanh, according to INR, created a new tension with the Buddhists that Huong had not, and also may have been approaching Hanoi much as he had accused Minh. | Under Khanh, the start of a civilian government, called the High Legislative Council, started in September, with Pham Khac Suu as head of state and Tran Van Huong as Premier and head of government. INR, however, did not believe this council would gain traction unless it was perceived as representative by both the populace and the military. Khanh dissolved the council in December, in the face of new demonstrations, although he temporarily retain Suu and Huong, dismissing them in December. Khanh, according to INR, created a new tension with the Buddhists that Huong had not, and also may have been approaching Hanoi much as he had accused Minh. | ||
A coup against Khanh failed in early February, but he left the country within a few weeks, with the Armed Forces Council back in charge. Just before Khanh left, the Council did set up a new civilian government headed by Phan Huy Quat. INR saw the Quat government as evidence of a temporary stability between the military and the Buddhist, but one that could be broken by a power play of factions on either side. | A coup against Khanh failed in early February, but he left the country within a few weeks, with the Armed Forces Council back in charge. Just before Khanh left, the Council did set up a new civilian government headed by Phan Huy Quat. INR saw the Quat government as evidence of a temporary stability between the military and the Buddhist, but one that could be broken by a power play of factions on either side. | ||
===U.S. military plans buildup, April=== | |||
On 13 April 1965, joint RVN-US discussions agreed that the ARVN force levels were inadequate. The manning level was increased, to increase RVN infantry battalions from 119 (93 infantry, 20 Ranger, and 6 airborne) to 150. The new battalions were generally added to existing regiments, to avoid the need of creating more headquarters units. By the end of 1965, twenty-four were either in the field or in training areas.<ref name=Collins1974-Ch01>{{citation | |||
| contribution = Chapter I: The Formative Years, 1950-1959 | |||
| title = Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 | |||
| first = James Lawton, Jr. | last = Collins | |||
| url = http://www.history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/devtrainrvn/ch1.htm}}, p. 64</ref> | |||
===McNamara proposes escalation, July=== | |||
In July 1965, McNamara sent Johnson a set of notes proposing escalation of what he saw as a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. "The situation in SVN is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. . . . The central highlands could well be lost to the NLF during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken...The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals."<ref name=McNamara1965-07-20>{{citation | |||
| first = Robert S. | last = McNamara | |||
| title = Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam," | |||
| date = 20 July 1965 | |||
| url = http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/doc261.htm}}</ref> | |||
McNamara saw the correlation of forces between the ARVN and the VC is quite unfavorable. "The Govt-to-VC ratio overall is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat battalions little better than 1.5-to-1." A historical rule of thumb for counterinsurgency has been that a 10 to 1 ratio is desirable, but, like all rules of thumb, it is not applicable to all situations. Even a critic of that generalization, "indeed, that ratio was often cited by critics of the U.S. policy in Vietnam", who cite a number of other revolutionary wars where the insurgency was defeated by less overwhelming ratios (e.g., Eritrea against Ethiopia) or where an acceptable goal was partition (e.g., [[Second Sudanese Civil War]]), cite the conventional wisdom as primarily relevant to situations of ideological insurgency against a central government, such as the Communist takeover of Vietnam, where the insurgents want complete victory.<ref name=Harkavy2001>{{citation | |||
| title = Warfare and the Third World | |||
| first = Robert E. | last = Harkavy | first= Stephanie G. | last = Neuman | |||
|publisher = Macmillan | year= 2001 | |||
| url =http://books.google.com/books?id=a9uTpGCUkQEC&pg=PA65&lpg=PA65&dq=counterinsurgency+ratio+10:1&source=web&ots=pNi8Gtqv_-&sig=g12LcGAepaUtOWSckZNDbNBj2lE&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=9&ct=result#PPA66,M1 }}, p. 65-66</ref> The current U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency also recognizes there is no simple ratio, "During | |||
previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents | |||
to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in | |||
COIN...A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s | |||
military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants...Twenty counterinsurgents | |||
per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN | |||
operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation." <ref name = FM3-24>{{citation | publisher = US Department of the Army | first1 = John A. | last1 = Nagl | first2 = David H.| last2 = Petraeus | first3 = James F. | last3 =Amos |first4 = Sarah | last4 = Sewall | |||
| title = Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency | |||
| date = December 2006 | |||
| url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf | |||
}} </ref> None of these sources, however, see a 3:1 to 1.5:1 as favorable. | |||
McNamara also observed that the Administration's approach to air war against the North, Rolling Thunder, had not " produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that SVN is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than complete takeover."<ref name=McNamara1965-07-20 /> | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} |
Revision as of 17:03, 28 September 2008
A new situation arose due to the overthrow of Diem, the two coups shortly following, [1] the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and increasing intensity in the war.
