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The '''Iraq War''' was the invasion of [[Iraq]] in 2003 by a multinational coalition led by the [[United States of America]]. Military operations were conducted by forces from the U.S., the [[United Kingdom]], [[Australia]] and [[Poland]], and was supported in various ways by many other countries, some of which allowed attacks to be launched or controlled from their territory. The U.N. neither approved nor censured the war, which was never a formally declared war.  The U.S. refers to it as [[Operation IRAQI FREEDOM]]. Continuing operations are under the command of [[Multi-National Force-Iraq]].


This war is to be distinguished from the [[Gulf War]] of 1991, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Gulf War had United Nations authorization.  Further, both these wars should be differentiated from the [[Iran-Iraq War]] of 1980-1988.
The '''Iraq War''' was the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a multinational coalition led by the United States of America. Military operations were conducted by forces from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland, and was supported in various ways by many other countries, some of which allowed attacks to be launched or controlled from their territory. The United Nations neither approved nor censured the invasion, which was never a formally declared a war.  The U.S. refers to it as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Continuing operations are under the command of Multi-National Force-Iraq. 
 
From the U.S. operational view, Operation Iraqi Freedom ended when the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the last operational brigade in Iraq, left in August 2010. <ref>{{citation
| title = Operation Iraqi Freedom ends as last combat soldiers leave Baghdad
| author = Ernesto Londoño
| journal = Washington Post 
| date = 19 August 2010
| url =http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR2010081805644_pf.html
}}</ref> Six other brigades actually remain, but they are called "advise and assist" units charged with training.
 
This war is to be distinguished from the Gulf War of 1991, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Gulf War had United Nations authorization.  Further, both these wars should be differentiated from the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988.
 
The war had quick result of the removal (and later execution) of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the formation of a democratically elected parliament and ratified constitution, which won UN approval. However, an amorphous insurgency since then has produced large numbers of civilian deaths and an unstable Iraqi government. It has generated enormous political controversy in the U.S. and other countries. 
 
It also changed the dynamics of the region. According to Anthony Zinni, <ref>Presentation at the Brookings Institution National Security Seminar, November 2001, as recorded by David Kilcullen</ref>, it produced the "first Shi'a Arab state in modern history." Earlier advocates of regime change in Iraq, such as David Wurmser, had proposed replacing Saddam Hussein with a government of Iraqi exiles centered around Ahmed Chalabi; such a government would be in close alliance with Jordan.<ref name=Tyranny>{{citation
| url = http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021130_40748.pdf
| title = Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein
| publisher = American Enterprise Institute
| year = 1999 | author = David Wurmser
}}, p. 80</ref> There have been constant questions of Iraq splitting along the ethnic and religious lines of the three Ottoman Empire provinces from which the British Empire created it: Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd.
 
Sovereignty has been transferred to a new elected Iraqi government, with U.S. forces withdrawn from the cities. Security problems still exist, although they are reduced from the worst times of the insurgency.
 
{{seealso|Iraq War, origins of invasion}}
{{seealso|Iraq War, major combat phase}}
{{seealso|Iraq War, Surge}}


The war had quick result of the removal (and later execution) of Iraqi dictator [[Saddam Hussein]] and the formation of a democratically elected parliament and ratified constitution, which won UN approval. However, an amorphous [[insurgency]] since then has produced large numbers of civilian deaths and an unstable Iraqi government. It has generated enormous political controversy in the U.S. and other countries.
==Rationale==
==Rationale==
There had been some sentiment, in the 1991 [[Gulf War]], that the invasion force should have continued to Baghdad and overthrown [[Saddam Hussein]], but most agree that would have been far beyond the UN mandate and the realities of the coalition. Nevertheless, there was increasingly strong pressure among American policy influencers, from the mid-1990s on, that regime change in Iraq was important to the overall goals of American foreign policy.  The 1998 [[Iraq Liberation Act]] formalized this as a Congressional statement of direction.
There had been some sentiment, in the 1991 Gulf War, that the invasion force should have continued to Baghdad and overthrown Saddam Hussein, but most agree that would have been far beyond the UN mandate and the realities of the coalition. Nevertheless, there was increasingly strong pressure among American policy influencers, from the mid-1990s on, that regime change in Iraq was important to the overall goals of American foreign policy.  The 1998 Iraq Liberation Act formalized this as a Congressional statement of direction.


The main rationale for the invasion was Iraq’s continued violation of the 1991 agreement (in particular United Nations Resolution 687) that the country allow UN weapons inspectors unhindered access to nuclear facilities, as well as the country’s failure to observe several UN resolutions ordering Iraq to comply with Resolution 687. The US government cited intelligence reports that Iraq was actively supporting terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as additional and acute reasons to invade. Though there was some justification before October 2002 for believing this intelligence credible, a later Senate investigation found that the intelligence was inaccurate and that the intelligence community failed to communicate this properly to the Bush administration<ref>{{citation
The main rationale for the invasion was Iraq’s continued violation of the 1991 agreement (in particular United Nations Resolution 687) that the country allow UN weapons inspectors unhindered access to nuclear facilities, as well as the country’s failure to observe several UN resolutions ordering Iraq to comply with Resolution 687. The US government cited intelligence reports that Iraq was actively supporting terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as additional and acute reasons to invade. Though there was some justification before October 2002 for believing this intelligence credible, a later Senate investigation found that the intelligence was inaccurate and that the intelligence community failed to communicate this properly to the Bush administration<ref>{{citation
Line 15: Line 38:


==Factors Leading Up to the Invasion==
==Factors Leading Up to the Invasion==
{{main|Iraq War, origins of invasion}}
There was wide support for the view that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had a negative effect on regional and world stability, although many of the opinion makers intensely disagreed on the ways in which it was destabilizing. This idea certainly did not begin with 9/11, but 9/11 intensified the concern in the Bush Administration.<ref name=Feith-War>{{citation
There was wide support for the view that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had a negative effect on regional and world stability, although many of the opinion makers intensely disagreed on the ways in which it was destabilizing. This idea certainly did not begin with 9/11, but 9/11 intensified the concern in the Bush Administration.<ref name=Feith-War>{{citation
  | title = War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism
  | title = War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism
  | author = Douglas J. Feith
  | author = Douglas J. Feith
  | publisher = Harper | year = 2008 | isbn = 9780060899738}}, pp. 215-216}}</ref>
  | publisher = Harper | year = 2008 | isbn = 9780060899738}}, pp. 215-216</ref> Nevertheless, U.S. military action against Iraq goes back to unconventional warfare during the Iran-Iraq War under Ronald Reagan, the Gulf War under George W. Bush and various operations under Bill Clinton.
 
Iraq had had and used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and had active missile, biological weapon and nuclear weapon development programs. These provided Saddam with both a means of threatening and deterring within the region. He also supported regional terrorists, but there is now little evidence he had operational control of terrorists acting outside the region.  Saddam had attempted an assassination of former President George H. W. Bush.


Iraq had had and used [[chemical weapon]]s in the [[Iran-Iraq War]] and had active missile, [[biological weapon]] and [[nuclear weapon]] development programs. These provided Saddam with both a means of threatening and deterring within the region.
The issue of non-national terrorism, however, took on new intensity after the 9/11 attack. Some analysts, such as Michael Scheuer, believe that many decision makers found it hard to accept that such an attack could come from other than a nation-state.


He also supported regional terrorists, but there is now little evidence he had operational control of terrorists acting outside the region.  Saddam had attempted an assassination of former President [[George H. W. Bush]].
The Authorization for the Use of Military Force that gave the George W. Bush Administration its legal authority to attack Iraq did not specifically depend on a proven relationship between Iraq and 9-11, or a specific WMD threat to the United States. Both, however, were assumed.


The issue of non-national terrorism, however, took on new intensity after the [[9-11 attack]]. Some analysts, such as [[Michael Scheuer]], believe that many decisionmakers found it hard to accept that such an attack could come from other than a nation-state.
==Strategic preparation==
''Not all the planning dates may seem in proper sequence; this is not anything suspicious as some of the work was already in progress as part of routine staff activity, while other work was started by informal communications.''


The [[Authorization for the Use of Military Force]] that gave the [[George W. Bush Administration]] its legal authority to attack Iraq did not specifically depend on a proven relationship between Iraq and 9-11, or a specific WMD threat to the United States. Both, however, were assumed.
Even before the 9/11 attacks, regime change in Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a high priority of the George W. Bush Administration. According to This is not to suggest that previous Administrations had not been considering it, and had been steadily carrying out air attacks in support of the no-fly zones (Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and Operation NORTHERN WATCH), as well as air strikes (Operation DESERT FOX). Nevertheless, the priorities changed.


===Clinton Administration===
In part using the cover of the no-fly zones, in part using clandestine operations, and in part activities in areas outside Iraq, work proceeded in what is now termed Operational Preparation of the Environment. This includes Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Operational Preparation of the Battlespace, and logistics (military)|logistical and other combat support and combat service support.
{{main|Iraq and weapons of mass destruction}}
After the [[Gulf War]] in 1991, United Nations Resolution 687 specified that Iraq must destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A large amount of WMDs were indeed destroyed under UN supervision ([[UNSCOM]]). Two no-fly zones were also instituted in northern and southern Iraq where Iraqi military aircraft were prohibited from flying. The United States and the United Kingdom (and [[France]] until 1998) patrolled these zones in, respectively, [[Operation NORTHERN WATCH]] and [[Operation SOUTHERN WATCH]].  


According to Richard Clarke, the U.S. found a press report, in April 1993, of an attempt, by the Iraqi intelligence service, to assassinate former President [[George H. W. Bush]] while he was visiting Kuwait.<ref name=Clarke>{{citation
Another change, in the Bush Administration, was an emphasis on not "fighting the last war".  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a constant advocate of transformation, emphasizing higher technology, more flexibility, and smaller forces, rather than the large heavy forces that were optimized to fight the Soviet Union. This was especially true after early operations in the Afghanistan War (2001-2021), where large U.S. ground forces were not used, but instead extensive special operations working with Afghan forces and using air power. Every war is different, however, and the reality in Afghanistan is there was an existing civil war and substantial indigenous resistance forces.
===Assumed links between 9/11 and Iraq===
Late in the evening of 9/11, the President had been told, by CIA chief George Tenet, that there was strong linkage to al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attack proper. Tenet did not discuss Iraq in this context. <ref name=Tenet>{{citation
| author = George Tenet with Bill Harlow
| title = At  the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA
| publisher = Harpercollins| year = 2007 | isbn = 9780061147784}}, p. 169</ref> On September 12, President Bush directed counterterrorism adviser Richard Clarke to review all information and reconsider if Saddam was involved in 9/11.<ref name=Clarke>{{citation
  | title = Against all Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror
  | title = Against all Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror
  | author = Richard A. Clarke
  | author = Richard Clarke
  | publisher = Free Press, Simon & Schuster | year = 2004
  | publisher = Free Press, Simon & Schuster | year = 2004
  | isbn = 0743260244
  | isbn = 0743260244
}}, pp. 80-84</ref>  After confirmation by the CIA and FBI, a retaliatory missile strike was delivered in June of that year.<ref name=CRS>{{citation
}}, p. 31</ref>
| title = Iraqi Challenges and U.S. Responses: March 1991 through October 2002
| date = November 20, 2002
| author = Alfred B. Prados
| publisher = Congressional Research Service
| url = http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31641.pdf
}}</ref> Searches of the records of the Iraqi service after 2003 did not provide hard evidence of such a plot, but reporter Michael Isikoff, often skeptical about U.S claims about Iraq, agreed the records might have been destroyed. <ref name=Newsweek>{{citation
| title  = Saddam’s Files: They show terror plots, but raise new questions about some U.S. claims.
| author = Michael Isikoff | journal = Newsweek
| date = March 31, 2008
| url = http://www.newsweek.com/id/128620}}</ref>


The [[1996 Khobar Towers bombing]] attacked forces, in Saudi Arabia, conducting SOUTHERN WATCH. This attack, however, appears to have been sponsored by Iran.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz sent Rumsfeld a memo, on September 17, called "Preventing More Events"; it argued that there was a better than 1 in 10 chance that Saddam was behind 9/11. <ref name=Isikoff>{{citation
 
  | title = HUBRIS: the Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War
However, by late 1997, the the [[Bill Clinton|Clinton administration]] became dissatisfied with Iraq’s increased unwillingness to cooperate with UNSCOM inspectors.
| author = Michael Isikoff, David Corn
As a result of widespread expectations that the Clinton administration would decide to act with military force, the UN weapons inspectors were evacuated from the country. Iraq and the United Nations agreed to resume weapons inspections, but Saddam Hussein continued to obstruct UNSCOM teams throughout the remainder of 1998.
  | publisher = Crown/Random house | year = 2006 | isbn = 0307346811}}, p. 80</ref> He had been told, by the CIA and FBI, that there was clear linkage to al-Qaeda, but said the CIA lacked imagination. <ref>Isikoff and Corn, p. 108</ref> On September 19, 2001, the Defense Advisory Board, chaired by Richard Perle, met for two days. Iraq was the focus. Among the speakers was Ahmed Chalabi, a controversial Iraqi exile who argued for an approach similar to the not-yet-executed approach to Afghanistan: U.S. air and other support to insurgent Iraqis. <ref name=COBRA>{{citation
 
Congress passed the [[Iraq Liberation Act]] in October 1998: <blockquote>It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime. <ref>{{citation
  | url = http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/libact103198.pdf
| title = Iraq Liberation Act of 1998}}</ref></blockquote> During the campaign, Bush had criticized  President Clinton as too widely engaged in too many conflicts, acting as the “world’s policeman.” In the end, President Bush believed Clinton had lacked the necessary resolve to hold Saddam Hussein accountable for his failure to comply with UN resolutions. Bush also questioned America’s membership in NATO and involvement in UN diplomacy, which led some to believe he was moving towards a more isolationist view of foreign policy.<ref>Cameron G. Thies. “From Containment to the Bush Doctrine: The Road to War with Iraq.” In: John Davis ed. ''Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War''. Aldershot (UK)/Burlington (VT):Ashgate193-207, here p. 200.</ref>
 
At the same time, Bush continued to favor executing the policy President Clinton had approved but not acted on: to actively proceed to effect regime change in Iraq.
 
In December 1998, President Clinton authorized military action against Iraq.  Between December 16 and 19, 1998, US and UK missiles and aircraft attcked military and government targets in Iraq in [[Operation DESERT FOX]]. It was widely understood that the Clinton administration intended Operation Desert Fox to be not merely a campaign of punishment for Iraq’s failure to cooperate but also to weaken the regime in advance of orchestrated efforts to cause regime change. In that respect, Clinton administration policy was ineffective.
 
As a result of Iraq’s barring inspectors from the country, UNSCOM inspections of Iraq’s WMD effectively came to an end and in March 1999, the UN concluded that the UNSCOM mandate should end. In December 1999, the UN passed UN Security Council Resolution 1284, setting up [[UNMOVIC]] (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), headed by Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, which was to identify the remaining WMD arsenals in Iraq. Because UNMOVIC was banned from Iraq, the world had to rely on indirect evidence, most of which turned out to be false or inaccurate.<ref>Ali A. Allawi. ''The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace''. New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press, 2007, p. 72.</ref> Iraq policy during the remainder of the Clinton presidency was marked by a return to the containment regime that existed before Operation Desert Fox, but now without the benefit of direct intelligence.
 
===Bush Administration Policy===
Iraq had been a high priority for George W. Bush during the campaign, and even more so after the election. Before the inauguration, Dick Cheney sent a message to the outgoing Secretary of Defense, [[William Cohen]], "We really need to get the president-elect briefed up on some things [including a serious]] discussion of Iraq."<ref name=WoodwardPlan>{{citation
| author = [[Bob Woodward]]
| title = Plan of Attack  | year = 2004
| publisher = Simon & Schuster
| ISBN = 074325547X
}}, pp. 7-8</ref> Bob Woodward put it that Bush said "I was not happy with our policy", but it was not yet a first priority.
 
When Bush and Clinton met in the days of transition, on December 19, 2000, Clinton said that his understanding of Bush's priorities, from reading his campaign statements, were [[ballistic missile defense|national missile defense]] and Iraq. Bush said that was correct. Clinton suggested Bush consider other priorities, including [[al-Qaeda]], Middle East diplomacy, North Korea, the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, and, only then, Iraq. Bush did not respond. <ref name=COBRA>{{citation
  | title = COBRA II: the inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq
  | title = COBRA II: the inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq
  | author = Michael R. Gordon, Bernard E. Trainor
  | author = Michael R. Gordon, Bernard E. Trainor
  | publisher = Pantheon | year = 2006 | isbn = 0375422625}}, p. 14</ref> Cheney reinforced the already existing, but not well-known, policy of regime change in Iraq, specified by the 1998 [[Iraq Liberation Act]].
  | publisher = Pantheon | year = 2006 | isbn = 0375422625}}, p. 27</ref> Chalabi had the greatest support among Republican-identified neoconservatives, but also had Democratic supporters such as former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey.<ref name=NYorker2003-05-12>{{citation
 
  | url = http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact?currentPage=all
On January 10, the new national security team was briefed on the no-fly programs, [[Operation SOUTHERN WATCH]] and [[Operation NORTHERN WATCH]], and the graduated responses in effect if the Iraqis fired on U.S. aircraft. Several days later, they were briefed on CIA operations, including Iraq, but the tree major priorities were:
  | author = Seymour Hersh
#Osama bin Laden
#Worldwide proliferation of [[weapons of mass destruction]]
#Rise of the Chinese military
Iraq was not discussed in detail. <ref>Woodward, p. 12</ref>  There was, however, a meeting of "principals", chaired by [[Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs]] [[Condaleeza Rice]] on February 5, which did include Cheney, [[Colin Powell]], and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin as a substitute for DCI George Tenet. This meeting was focused on Iraq policy. The decision was to reduce the number of no-fly sorties but to increase the intensity of response.
====Policy before 9/11 Attacks====
Because Iraq was known to have had and used WMD in the past and because Iraq had blocked UN supervision of the destruction of its WMD, there remained great uncertainty about Iraq’s WMD arsenal. The Bush administration made Iraq of central importance to its national security policy. Combined with his isolationist foreign policy beliefs, President Bush started to formulate what has become known as the [[Bush Doctrine]]. The doctrine is most fully expressed in the administration’s ''National Security Strategy of the United States of America'', published in September 2002. In it, the President states:
 
<blockquote>We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by (…) direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors.<ref>[http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss3.html ''National Security Strategy of the United States of America''], The White House, September 2002. (Page 6 in the printed edition). Retrieved May 8, 2008.</ref></blockquote>
 
The Bush national security doctrine invoked a doctrine that it called "preemption" of potential threats, but the attitude toward Iraq was more one of [[preventive war]], or military action to stop development of capabilities in [[weapons of mass destruction]] or [[terrorism]]. The usual meaning of [[preemptive attack]] is to stop an imminent and identifiable enemy action.
 
In January 2002, [[Time Magazine]] reported that since President Bush took office he had been grumbling about finishing the job his father started. <ref>http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,235395,00.html Time Magazine reports</ref>
 
On February 16, 2001 a number of US and UK warplanes attacked Baghdad, nearly two years before the start of the Iraq war. <ref>http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/02/16/iraq.airstrike/ CNN reports</ref>. An officer in the [[Joint Staff]] notified Rice, who notified the President. Rumsfeld was not told, and was furious, because the chain of command went through him. Rumsfeld told Woodward that as the first Secretary of Defense to serve again, many years later, he was determined to play it better and have near-total control. Rumsfeld, a college wrestler, said "If someone does not know how to wrestle, he will get hurt. If you don't know how to move, you will get a black eye. Same in Defense." Rumsfeld wanted the Administration to be "forward-leaning" rather than reactive. <ref>Woodward, pp 14-19</ref> 
 
Policy discussions continued at the Deputies level, where Deputy Secretary of State [[Richard Armitage]], Powell's best friend, faced Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Paul Wolfowitz]]. One of the Iraq issues was [[Ahmed Chalabi]], who was distrusted by State and CIA, but attractive to Defense.
 
====Iraqi WMD and the War on Terror ====
At the top level, it does not appear that any top government leaders wanted to strike Iraq immediately after 9/11. It had been discussed; some of Rumsfeld's notes suggest raising the question with Wolfowitz. In a meeting on the 15th, none of the principals wanted to attack Iraq at first; Woodward reported Cheney said "If we go after Saddam Hussein, we lose our rightful place as good guy." Wolfowitz suspected Saddam but had no proof.  Bush told Woodward, two years later, said it changed his attitude toward "Saddam Hussein's capability to create harm...all his terrible features became much more threatening. Keeping Saddam in a box looked less and less feasible to me." <ref>Woodward, pp. 25-27</ref>
 
The administration included Iraq in a series of states it considered acutely dangerous to world peace. In his 2002 [[State of the Union]] President Bush called Iraq part of an “axis of evil” together with [[Iran]] and [[North Korea]].<ref>[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html 2002 State of the Union address], President George W. Bush, January 29, 2002. Retrieved May 8, 2008.</ref> In this address the president also claimed the right to wage a [[preventive attack|preventive war]], as distinct from a [[preemptive attack]]. Early in 2002, the administration began pressuring Iraq as well as the international community on greater compliance by Iraq with UN resolutions.
======Priority======
Not all the senior officials of the administration treated attacking Iraq as a high priority. Some believed there was no case, while others felt that Afghanistan needed a higher priority. While [[Colin Powell]] eventually argued for Iraqi WMD before the United Nations, he and his deputy, [[Richard Armitage]], internally raised questions.  Senators [[Joe Biden]], [[Richard Lugar]], and [[Chuck Hagel]] were drafting legislation to limit Bush's authority; Biden said he was getting support from Powell and Armitage. <ref name=Isikoff>{{citation
| title = HUBRIS: the Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War
| author = Michael Isikoff, David Corn
| publisher = Crown/Random house | year = 2006 | isbn = 0307346811}}, p. 127</ref>
 