Note that Minh was exiled within the same month as the Gulf of Tonkin incident, with its obvious ramifications of increased U.S. involvement.
1964
September 1964: SVN explores governments
Under Khanh, the start of a civilian government, called the High Legislative Council, started in September, with Pham Khac Suu as head of state and Tran Van Huong as Premier and head of government. INR, however, did not believe this council would gain traction unless it was perceived as representative by both the populace and the military. Khanh dissolved the council in December, in the face of new demonstrations, although he temporarily retain Suu and Huong, dismissing them in December. Khanh, according to INR, created a new tension with the Buddhists that Huong had not, and also may have been approaching Hanoi much as he had accused Minh.
1965
February 1965: new government in Saigon
A coup against Khanh failed in early February, but he left the country within a few weeks, with the Armed Forces Council back in charge. Just before Khanh left, the Council did set up a new civilian government headed by Phan Huy Quat. INR saw the Quat government as evidence of a temporary stability between the military and the Buddhist, but one that could be broken by a power play of factions on either side.
Under Khanh, the start of a civilian government, called the High Legislative Council, started in September, with Pham Khac Suu as head of state and Tran Van Huong as Premier and head of government. INR, however, did not believe this council would gain traction unless it was perceived as representative by both the populace and the military. Khanh dissolved the council in December, in the face of new demonstrations, although he temporarily retain Suu and Huong, dismissing them in December. Khanh, according to INR, created a new tension with the Buddhists that Huong had not, and also may have been approaching Hanoi much as he had accused Minh.
A coup against Khanh failed in early February, but he left the country within a few weeks, with the Armed Forces Council back in charge. Just before Khanh left, the Council did set up a new civilian government headed by Phan Huy Quat. INR saw the Quat government as evidence of a temporary stability between the military and the Buddhist, but one that could be broken by a power play of factions on either side.
U.S. military plans buildup, April
On 13 April 1965, joint RVN-US discussions agreed that the ARVN force levels were inadequate. The manning level was increased, to increase RVN infantry battalions from 119 (93 infantry, 20 Ranger, and 6 airborne) to 150. The new battalions were generally added to existing regiments, to avoid the need of creating more headquarters units. By the end of 1965, twenty-four were either in the field or in training areas.[2]
McNamara proposes escalation, July
In July 1965, McNamara sent Johnson a set of notes proposing escalation of what he saw as a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. "The situation in SVN is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. . . . The central highlands could well be lost to the NLF during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken...The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals."[3]
McNamara saw the correlation of forces between the ARVN and the VC is quite unfavorable. "The Govt-to-VC ratio overall is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat battalions little better than 1.5-to-1." A historical rule of thumb for counterinsurgency has been that a 10 to 1 ratio is desirable, but, like all rules of thumb, it is not applicable to all situations. Even a critic of that generalization, "indeed, that ratio was often cited by critics of the U.S. policy in Vietnam", who cite a number of other revolutionary wars where the insurgency was defeated by less overwhelming ratios (e.g., Eritrea against Ethiopia) or where an acceptable goal was partition (e.g., Second Sudanese Civil War), cite the conventional wisdom as primarily relevant to situations of ideological insurgency against a central government, such as the Communist takeover of Vietnam, where the insurgents want complete victory.[4] The current U.S. Army doctrine on counterinsurgency also recognizes there is no simple ratio, "During previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN...A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation’s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants...Twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation." [5] None of these sources, however, see a 3:1 to 1.5:1 as favorable.
McNamara also observed that the Administration's approach to air war against the North, Rolling Thunder, had not " produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that SVN is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than complete takeover."[3]
References
- ↑ Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, IV. Time of Decision: November 1963-March 1965, Vietnam 1961-1968 as interpreted in INR's Production, vol. George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 121, INR-VN4, pp. 10-18
- ↑ Collins, James Lawton, Jr., Chapter I: The Formative Years, 1950-1959, Vietnam Studies: The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, p. 64
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 McNamara, Robert S. (20 July 1965), Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam,"
- ↑ Neuman, Stephanie G. (2001), Warfare and the Third World, Macmillan, p. 65-66
- ↑ Nagl, John A.; David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos et al. (December 2006), Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, US Department of the Army