Douglas Feith said never heard Bush say "we should [go to war] simply or primarily to help a foreign pro-democracy movement oust a dictator. Neocons, including myself, were commonly accused of wanting to spread democracy by the sword...In my view, the reason to go to war with Iraq was self-defense." <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 234</ref>
 
In the spring of 2002, [[Richard Haass]], head of the [[Policy Planning Staff]] at the [[U.S. Department of State]], met with Condoleeza Rice, and expressed State's concerns about war with Iraq. She surprised him by saying "Save your breath. The President has made up his mind."  Haass described it as "A decision was not made &mdash; a decision happened, and you can't say when or how. <ref name=Packer2006>{{citation
| title = The Assassins' Gate
| author = George Packer
| publisher = Farrar, Straus and Giroux | year = 2005
| isbn = 0374299633}}, p. 45</ref>
 
On January 13, 2003, Bush met with Powell to tell him he had decided to go to war, "The inspections are not getting us there...I really think I'm going to have to do this." He asked Powell if he would or would not support the decision, and Powell agreed; Powell still would attempt to avoid war through diplomatic channels. Bush told Chief of Staff [[Andy Card]] of the meeting, and Card believed that Powell had false hope of avoiding war. <ref>Woodward, pp. 269-273</ref>
 
======Goals======
Bush's vision was not simply ousting Saddam, but creating a democracy. This had been the goal of the [[Project for the New American Century]] in its 2000 policy paper, "Rebuilding America's Defenses".<ref name=PNAC>{{citation
| title = Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century
| author = Project for the New American Century
| date = September 2000
| url = http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf}}</ref>; the concept involves using preventive war, if necessary, to install democracies; it assumes societies will accept democracies. According to [[Bob Woodward]], Bush had said, <blockquote>We've got an obligation to go stand up a democracy. We can't go get some former [Iraqi] general and say, Okay, now you're the dictator in Iraq. We've got to fundamentally change the place. And we've got to give the Iraqi people a chance at those fundamental values we believe in.</blockquote> Cheney thought that too many people in the State Department, including Powell, did not support Bush's vision.<ref>Woodward Plan, p. 284</ref>  Cheney, therefore, tried to keep control of the implementation, generally in concert with Rumsfeld, his protege and bureaucratic opponent of Powell. While Rice probably was personally closer to Bush than the others, she was not as strong an infighter.
 
==Strategic planning==
''Not all the planning dates may seem in proper sequence; this is not anything suspicious as some of the work was already in progress as part of routine staff activity, while other work was started by informal communications.''
 
Even before the [[9-11 attack]]s, regime change in [[Saddam Hussein]]'s Iraq was a high priority of the [[George W. Bush Administration]]. According to This is not to suggest that previous Administrations had not been considering it, and had been steadily carrying out air attacks in support of the no-fly zones ([[Operation SOUTHERN WATCH]] and [[Operation NORTHERN WATCH]]), as well as air strikes ([[Operation DESERT FOX]]). Nevertheless, the priorities changed.
 
Another change, in the Bush Administration, was an emphasis on not "fighting the last war".  Secretary of Defense [[Donald Rumsfeld]] was a constant advocate of transformation, emphasizing higher technology, more flexibility, and smaller forces, rather than the large heavy forces that were optimized to fight the Soviet Union. This was especially true after early operations in the [[Afghanistan War (2001-)]], where large U.S. ground forces were not used, but instead extensive [[special operations]] working with Afghan forces and using air power. Every war is different, however, and the reality in Afghanistan is there was an existing civil war and substantial indigenous resistance forces.
===Assumed links between 9/11 and Iraq===
Late in the evening of 9/11, the President had been told, by CIA chief [[George Tenet]], that there was strong linkage to al-Qaeda. <ref name=Tenet>{{citation
| author = [[George Tenet]] with Bill Harlow
| title = At  the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA
| publisher = Harpercollins| year = 2007 | isbn = 9780061147784}}, p. 169</ref> On September 12, President Bush directed counterterrorism adviser [[Richard Clarke]] to review all information and reconsider if Saddam was involved in 9/11.<ref>Clarke, p. 31</ref>
 
Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Paul Wolfowitz]] sent Rumsfeld a memo, on September 17, called "Preventing More Events"; it argued that there was a better than 1 in 10 chance that Saddam was behind 9/11. <ref>Isikoff and Corn, p. 80</ref> He had been told, by the CIA and FBI, that there was clear linkage to [[al-Qaeda]], but said the CIA lacked imagination.<ref>Isikoff & Corn, p. 108</ref> On September 19, 2001, the [[Defense Advisory Board]], chaired by [[Richard Perle]], met for two days. Iraq was the focus. Among the speakers was [[Ahmed Chalabi]], a controversial Iraqi exile who argued for an approach similar to the not-yet-executed approach to Afghanistan: U.S. air and other support to insurgent Iraqis. <ref>COBRA II, p. 27</ref> Chalabi had the greatest support among Republican-identified neoconservatives, but also had Democratic supporters such as former [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[R. James Woolsey]].<ref name=NYorker2003-05-12>{{citation
  | http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact?currentPage=all
  | author = [[Seymour Hersh]]
  | journal = New Yorker
  | journal = New Yorker
  | title = Annals of National Security, Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld has his own special sources. Are they reliable?
  | title = Annals of National Security, Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld has his own special sources. Are they reliable?
Line 150: Line 91:
  | author = Ron Suskind}}, pp. 19-20</ref>  
  | author = Ron Suskind}}, pp. 19-20</ref>  


While Tenet agreed there was a connection between al-Qaeda and 9-11, and that Saddam was supporting Palestinian and European terrorists, he said that the CIA could not make a firm connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq. While CIA continued its analysis, it accepted a briefing from a Pentagon group, under [[Douglas Feith]], to share its ideas about an Iran-9/11 connection. This was presented at CIA headquarters on August 14, 2002. According to Tenet, while Feith's team felt they had found things, in raw reports, that CIA had missed, they were not using the skills of professional intelligence analysts to consider other than the desired conclusion. His attention immediately was caught by a naval reservist working for Feith, Tina Shelton, who said the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq was an "open and shut case...no further analysis is required." A slide said there was a "mature, symbiotic relationship", which Tenet did not believe was supported. Pre-9/11 coordination between al-Qaeda operative [[Mohammed Atta]], in Prague, with the Iraqi intelligence service had become likely; Tenet described this association, which was later disproved, He called aside VADM Jake Jacoby, director of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]], and telling him he worked for Rumsfeld and Tenet, and was to remove himself from Feith's policy channels. Later, Tenet learned that the Feith team was presenting to the White House, NSC, and Office of the Vice President. <ref>Tenet, pp. 346-348</ref>
While Tenet agreed there was a connection between al-Qaeda and 9-11, and that Saddam was supporting Palestinian and European terrorists, he said that the CIA could not make a firm connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq. While CIA continued its analysis, it accepted a briefing from a Pentagon group, under Douglas Feith, to share its ideas about an Iran-9/11 connection. This was presented at CIA headquarters on August 14, 2002. According to Tenet, while Feith's team felt they had found things, in raw reports, that CIA had missed, they were not using the skills of professional intelligence analysts to consider other than the desired conclusion. His attention immediately was caught by a naval reservist working for Feith, Tina Shelton, who said the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq was an "open and shut case...no further analysis is required." A slide said there was a "mature, symbiotic relationship", which Tenet did not believe was supported. Pre-9/11 coordination between an al-Qaeda operative in Prague with the Iraqi intelligence service had become likely; Tenet described this association, which was later disproved, He called aside VADM Jake Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and telling him he worked for Rumsfeld and Tenet, and was to remove himself from Feith's policy channels. Later, Tenet learned that the Feith team was presenting to the White House, NSC, and Office of the Vice President. <ref>Tenet, pp. 346-348</ref>


It appeared a matter of certainty in the White House, especially with Cheney, that a link existed between al-Qaeda and 9/11, and Iraq War policy assumed it. A February 2007 report by the Department of Defense Inspector General said no laws were broken, but Feith's group bypassed Intelligence Community safeguards <ref name=NYT2007-02-09>{{citation
It appeared a matter of certainty in the White House, especially with Cheney, that a link existed between al-Qaeda and 9/11, and Iraq War policy assumed it. A February 2007 report by the Department of Defense Inspector General said no laws were broken, but Feith's group bypassed Intelligence Community safeguards <ref name=NYT2007-02-09>{{citation
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  | title = Cheney: No link between Saddam Hussein, 9/11}}</ref>
  | title = Cheney: No link between Saddam Hussein, 9/11}}</ref>


[[W. Patrick Lang]], DIA national intelligence officer for the Middle East, said <blockquote>The Pentagon has banded together to dominate the government’s foreign policy, and they’ve pulled it off. They’re running Chalabi. The D.I.A. has been intimidated and beaten to a pulp. And there’s no guts at all in the C.I.A.”<ref name=NYorker2003-05-12 ></blockquote>
W. Patrick Lang, DIA national intelligence officer for the Middle East, said <blockquote>The Pentagon has banded together to dominate the government’s foreign policy, and they’ve pulled it off. They’re running Chalabi. The D.I.A. has been intimidated and beaten to a pulp. And there’s no guts at all in the C.I.A.”<ref name=NYorker2003-05-12 /></blockquote>


===Reviews by Rumsfeld===
===Reviews by Rumsfeld===
CENTCOM had a contingency plan for a new war with Iraq, designated OPLAN 1003-98. It assumed Iraq would launch an attack as it had done in 1990. Rumsfeld had OPLAN 1003-98 presented by LTG [[Greg Newbold]], director of operations for the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], in late 2001. Rumsfeld believed the plan, which called for up to 500,000 troops, was far too large; Rumsfeld thought that no more than 125,000 would be needed. Newbold later said he regretted he did not say, at the time, <blockquote>Mr. Secretary, if you try to put a number on a mission like this, you may cause enormous mistakes. Give the military the task, give the military what you would like to see them do, and let them come up with it. I was the junior military man in the room, but I regret not saying it<ref>COBRA II, p. 4</ref></blockquote>
CENTCOM had a contingency plan for a new war with Iraq, designated OPLAN 1003-98. It assumed Iraq would launch an attack as it had done in 1990. Rumsfeld had OPLAN 1003-98 presented by LTG Greg Newbold, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in late 2001. Rumsfeld believed the plan, which called for up to 500,000 troops, was far too large; Rumsfeld thought that no more than 125,000 would be needed. Newbold later said he regretted he did not say, at the time, <blockquote>Mr. Secretary, if you try to put a number on a mission like this, you may cause enormous mistakes. Give the military the task, give the military what you would like to see them do, and let them come up with it. I was the junior military man in the room, but I regret not saying it<ref>COBRA II, p. 4</ref></blockquote>


Informally, Franks had called it "DESERT STORM II", using three corps as in 1991, but to force collapse of [[Saddam Hussein]]'s regime.  On November 27, he told the Secretary of Defense that he had a new concept, but that detailed planning would be needed. <ref name=Franks>{{citation  
Informally, Franks had called it "Desert Storm II", using three corps as in 1991, but to force collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime.  On November 27, he told the Secretary of Defense that he had a new concept, but that detailed planning would be needed. <ref name=Franks>{{citation  
  | title = American Soldier
  | title = American Soldier
  | last1 = Franks | first1= Tommy | first2 = Malcolm | last2 = McConnell
  | last1 = Franks | first1= Tommy | first2 = Malcolm | last2 = McConnell
  | publisher = Regan | year = 2004}}, p. 315</ref> Franks told Rumsfeld, during a videoconference on December 4, 2001, that it was a stale, troop-heavy concept. [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] (CJCS) [[Dick Myers]], Vice CJCS [[Peter Pace]], and Undersecretary of Defense [[Douglas Feith]] were on the Washington end. Franks intended to ignore Feith, who he described as a "master of the off-the-wall question that rarely had relevance to operational problems." <ref>Franks, p. 331</ref>  
  | publisher = Regan | year = 2004}}, p. 315</ref> Franks told Rumsfeld, during a videoconference on December 4, 2001, that it was a stale, troop-heavy concept. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Dick Myers, Vice CJCS Peter Pace, and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith were on the Washington end. Franks intended to ignore Feith, who he described as a "master of the off-the-wall question that rarely had relevance to operational problems." <ref>Franks, p. 331</ref>  


Franks proposed three basic options:
Franks proposed three basic options:
Line 175: Line 116:
*REDUCED OPTION: A lesser number of countries supporting would mean a sequential air and ground operation.
*REDUCED OPTION: A lesser number of countries supporting would mean a sequential air and ground operation.
*UNILATERAL OPTION: If launching forces from Kuwait, U.S. ships, and U.S. aircraft from distant bases, the air and ground operations would be "absolutely sequential" due to the lack of infrastructure to bring in all ground forces at once.   
*UNILATERAL OPTION: If launching forces from Kuwait, U.S. ships, and U.S. aircraft from distant bases, the air and ground operations would be "absolutely sequential" due to the lack of infrastructure to bring in all ground forces at once.   
Franks wrote that during the Afghanistan planning, he had developed a technique that presented, visiually, the tasks to be done ("lines of operation") and the country or resource that would be affected by these tasks ("slices"). It is not clear when he first drew this visual aid for Iraq, although it was part of the December 12 briefing to Rumsfeld; the version reproduced in his book was dated December 8.
Franks wrote that during the Afghanistan planning, he had developed a technique that presented, visually, the tasks to be done ("lines of operation") and the country or resource that would be affected by these tasks ("slices"). It is not clear when he first drew this visual aid for Iraq, although it was part of the December 12 briefing to Rumsfeld; the version reproduced in his book was dated December 8.


[[Image:Franks slices and lines.png|thumb|left
Image:Franks slices and lines.png|thumb|left
|550px|Franks model, from sketch dated December 8, 2001]]<small> In this model, operational fires are strikes by aircraft, artillery, and missiles. Special Operations Forces operations are principally [[special reconnaissance]] and [[direct action (military)]]; [[unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)|unconventional warfare]] involves both military and CIA guerillas. [[Information operations]], as a line, includes [[psychological operations]], [[electronic warfare]], [[deception]], and [[computer network operations]]; politicomilitary and civil-military operations are doctrinally part of information operations but are shown separately here. RG and SRG are, respectively, the Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard elite combat formations.</small>
|550px|Franks model, from sketch dated December 8, 2001<small> In this model, operational fires are strikes by aircraft, artillery, and missiles. Special Operations Forces operations are principally special reconnaissance and direct action (military); unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)|unconventional warfare involves both military and CIA guerrillas. Information operations, as a line, includes psychological operations, electronic warfare, deception, and computer network operations; politicomilitary and civil-military operations are doctrinally part of information operations but are shown separately here. RG and SRG are, respectively, the Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard elite combat formations.</small>




Line 205: Line 146:


===Rumsfeld calls for new planning===
===Rumsfeld calls for new planning===
Early warning of Rumsfeld's desires came to LTC Thomas Reilly, chief of planning for [[Third United States Army]], still based at Fort McPherson in the U.S.  While Third Army would become the Coalition Forces Land Component of CENTCOM, it had not yet been so designated, whenn Reilly received the notice on September 13, 2001. It used the term POLO STEP, the code word for Franks' concept of operations. <ref>COBRA II, pp. 19-20</ref>
Early warning of Rumsfeld's desires came to LTC Thomas Reilly, chief of planning for Third United States Army, still based at Fort McPherson in the U.S.  While Third Army would become the Coalition Forces Land Component of CENTCOM, it had not yet been so designated, when Reilly received the notice on September 13, 2001. It used the term POLO STEP, the code word for Franks' concept of operations. <ref>COBRA II, pp. 19-20</ref>


On October 9, 2002, GEN [[Eric Shinseki]], [[Chief of Staff of the Army]], told staff officers "From today forward the main effort of the US Army must be to prepare for war with Iraq". <ref name=Point-I-Ch02>{{citation
On October 9, 2002, GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, told staff officers "From today forward the main effort of the US Army must be to prepare for war with Iraq". <ref name=Point-I-Ch02>{{citation
  | title = On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
  | title = On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
  | contribution  = Chapter 2: Prepare, Mobilize, and Deploy
  | contribution  = Chapter 2: Prepare, Mobilize, and Deploy
Line 222: Line 163:
*Caps on the number and type of troops that would be assigned
*Caps on the number and type of troops that would be assigned
===Intensified overt operations===
===Intensified overt operations===
For a number of years, the US and UK had been patrolling the "no-fly" zones of Iraq, and attacking air defense sites that directly threatened them. On September 4, 2002, however, there was a 100-aircraft strike that expanded the scope of [[Operation SOUTHERN WATCH]], doing major damage to the H-3 and al-Baghdadi air bases near Jordan. These were more general-purpose than strictly air defense sites, and degraded a range of Iraqi capabilities. <ref name=Bodansky2004>{{citation
For a number of years, the US and UK had been patrolling the "no-fly" zones of Iraq, and attacking air defense sites that directly threatened them. On September 4, 2002, however, there was a 100-aircraft strike that expanded the scope of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, doing major damage to the H-3 and al-Baghdadi air bases near Jordan. These were more general-purpose than strictly air defense sites, and degraded a range of Iraqi capabilities. <ref name=Bodansky2004>{{citation
  | title = The Secret History of the Iraq War
  | title = The Secret History of the Iraq War
  | author = Yossef Bodansky
  | author = Yossef Bodansky
Line 231: Line 172:


===Secret operations in Iraq===
===Secret operations in Iraq===
The [[Central Intelligence Agency]], as well as military [[special operations]], conducted a wide range of activities in Iraq well before the invasion. They included intelligence collection, destabilization, and planning for using Iraqis in combat.
The Central Intelligence Agency, as well as military special operations, conducted a wide range of activities in Iraq well before the invasion. They included Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace such as adding intelligence collection, and Operational Preparation of the Battlespace such as destabilization and planning for using Iraqis in combat.  
 
George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, had a major role in the decision to go to war, but also how it was to be fought. A lesson learned from Afghanistan was that "covert action, effectively coupled with a larger military plan, could succeed. What we were telling the vice president that day [in early 2002] was that CIA could not go it alone in toppling Saddam...in Iraq, unlike in Afghanistan, CIA's role was to provide information to the military...assess the political environment...coordinate the efforts of indigenous networks of supporters for U.S. military advances..." In February 2002, the Agency re-created the Northern Iraq Liaison Element (NILE) teams to work with the Kurds. Later, CIA officers worked to encourage surrender, but this soon proved impractical; the U.S. forces were so small that the prisoners would have outnumbered the invaders. <ref>Tenet, pp. 385-387</ref>


George Tenet, [[Director of Central Intelligence]], had a major role in the decision to go to war, but also how it was to be fought. A lesson learned from Afghanistan was that "covert action, effectively coupled with a larger military plan, could succeed. What we were telling the vice president that day [in early 2002] was that CIA could not go it alone in toppling Saddam...in Iraq, unlike in Afghanistan, CIA's role was to provide information to the military...assess the political environment...coordinate the efforts of indigenous networks of supporters for U.S. military advances..." In February 2002, the Agency re-created the [[Northern Iraq Liaison Element]] (NILE) teams to work with the Kurds. Later, CIA officers worked to encourage surrender, but this soon proved impractical; the U.S. forces were so small that the prisoners would have outnumbered the invaders. <ref>Tenet, pp. 385-387</ref>
====DBANABASIS: Destabilization====
====DBANABASIS: Destabilization====
At White House direction, the CIA had created a program, under the [[compartmented control system#Cryptonyms and pseudonyms|cryptonym]] DBANABASIS, for destabilizing Saddam.  The deputy chief of the Iraq Operations Group assigned, by Deputy Director for Operations [[John Pavitt]], to run the program, starting in late 2001, was John Maguire; the other, whose identity remains classified, is known as Luis.  In the mid-nineties, CIA had found that a first coup attempt simply had gotten Iraqi CIA assets killed; Maguire had been involved in that operation, the failure of which he blamed, in large part, on [[Ahmed Chalabi]]. <ref>Isikoff and Corn, pp. 6-8</ref>
At White House direction, the CIA had created a program, under the compartmented control system#Cryptonyms and pseudonyms|cryptonym DBANABASIS, for destabilizing Saddam.  The deputy chief of the Iraq Operations Group assigned, by Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt, to run the program, starting in late 2001, was John Maguire; the other, whose identity remains classified, is known as Luis.  In the mid-nineties, CIA had found that a first coup attempt simply had gotten Iraqi CIA assets killed; Maguire had been involved in that operation, the failure of which he blamed, in large part, on Ahmed Chalabi. <ref>Isikoff and Corn, pp. 6-8</ref>


On February 16, 2002, the President signed a Finding authorizing ANABASIS operations. The Congressional leadership was briefed. As opposed to the 1995 plan, ANABASIS would involve considerably more lethal activities. When they mentioned, for example, destroying railroad likes, Tyler Drumheller, chief of the European Division, said "you're going to kill people if you do this." Cofer Black, director of the Counterterrorism Center, had said "the gloves are off" soon after 9/11; this was an example of that change. Again as with Afghanistan, the CIA would make the initial political contacts with the resistance groups:
On February 16, 2002, the President signed a Finding authorizing ANABASIS operations. The Congressional leadership was briefed. As opposed to the 1995 plan, ANABASIS would involve considerably more lethal activities. When they mentioned, for example, destroying railroad likes, Tyler Drumheller, chief of the European Division, said "you're going to kill people if you do this." Cofer Black, director of the Counterterrorism Center, had said "the gloves are off" soon after 9/11; this was an example of that change. Again as with Afghanistan, the CIA would make the initial political contacts with the resistance groups:
*[[Kurdish Democratic Party]] headed by [[Massoud Barzani]]
*Kurdish Democratic Party headed by Massoud Barzani
*[[Patriotic Union of Kurdistan]] led by [[Jalal Talabani]]
*Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani
Maguire's team entered in April, and met with both Barzani and Talabani. They met Iraqi troops who seemed eager for an American invasion. <ref>Isikoff and Corn, pp. 9-10</ref>
Maguire's team entered in April, and met with both Barzani and Talabani. They met Iraqi troops who seemed eager for an American invasion. <ref>Isikoff and Corn, pp. 9-10</ref>
====DBROCKSTARS: intelligence collection====
====DBROCKSTARS: intelligence collection====
In July 2002, a CIA team drove from Turkey to a base at Sulaymaniyah, 125 miles into Iraq from the Turkish border, and a few miles from the Iranian border. Turkey had been told that they were there primarily for collecing intelligence on [[Ansar al-Islam]], a radical group opposed to the secular Kurdish parties, allied with [[al-Qaeda]], and experimenting with poisons. It was based at Sargat, 25 miles from his base, at a location called Khurmal. The team was helped by [[Jalal Talabani]]'s [[Patriotic Union of Kurdistan]].
In July 2002, a CIA team drove from Turkey to a base at Sulaymaniyah, 125 miles into Iraq from the Turkish border, and a few miles from the Iranian border. Turkey had been told that they were there primarily for collecting intelligence on Ansar al-Islam, a radical group opposed to the secular Kurdish parties, allied with al-Qaeda, and experimenting with poisons. It was based at Sargat, 25 miles from his base, at a location called Khurmal. The team was helped by Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
 
The supplementary assignment for the team, beyond Anwar al-Islam, was for covert action to overthrow Saddam. They had been ordered to penetrate the regime's military, intelligence, and security services. Confusing the situation was that they had Turkish escorts. Even with difficulties, they established liaison with a well-connected religious group, which access to the inner circles of Saddam's organizations, and irritation with the PUK. Their reports were to be identified as DBROCKSTARS. <ref>Woodward, pp. 140-144</ref> By February 2003, the informants were providing significant information, including communications from Saddam's Special Security Organization. Air defense installations were confirmed and bombed. <ref>Woodward, pp. 302-306</ref>  87 secure satellite telephones were made available, but, probably in early March, one asset was captured; 30 of the assets never reported again. <ref>Woodward, pp. 335-337</ref>


The supplementary assignment for the team, beyond Anwar al-Islam, was for covert action to overthrow Saddam. They had been ordered to penetrate the regime's military, intelligence, and security services. Confusing the situation was that they had Turkish escorts. Even with difficulties, they established liaison with a well-connected religious group, which access to the inner circles of Saddam's organizations, and irritation with the PUK. Their reports were to be identified as DBROCKSTARS. <ref>Woodward, pp. 140-144</ref> By February 2003, the informants were providing significant information, including communications from Saddam's [[Special Security Organization]]. Air defense installations were confirmed and bombed. <ref>Woodward, pp. 302-306</ref>  87 secure satellite telephones were made available, but, probably in early March, one asset was captured; 30 of the assets never reported again. <ref>Woodward, pp. 335-337</ref>
====Unconventional warfare====
====Unconventional warfare====
Franks also intensively explored the potential for military special operations, both direct action by U.S. personnel, and, as in Afghanistan, using native resistance elements. In particular, it was agreed that [[United States Army Special Forces]] teams could lead up to 10,000 Kurds in [[Unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)|guerilla warfare]], a number large enough to be effective but not large enough to threaten Turkish sensitivity about spillover of Kurdish nationalism into Turkey. <ref>Woodward, p. 75</ref>  The usually antagonistic  
Franks also intensively explored the potential for military special operations, both direct action by U.S. personnel, and, as in Afghanistan, using native resistance elements. In particular, it was agreed that United States Army Special Forces teams could lead up to 10,000 Kurds in Unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)|guerrilla warfare, a number large enough to be effective but not large enough to threaten Turkish sensitivity about spillover of Kurdish nationalism into Turkey. <ref>Woodward, p. 75</ref>  The usually antagonistic  
KDP and PUK worked with Special Forces against units of Saddam Hussein's military at the start of the war, although <ref name=FM3-05.130>{{citation
KDP and PUK worked with Special Forces against units of Saddam Hussein's military at the start of the war, although <ref name=FM3-05.130>{{citation
  | title = Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare
  | title = Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare
Line 252: Line 196:
  | publisher = Department of the Army
  | publisher = Department of the Army
  | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf
  | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf
}}, pp. 6-2 to 6-3</ref>  This was later to result in partitioning Kurdistan into KDP and PUK areas, although there eventually was a unified Kurdistan Regional Government by 2008.
}}, pp. 6-2 to 6-3</ref>  yhis was later to result in partitioning Kurdistan into KDP and PUK areas. There eventually was a unified Kurdistan Regional Government by 2008.
 
On March 15, a Kurdish group, with CIA technical assistance, derailed an Iraqi troop train by blowing up the railroad tracks, a more visible activity than expected by Washington. There were several dozen harassing attacks in Kurdistan, and a march by 20,000 protesters on Ba'ath Party headquarters in Kirkuk.<ref>Woodward, pp. 349-351</ref>


On March 15, a Kurdish group, with CIA technical assistance, derailed an Iraqi troop train by blowing up the rainroad tracks. There were several dozen harassing attacks in Kurdistan, and a march by 20,000 protesters on Ba'ath Party headquarters in [[Kirkuk]].<ref>Woodward, pp. 349-351</ref>
====JTFI: WMD intelligence====
====JTFI: WMD intelligence====
Separate from DBANABASIS was the Joint Task Force on Iraq (JTFI) in the Counterproliferation Division. Its mission was not destabilization, but precise intelligence on WMD. [[Valerie Plame Wilson]] was its operations chief. JTFI developed sources inside Iraq, but worked from outside the country. Isikoff and Corn wrote that JTFI felt accurate intelligence was important, but "Bush, Cheney, and a handful of other senior officials already believed they had enough information to know what to do about Iraq". Rumsfeld, Perle, Wolfowitz, Libby and Feith believed Saddam was the principal danger to the U.S. and "we know what we are doing." <ref>Isikoff and Corn, pp. 15-17</ref>  They considered Saddam a greater threat than bin Laden.
Separate from DBANABASIS was the Joint Task Force on Iraq (JTFI) in the Counterproliferation Division. Its mission was not destabilization, but precise intelligence on WMD. Valerie Plame Wilson was its operations chief. JTFI developed sources inside Iraq, but worked from outside the country. Isikoff and Corn wrote that JTFI felt accurate intelligence was important, but "Bush, Cheney, and a handful of other senior officials already believed they had enough information to know what to do about Iraq". Rumsfeld, Perle, Wolfowitz, Libby and Feith believed Saddam was the principal danger to the U.S. and "we know what we are doing." <ref>Isikoff and Corn, pp. 15-17</ref>  They considered Saddam a greater threat than bin Laden.
 
==Legislative authorization==
Joint Resolution 114 of October 11, 2002 is the primary legislative authorization for combat operations, although some advocates of presidential authority maintained it was within the inherent powers of the Presidency. 
 
Voting was not strictly on party lines. In the Senate, it was opposed by the Independent and some Democrats.
{{col-begin}}
{{col-break|width=33%}}
{|
|- valign=top
|
*Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii)
*Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico)
*Barbara Boxer (D-California)
*Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia)
*Lincoln Chaffee (R-Rhode Island)
*Kent Conrad (D-North Dakota)
*Jon Corzine (D-New Jersey)
*Mark Dayton (D-Minnesota)
*Dick Durbin (D-Illinois)
{{col-break|width=33%}}
*Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin)
*Bob Graham (D-Florida)
*Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
*Jim Jeffords (I-Vermont)
*Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts)+
*Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont)
*Carl Levin (D-Michigan)
{{col-break|width=33%}}
*Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland)
*Patty Murray (D-Washington)
*Jack Reed (D-Rhode Island)
*Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryland)
*Debbie Stabenow (D-Michigan)
*Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota)+
*Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) 
|}
 
The House also was not on strict party lines. Voting against were:
{{col-begin}}
{{col-break|width=33%}}
{|
|- valign=top
|
*Neil Abercrombie  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Hawaii)
*Tom Allen  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maine)
*Joe Baca  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Brian Baird  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
*John Baldacci  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maine)§°
*Tammy Baldwin  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Wisconsin)
*Gresham Barrett (R-South Carolina)
*Xavier Becerra  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Earl Blumenauer  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)
*David Bonior  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan) §
*Robert Brady  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania)
*Corinne Brown  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Florida)
*Sherrod Brown  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
*Lois Capps  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Michael Capuano  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
*Benjamin Cardin  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maryland)
*Julia Carson  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Indiana)
*William Clay  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Missouri)
*Eva Clayton  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-North Carolina) §
*James Clyburn  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-South Carolina)
*Gary Condit  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)  §
*John Conyers  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
*Jerry Costello  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
*William Coyne  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania)  §
*Elijah Cummings  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maryland)
* Susan Davis  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Danny Davis  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
*Peter DeFazio  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)
*Diana DeGette  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Colorado)
*Bill Delahunt  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
*Rosa DeLauro  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Connecticut)
*John Dingell  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
*Lloyd Doggett  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
*Mike Doyle  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania)
*John Duncan, Jr. (R-Tennessee)
*Anna Eshoo  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Lane Evans  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
*Sam Farr  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Chaka Fattah  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania)
*Bob Filner  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Barney Frank  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
*Charles Gonzalez  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
*Luis Gutierrez  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
{{col-break|width=33%}}
*Alice Hastings  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Florida)
*Earl Hilliard  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Alabama)§
*Maurice Hinchey  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Ruben Hinojosa  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
*Rush Holt  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
*Mike Honda  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Darlene Hooley  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)
*John Hostettler (R-Indiana)
*Amo Houghton (R-New York) § 
*Jay Inslee  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
*Jesse Jackson, Jr.  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
*Sheila Jackson-Lee  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
*Eddie Bernice Johnson  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
*Stephanie Tubbs Jones  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
*Marcy Kaptur  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
*Dale Kildee  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
*Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
*Jerry Kleczka  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Wisconsin)
*Dennis Kucinich  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio) §
*John LaFalce  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*James Langevin  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Rhode Island)
*Rick Larsen  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
*John Larson  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Connecticut)
*Jim Leach (R-Iowa)
*Barbara Lee  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Sandy Levin  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
*John Lewis  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Georgia)
*Bill Lipinski  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois) §
*Zoe Lofgren  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*James Maloney  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Connecticut) §
*Robert Matsui  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California) +
*Karen McCarthy  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Missouri) §
*Betty McCollum  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Minnesota)
*Jim McDermott  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
*Jim McGovern  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
*Cynthia McKinney  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Georgia)
*Carrie Meek  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Florida) §
*Gregory Meeks  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Robert Menendez  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
*Juanita Millender-McDonald  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*George Miller  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Alan Mollohan  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-West Virginia)
*Jim Moran  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Virginia)
*Connie Morella  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maryland)
{{col-break|width=33%}}
*Jerrold Nadler  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Grace Napolitano  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Richard Neal  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
*Jim Oberstar  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Minnesota)
*David Obey  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Wisconsin)
*John Olver  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
*Major Owens  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Frank Pallone, Jr.  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
*Ed Pastor  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Arizona)
*Ron Paul (R-Texas)
*Donald Payne  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
*Nancy Pelosi  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*David Price  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-North Carolina)
*Nick Rahall  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-West Virginia)
*Charles Rangel  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Silvestre Reyes  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
*Lynn Rivers  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan) §
*Ciro Rodriguez  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
*Lucille Roybal-Allard  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California) §
*Bobby Rush  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
*Martin Olav Sabo  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Minnesota)
*Loretta Sanchez  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont)
*Thomas Sawyer  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
*Jan Schakowsky  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
*Bobby Scott  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Virginia)
*Jose Serrano  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Louise Slaughter  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Vic Snyder  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Arkansas)
*Hilda Solis  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Pete Stark  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Ted Strickland  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
*Burt Stupak (Michigan)
*Mike Thompson  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Bennie Thompson  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Mississippi)
*John Tierney  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
*Edolphus Towns  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Mark Udall  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Colorado)
*Tom Udall  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Mexico)
*Nydia Velaquez  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
*Pete Visclosky  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Indiana)
*Maxine Waters  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Diane Watson  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*Melvin Watt  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-North Carolina)
*Lynn Woolsey  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
*David Wu  (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)
|}
 
+ Deceased<br />
§ Retired from office <br />
° Now Governor<br />


==Theater/operational planning==
==Theater/operational planning==
{{main|Iraq War, theater operational planning}}
Detailed planning by CENTCOM began while active combat was ongoing in Afghanistan, in December 2002.<ref>Franks, pp. 329-335</ref> At the time, GEN Eric Shinseki, then Chief of Staff of the Army, testified to Congress that the number of troops approved by Rumsfeld was inadequate. Shinseki, however, was not in the chain of command for operational deployment. Although the Chief of Staff is the senior officer of the United States Army, he is responsible for developing doctrine and preparing forces for use by the combatant commanders.
Detailed planning by CENTCOM began while active combat was ongoing in [[Afghanistan]], in December 2002.<ref>Franks, pp. 329-335</ref> At the time, GEN [[Eric Shinseki]], then [[Chief of Staff of the Army]], testified to Congress that the number of troops approved by Rumsfeld was inadequate. Shinseki, however, was not in the chain of command for operational deployment. Although the Chief of Staff is the senior officer of the [[United States Army]], he is responsible for developing doctrine and preparing forces for use by the combatant commanders.
 
The responsible combatant commander was  GEN Tommy Franks, commanding United States Central Command.  Franks had already begun contingency planning. Franks discussed high-level concepts with Rumsfeld and his staff, and returned with alternatives. Once the broad theater-level concept was ready, Franks tasked his subordinate land, air, special operations and naval commanders to go to the next level.


The responsible combatant commander was  GEN [[Tommy Franks]], commanding [[U.S. Central Command]].  Franks had already begun contingency planning. Franks discussed high-level concepts with Rumsfeld and his staff, and returned with alternatives. Once the broad theater-level concept was ready, Franks tasked his subordinate land, air, special operations and naval commanders to go to the next level.
==Criticism by senior officers==
==Criticism by senior officers==
A number of generals were highly critical of the plan or its execution, focused especially on what they considered the unrealistic goals of Secretary of Defense [[Donald Rumsfeld]], or on Rumsfeld's management of the occupation. <ref name=Deary>{{citation
A number of generals were highly critical of the plan or its execution, focused especially on what they considered the unrealistic goals of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, or on Rumsfeld's management of the occupation. <ref name=Deary>{{citation
  |title= Six agaist the Secretary: the Retired Generals and Donald Rumsfeld  
  |title= Six against the Secretary: the Retired Generals and Donald Rumsfeld  
  |first = David S. | last = Deary
  |first = David S. | last = Deary
  |publisher = Air War College
  |publisher = Air War College
  | date = February 23, 2007
  | date = February 23, 2007
  | url =http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=25&q=https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_f1b997dd-4400-4028-874a-02bcf20de9e4/display.aspx%3Frs%3Denginespage&usg=AFQjCNGtXCtFDMj8GW3wj1mNEmWusDbZ3A}}</ref> They include [[Paul Eaton]], who headed training of the Iraqi military in 2003-2004;<ref name=NYT2006-03-19>{{citation
  | url =http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=25&q=https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_f1b997dd-4400-4028-874a-02bcf20de9e4/display.aspx%3Frs%3Denginespage&usg=AFQjCNGtXCtFDMj8GW3wj1mNEmWusDbZ3A}}</ref> They include Paul Eaton, who headed training of the Iraqi military in 2003-2004;<ref name=NYT2006-03-19>{{citation
  | title = For his failures, Rumsfeld must go
  | title = For his failures, Rumsfeld must go
  | author = [[Paul Eaton]]
  | author = Paul Eaton
  | date = 19 March 2006
  | date = 19 March 2006
  | journal = New York Times
  | journal = New York Times
  | url = http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/opinion/19iht-edeaton.html
  | url = http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/opinion/19iht-edeaton.html
}}</ref>  former chiefs of [[United States Central Command]] ([[Anthony Zinni]] and [[Joseph Hoar]]); [[Greg Newbold]], Director of the [[Joint staff]] from 2000 to 2002;<ref name=Time2006-04-09>{{citation
}}</ref>  former chiefs of United States Central Command (Anthony Zinni and Joseph Hoar); Greg Newbold, Director of the Joint staff from 2000 to 2002;<ref name=Time2006-04-09>{{citation
  | date = 9 April 2006
  | date = 9 April 2006
  | title = Why Iraq Was a Mistake
  | title = Why Iraq Was a Mistake
  | author = [[Greg Newbold]] | journal = Time
  | author = Greg Newbold | journal = Time
  | url = http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1181629,00.html
  | url = http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1181629,00.html
}}</ref>  [[John Riggs]], a planner who had criticized personnel levels, in public, while on duty; [[division|division commander]]s [[Charles Swannack]] and [[John Batiste]].
}}</ref>  John Riggs, a planner who had criticized personnel levels, in public, while on duty; division|division commanders Charles Swannack and John Batiste.


Newbold regretted he had not resigned when the proposals were first made. Swannack retired two days after ending a command tour in Iraq.  Eaton also quit his assignment in Iraq.
Newbold regretted he had not resigned when the proposals were first made. Swannack retired two days after ending a command tour in Iraq.  Eaton also quit his assignment in Iraq.
Line 286: Line 414:
==Major combat phase==
==Major combat phase==
{{main|Iraq War, major combat phase}}
{{main|Iraq War, major combat phase}}
While the start of major combat is often stated as March 20, 2003, operations actually had started well before then.  [[Special operations]] forces were in the country, and there had been a gradual intensification of bombing under the "no-fly" programs, [[Operation NORTHERN WATCH]] and [[Operation SOUTHERN WATCH]].
Ground combat was directed by an intermediate headquarters in Iraq, based on Third United States Army, called Coalition Forces Land Combat Command (CFLCC) under LTG David McKiernan.  


A "running start" had been planned, and it was fully expected that the plan would alter with events, as it is a truism no plan survives contact with the enemy. Both sides did consider Baghdad the key [[centers of gravity (military)|center of gravity]], but both made incorrect assumptions about the enemy's plans. The U.S. was still sensitive over the casualties taken by a too-light raid in [[Operation GOTHIC SERPENT]] in [[Mogadishu]], [[Somalia]]. As a result, the initial concept of operations was to surround Baghdad with tanks, while airborne and air assault infantry cleared it block-by-block. <ref name=Zucchino>{{citation
While the start of major combat is often stated as March 20, 2003, operations actually had started well before then.  Special operations forces were in the country, and there had been a gradual intensification of bombing under the "no-fly" programs, Operation NORTHERN WATCH and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.
 
A "running start" had been planned, and it was fully expected that the plan would alter with events, as it is a truism no plan survives contact with the enemy. Both sides did consider Baghdad the key centers of gravity (military)|center of gravity, but both made incorrect assumptions about the enemy's plans. The U.S. was still sensitive over the casualties taken by a too-light raid in Operation GOTHIC SERPENT in Mogadishu, Somalia. As a result, the initial concept of operations was to surround Baghdad with tanks, while airborne and air assault infantry cleared it block-by-block. <ref name=Zucchino>{{citation
  | author = David Zucchino
  | author = David Zucchino
  | title = Thunder Run: the Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad
  | title = Thunder Run: the Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad
Line 295: Line 425:
The Coalition did not expect to be able to reach Baghdad in a single bound; there was always an intention to make entry, regroup, and then make a final assault. Baghdad was not the only target; there were urgent needs to secure the oilfields against destruction, and to take control of the southern port of Umm Qasr. Kurds in the north were already semi-autonomous and wanted to take action; the relations between the Kurds in Iraq and Kurds in Turkey was extremely sensitive.
The Coalition did not expect to be able to reach Baghdad in a single bound; there was always an intention to make entry, regroup, and then make a final assault. Baghdad was not the only target; there were urgent needs to secure the oilfields against destruction, and to take control of the southern port of Umm Qasr. Kurds in the north were already semi-autonomous and wanted to take action; the relations between the Kurds in Iraq and Kurds in Turkey was extremely sensitive.


Baghdad was effectively in U.S. hands by April 9. Deputy CENTCOM commander [[Mike DeLong]] said three factors made looting much worse than expected:<ref name=DeLong>{{citation
Baghdad was effectively in U.S. hands by April 9. Deputy CENTCOM commander Mike DeLong said three factors made looting much worse than expected:<ref name=DeLong>{{citation
  | author = Michael DeLong with Noah Lukeman
  | author = Michael DeLong with Noah Lukeman
  | title = Inside CENTCOM: the Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
  | title = Inside CENTCOM: the Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
Line 301: Line 431:
  | isbn = 0895260204}}, pp. 117-118</ref>  
  | isbn = 0895260204}}, pp. 117-118</ref>  
*Saddam opened his prison doors and let prisoners free; these were primarily "ordinary decent criminals" rather than dissenters; it added 30,000-50,000 outlaws to the confusion
*Saddam opened his prison doors and let prisoners free; these were primarily "ordinary decent criminals" rather than dissenters; it added 30,000-50,000 outlaws to the confusion
*The "resignation" of the Iraqi police, which DeLong said was the most unexpected. He is unsure that the [[information operations]] campaign urging the military to disarm also affected the police
*The "resignation" of the Iraqi police, which DeLong said was the most unexpected. He is unsure that the information operations campaign urging the military to disarm also affected the police
*The dissolution of the Iraqi army, both by its soldiers and as a political decision, putting large numbers of unemployed young men onto the streets.
*The dissolution of the Iraqi army, both by its soldiers and as a political decision, putting large numbers of unemployed young men onto the streets.


Line 311: Line 441:
| publisher = Joint Forces Staff College
| publisher = Joint Forces Staff College
| date = 25 August 2006
| date = 25 August 2006
| url = http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA455278}}, pp. 13-14</ref> The bureaucratic infighting was worst between State and Defense, probably with involvement from the Office of the Vice President and the National Security Council. The role of the [[Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs]], in such circumstances, is supposed to be collecting the positions and submitting them to the President when he is the only one that can make the decision. This did not happen.
| url = http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA455278}}, pp. 13-14</ref> The bureaucratic infighting was worst between State and Defense, probably with involvement from the Office of the Vice President and the National Security Council. The role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in such circumstances, is supposed to be collecting the positions and submitting them to the President when he is the only one that can make the decision. This did not happen.
 
While the fighting was in progress, Franks asked for a provisional government to be established.


While the fighting was in progress, Franks asked for a provisional government to be established,
===Changes from the White House===
===Changes from the White House===
Rumsfeld and the White House made rapid changes. The decision was made to bring in [[L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer]], who had been [[Henry Kissinger]]'s chief of staff, Ambassador to the Netherlands, and head of the State Department counterterrorism office. He had no Middle East experience, which Rumsfeld considered an advantage: Rumsfeld had rejected some of Garner's appointments because they were State Department Arabists who might not be sympathetic to the President's goal of remaking Iraqi society.
Rumsfeld and the White House made rapid changes. The decision was made to bring in L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer, who had been Henry Kissinger's chief of staff, Ambassador to the Netherlands, and head of the State Department counterterrorism office. He had no Middle East experience, which Rumsfeld considered an advantage: Rumsfeld had rejected some of Garner's appointments because they were State Department Arabists who might not be sympathetic to the President's goal of remaking Iraqi society.


"In mid-April 2003 [[Scooter Libby]] and [[Paul Wolfowitz]] contacted former Ambassador Bremer to serve as the senior American official in Iraq. Bremer would replace Garner and Khalilzad in leading Coalition efforts to help shape the new Iraq. President Bush publicly announced the decision on 6 May 2003, 17 days after Garner arrived in Baghdad as the head of ORHA.The CPA’s stated mission was to “restore conditions of safety and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can safely determine their own political future, and facilitate economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.” The US Government never issued a formal order dissolving the ORHA." Some of its staff members joined the CPA, and Garner returned to civilian life.<ref name=OPII-II-IV>{{citation
President Bush publicly announced the decision on 6 May 2003, 17 days after Garner arrived in Baghdad as the head of ORHA.  The US Government never issued a formal order dissolving the ORHA. Some of its staff members, such as Meghan O'Sullivan. joined the CPA, and Garner returned to civilian life.<ref name=OPII-II-IV>{{citation
| author = Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese with the Contemporary Operations Study Team
| author = Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese with the Contemporary Operations Study Team
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/onpoint/chap04-05.htm
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/onpoint/chap04-05.htm
| contribution = Part II, Transition to a New Campaign; Chapter 4: Leading the New Campaign: Transitions in Command and Control in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
| contribution = Part II, Transition to a New Campaign; Chapter 4: Leading the New Campaign: Transitions in Command and Control in Operation Iraqi Freedom
|title = ON POINT II: Transition to the New Campaign; The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January 2005
|title = ON POINT II: Transition to the New Campaign; The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003-January 2005
}}</ref>
}}</ref>


Bremer, in turn, wanted full authority. At first, he was to share authority with Khalizad, who was the point of contact to Iraqis who might be in a full government. When Bremer's appointment was announced on May 6 by the White House, Khalizad had just been told he was not included in the solution, amazing Powell. When Powell asked Rice for an explanation, she said she had nothing to do with it.<ref>COBRA II, pp. 475-476))</ref>
Bremer, in turn, wanted full authority. At first, he was to share authority with Khalizad, who was the point of contact to Iraqis who might be in a full government. When Bremer's appointment was announced on May 6 by the White House, Khalizad had just been told he was not included in the solution, amazing Powell. When Powell asked Rice for an explanation, she said she had nothing to do with it.<ref>COBRA II, pp. 475-476</ref>
 
===Force drawdown and command reorganization===
===Force drawdown and command reorganization===
On April 16, Franks declared the end of major combat,<ref>Franks, pp. 528-529</ref> and ordered the withdrawal of the major U.S. combat units. The CENTCOM forward headquarters in Qatar and I MEF were to be withdrawn. U.S. forces would be reduced to 30,000 by the end of August, which the U.S. believed was adequate. <ref name=Sanchez>{{citation
On April 16, Franks declared the end of major combat,<ref>Franks, pp. 528-529</ref> and ordered the withdrawal of the major U.S. combat units. The CENTCOM forward headquarters in Qatar and I MEF were to be withdrawn. U.S. forces would be reduced to 30,000 by the end of August, which the U.S. believed was adequate. <ref name=Sanchez>{{citation
Line 334: Line 466:
While regular Iraqi military units were no longer fighting, resistance by irregulars continued, first by Ba'ath loyalists, then random Iraqis objecting to an invasion, but then sectarian fighting among the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds, and their various factions. A full-fledged insurgency, however, was not underway until July. Since the Iraqi police as well as the Iraqi army had dissolved, providing population security fell to the military, which was not organized for it, as, for example, the WWII Constabulary in Germany had been.
While regular Iraqi military units were no longer fighting, resistance by irregulars continued, first by Ba'ath loyalists, then random Iraqis objecting to an invasion, but then sectarian fighting among the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds, and their various factions. A full-fledged insurgency, however, was not underway until July. Since the Iraqi police as well as the Iraqi army had dissolved, providing population security fell to the military, which was not organized for it, as, for example, the WWII Constabulary in Germany had been.


CFLCC was  redesignated Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) on May 1, but McKiernan's headquarters was replaced by [[V Corps]], then under LTG Wallace. MG [[Ricardo Sanchez]], then commanding [[1st Armored Division (U.S.)]] in Germany, was promoted to LTG and given command of V Corps. According to Sanchez, Franks had not specified a specific Phase IV role for CENTCOM or V Corps. <ref>Sanchez, p. 171</ref>
CFLCC was  redesignated Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) on May 1, but McKiernan's headquarters was replaced by V Corps, then under LTG Wallace. MG Ricardo Sanchez, then commanding 1st Armored Division (U.S.) in Germany, was promoted to LTG and given command of V Corps. According to Sanchez, Franks had not specified a specific Phase IV role for CENTCOM or V Corps. <ref>Sanchez, p. 171</ref>
====Debaathification, retention of Army and Police====
 
{{main|Debaathification}}
====De-Ba'athification, retention of Army and Police====
Franks and DeLong recommended that only the senior [[Ba'ath Party]] leadership be blacklisted, on the assumption, much as with the Soviet Communist Party, that Party members ran most of the basic government services. Nevertheless, the Party was dissolved on May 12, and CENTCOM was faced with the job of creating a new civilian infrastructure. Garner said that he had protested full [[debaathication]] to Bremer, who said "These are the directions I have. I have directions to execute this..." <ref name=Garner-PBS />
{{main|De-Ba'athification}}
Franks and DeLong recommended that only the senior Ba'ath Party leadership be blacklisted, on the assumption, much as with the Soviet Communist Party, that Party members ran most of the basic government services. Nevertheless, the Party was dissolved on May 12, and CENTCOM was faced with the job of creating a new civilian infrastructure. Garner said that he had protested full de-Ba'athification to Bremer, who said "These are the directions I have. I have directions to execute this..." <ref name=Garner-PBS>{{citation
| url = http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/garner.html
| title = The Lost Year in Iraq: Interview, Lt. Gen. (retired) Jay Garner
| date = 11 August 2006
| journal = PBS Frontline}}</ref>


====Resources from other nations====
====Resources from other nations====
CENTCOM tried to get peacekeeping resources from other nations. The Administration preemption doctrine had assumed that while the US might have acted unilaterally, successful operations might cause allies to share the postwar work. The immediate operations were so confused, however, that this was never really evaluated.
CENTCOM tried to get peacekeeping resources from other nations. The Administration preemption doctrine had assumed that while the US might have acted unilaterally, successful operations might cause allies to share the postwar work. The immediate operations were so confused, however, that this was never really evaluated.


Promises of a Muslim peacekeeping unit did not materialize. The Saudis did not want to be under U.S. command, and the US was nervous about the hospital they did volunteer, believing the staff might contain Wahhabist activists. The [[United Arab Emirates]] was not interested in policing the south.
Promises of a Muslim peacekeeping unit did not materialize. The Saudis did not want to be under U.S. command, and the US was nervous about the hospital they did volunteer, believing the staff might contain Wahhabist activists. The United Arab Emirates was not interested in policing the south.


India considered sending troops, in response to a request delivered by BG E.J. Sinclair, assistant division commander of the [[101st Airborne Division]]. From the Indian perspective, reasons to participate were to be recognized as more of a great power. Reasons against included an April parliamentary resolution that the war was illegal, and a general question of risks and benefits for India. India is extensively experienced in peacekeeping, but always under UN auspices. The proposal was that it put its troops under US and UK command. Given the unpopularity of the war, what would be the Indian public perception of Indian lives lost, and Indians seen as occupiers, especially among India's Muslim population and in the Middle East?  How would this affect US support of Pakistan, or would Pakistan seize the opportunity if India did not?<ref name=AT2003-06-19>{{citation
India considered sending troops, in response to a request delivered by BG E.J. Sinclair, assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne Division. From the Indian perspective, reasons to participate were to be recognized as more of a great power. Reasons against included an April parliamentary resolution that the war was illegal, and a general question of risks and benefits for India. India is extensively experienced in peacekeeping, but always under UN auspices. The proposal was that it put its troops under US and UK command. Given the unpopularity of the war, what would be the Indian public perception of Indian lives lost, and Indians seen as occupiers, especially among India's Muslim population and in the Middle East?  How would this affect US support of Pakistan, or would Pakistan seize the opportunity if India did not?<ref name=AT2003-06-19>{{citation
  | title = India dithers over Iraq dilemma
  | title = India dithers over Iraq dilemma
  | author = Sudha Ramachandran  
  | author = Sudha Ramachandran  
Line 350: Line 487:
  | url = http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EF19Df01.html}}</ref>
  | url = http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EF19Df01.html}}</ref>


[[Poland]] led a division, but of uneven quality. A Polish official, Marek Belka, was deputy head of ORHA.  Poland does have peacekeeping experience, but not in this sensitive environment. It would get general assistance from NATO, but NATO was not itself going to be seen as part of the peacekeeping force.<ref>{{citation
Poland led a division, but of uneven quality. A Polish official, Marek Belka, was deputy head of ORHA.  Poland does have peacekeeping experience, but not in this sensitive environment. It would get general assistance from NATO, but NATO was not itself going to be seen as part of the peacekeeping force.<ref>{{citation
  | title = Iraq: Is Poland Up To The Task Of Directing A Peacekeeping Zone?
  | title = Iraq: Is Poland Up To The Task Of Directing A Peacekeeping Zone?
  | author = Breffni O'Rourke |journal = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
  | author = Breffni O'Rourke |journal = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Line 356: Line 493:
  | date = 6 June 2003}}</ref> The Poles also would command a Spanish force with restrictive rules of engagement.  
  | date = 6 June 2003}}</ref> The Poles also would command a Spanish force with restrictive rules of engagement.  


A [[Ukraine|Ukrainian]] brigade was sent, but was of minimal ability; only the UK forces, with Italian and other NATO supplements, were effective. <ref>COBRA II, p. 471</ref>
A Ukraine|Ukrainian brigade was sent, but was of minimal ability; only the UK forces, with Italian and other NATO supplements, were effective. <ref>COBRA II, p. 471</ref>
==Security operations==
CJTF-7 conducted operations to root out resistance, especially by Saddam loyalists. Operation PENINSULA STRIKE, on  June 9-12, cordoned and swept areas of the Sunni Triangle.<ref>{{citation
| title = Operation Peninsula Strike,June 9-12, 2003
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/peninsula_strike.htm
| journal = Globalsecurity}}</ref>  Operation DESERT SCORPION, from June 15 to 19, swept the Sunni Triangle with raids  based on targeted intelligence, and also conducted some humanitarian operations.  <ref>{{citation
| title = Operation Desert Scorpion Continues Throughout Iraq | author = Jim Garamone
| journal = American Forces Press Service
| date = 17 June 2003
| url = http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28865}}</ref>"These are highly coordinated, intelligence- driven operations," according to a V Corps spokesman.  "These are places where we've been shot at, ambushed from and we have tracked the actions to these people." 
 
Operation VICTORY BOUNTY went through the same areas on July 26 to 29, but Sanchez decided to reduce the sweep operations, in part innocent Iraqis were being taken into custody, and the custody facilities were overloaded. It was unclear how to treat detainees that were not clearly military, but he ordered, in June, for them to be treated under the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Following VICTORY BOUNTY, he examined the Abu Ghraib and Khan Bani Sadh prisons as potential detention sites, but found the second essentially destroyed. Abu Ghraib was the only available facility, although Sanchez ruled that the torture and execution chambers had to be sealed. <ref>Sanchez, ''Wiser in Battle'', pp. 206-207</ref> It was not fully understood that the division commanders were doing little screening of detainees, which contributed to overcrowding. BG Barbara Karpinski said the 4th ID was the least selective, the 82nd Airborne the best, the 101st fairly good, and the 1st Armored would also send too many.<ref name=Ricks-Fiasco2>{{citation
| author = Thomas E. Ricks
| title = FIASCO: the American Military Adventure in Iraq
| publisher = Penguin | year = 2006
| isbn=159320103X}},  p. 239</ref>


While it is a danger to micromanage, some officers felt Sanchez had little overall vision and the various divisions had different styles. In the north, the 101st Airborne Division, under MG David Petraeus, was having good success both with security and nation-building, but it was also dealing with the more cooperative Kurds. Still, Petraeus was the Army's counterinsurgency expert and took a different approach than other commanders.<ref name=Gentile>{{citation
| title = A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects
| author = Gian P. Gentile
| journal = World Affairs | date = Summer 2008
| url = http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Gentile.html}}</ref>
The 4th Infantry Division, under MG Ray Odierno, was having a difficult time in the Sunni Triangle, and used the most force; a retired general at CPA said it fueled the insurgency <ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco'', pp. 232-233</ref> The 101st Airborne Division, commanded by MG Charles Swannack, was having slightly better luck closer to Baghdad. <ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco'', pp. 226-232</ref>
There were also personality clashes and communications failures between Bremer and Sanchez. In the summer of 2003, COL Teddy Spain, the military police commander in Baghdad, could get no clear answer to "who is in charge". In theory, Bremer and Sanchez ultimately reported to Rumsfeld, but Rumsfeld generally assumed he reported to the White House. Spain said he would get conflicting orders from the CPA and from CJTF-7.<ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco, pp. 179-180''</ref>
==WMD assessment==
In October, David Kay, under the direction of Tenet, issued a report saying:<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 470-474</ref>
*Saddam had a significant history, capabilities and programs related to WMD; laboratories existed within the security organizations
*Saddam had no WMD stockpiles
Feith believes that the finding of infrastructure supported the WMD justification for the war, but the Administration quickly got off-message with it and essentially changed arguments to democracy promotion.
==American civilian government==
There was a brief period in which the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was responsible for peace operations, but the responsibility soon passed to the #Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). L. Paul Bremer, head of CPA, told Feith he wanted to arrive with one key message: "the Ba'athists are not coming back."
As the senior official, Garner was replaced in a month, on May 7, by L. Paul Bremer of the U.S. Department of State, although Bremer took control 9 days later. <ref>DeLong, pp. 124-125</ref>  Bremer established the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was not well coordinated with the military. Garner had assumed a quick transition to Iraqi provisional rule. <blockquote>Bremer reversed Garner’s plans for an early turnover of political power and announced the indefinite postponement of the formation of an Interim Iraqi Government. Instead of a temporary Iraqi sovereign body, the CPA would continue to serve as the chief political authority and the Coalition armed forces as the military arm of that authority. This decision, in the eyes of many Iraqis, transformed the intent of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483|United Nations (UN) Resolution 1483, which recognized the United States and Great Britain as “occupying powers” and urged the two powers to promote the welfare of Iraqis and to administer the country until Iraqis were capable of self-governance. The resolution appeared to formalize the sense that the Coalition powers were acting like occupiers rather than liberators, and this perception fueled the disaffection of some in Iraq.<ref name=OPII-II-IV /></blockquote>
===ORHA===
===ORHA===
In April, [[Leonard Di Rita]], a close aide of Rumsfeld, came to Kuwait and joined ORHA.  Di Rita said State had mismanaged other peace operations, and this would be different, following Rumsfeld's "[[Beyond Nation-Building]]" doctrine. When asked by an [[AID]] official about reconstruction, he said  "We don't owe the people of Iraq anything," Di Rita said. "We're giving them their freedom. That's enough," according to Packer. The U.S. wouldn't get bogged down in Iraq, Di Rita later told war planners at a major meeting: "We're going to stand up an interim Iraqi government, hand power over to them, and get out of there in three to four months," Di Rita said, speaking for Rumsfeld.<ref>George Packer, ''The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq'', ''quoted by'' Art Levine,  February 26, 2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/art-levine/stuff-happens-revisited_b_16402.html</ref>
{{main|Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance}}
In April, Leonard Di Rita, a close aide of Rumsfeld, came to Kuwait and joined ORHA.  Di Rita said State had mismanaged other peace operations, and this would be different, following Rumsfeld's "Beyond Nation-Building" doctrine. When asked by an AID official about reconstruction, he said  "We don't owe the people of Iraq anything," Di Rita said. "We're giving them their freedom. That's enough," according to Packer. The U.S. wouldn't get bogged down in Iraq, Di Rita later told war planners at a major meeting: "We're going to stand up an interim Iraqi government, hand power over to them, and get out of there in three to four months," Di Rita said, speaking for Rumsfeld.<ref>George Packer, ''The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq'', ''quoted by'' Art Levine,  February 26, 2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/art-levine/stuff-happens-revisited_b_16402.html</ref>


Garner waited in Kuwait, in early May, to come to Baghdad. The original plan had him arriving 60 days after the end of the war, with the initial preparation being done by CENTCOM [[civil affairs]] teams and engineers. The White House assumed the Americans would be welcomed. Rice had said "The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces. You would be able to bring new leadership but keep the body in place." Under the changing situation, Garner saw himself in that leadership role, but as a partner, not director, of Iraqis. <ref>COBRA II, p. 463</ref>
Garner waited in Kuwait, in early May, to come to Baghdad. The original plan had him arriving 60 days after the end of the war, with the initial preparation being done by CENTCOM civil affairs teams and engineers. The White House assumed the Americans would be welcomed. Rice had said "The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces. You would be able to bring new leadership but keep the body in place." Under the changing situation, Garner saw himself in that leadership role, but as a partner, not director, of Iraqis. <ref>COBRA II, p. 463</ref>
In the PBS interview, Garner's interviewer asked him if his superiors wanted him simply prepare for Chalabi, a neoconservative favorite, to take over. Garner denied this was Rumsfeld's plan, quoting him as saying "I don't have a candidate. The best man will rise." Garner did say that Chalabi "certainly he was the darling of [[Douglas Feith|Doug Feith]] and [former Defense Policy Board Chairman] [[Richard Perle]] and probably ...[[Paul Wolfowitz]], perhaps (Vice-President) [[Dick Cheney]]. I'm not sure."  He said that he was prepared to bring back the Army, <blockquote>By the 15th of May, we had a large number of Iraqi army located that were ready to come back, and the Treasury guys were ready to pay them. When the order came out to disband, [it] shocked me, because I didn't know we were going to do that. All along I thought we were bringing back the Iraqi army. ... Why we didn't do that, I don't know.</blockquote>
In the PBS interview, Garner's interviewer asked him if his superiors wanted him simply prepare for Chalabi, a neoconservative favorite, to take over. Garner denied this was Rumsfeld's plan, quoting him as saying "I don't have a candidate. The best man will rise." Garner did say that Chalabi "certainly he was the darling of Douglas Feith|Doug Feith and [former Defense Policy Board Chairman] Richard Perle and probably ...Paul Wolfowitz, perhaps (Vice-President) Dick Cheney. I'm not sure."  He said that he was prepared to bring back the Army, <blockquote>By the 15th of May, we had a large number of Iraqi army located that were ready to come back, and the Treasury guys were ready to pay them. When the order came out to disband, [it] shocked me, because I didn't know we were going to do that. All along I thought we were bringing back the Iraqi army. ... Why we didn't do that, I don't know.</blockquote>


==Coalition Provisional Authority==
===Coalition Provisional Authority===
Bremer, before leaving with Iraq, met with Rumsfeld's staff, specifically being sent to [[Douglas Feith]] to draft the [[debaathification]] order. Feith said his staff had briefed Bremer extensively about the interagecy work on [[debaathification]], which had been approved, in draft form, by the President on March 10. Bremer asked for a delay, wanting to make he announcement himself. Walter Slocombe, who had drafted Orders 1 and 2 with Bremer, showed them to Feith on May 9.  <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 428</ref>
{{main|Coalition Provisional Authority}}
Bremer, before leaving with Iraq, met with Rumsfeld's staff, specifically being sent to Douglas Feith to draft the de-Ba'athification order. Feith said his staff had briefed Bremer extensively about the interagency work on de-Ba'athification, which had been approved, in draft form, by the President on March 10. Bremer asked for a delay, wanting to make he announcement himself. Walter Slocombe, who had drafted Orders 1 and 2 with Bremer, showed them to Feith on May 9.  <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 428</ref>


Bremer did have some concerns about conflicting advice from James Dobbins, now a RAND Corporation researcher and a former State Department expert on [[peace operations#nation-building|nation-building]]. While Dobbins did not want to join CPA, he did point Bremer to a recent study that, among other things, suggested large peacekeeping forces were better than small ones. <ref name=RANDMR1753>{{citation
Bremer did have some concerns about conflicting advice from James Dobbins, later a RAND Corporation researcher and a former State Department expert on peace operations#nation-building|nation-building. While Dobbins did not want to join CPA, he did point Bremer to a recent study that, among other things, suggested large peacekeeping forces were better than small ones. <ref name=RANDMR1753>{{citation
  | url = http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/
  | url = http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/
  | title =  America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq
  | title =  America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq
Line 373: Line 547:
  | author = James Dobbins, ''et al.'' | year = 2003}}</ref> Dobbins was concerned that the Administration was dangerously ignoring lessons from the Balkans. While Rumsfeld had given a February speech "Beyond Nation-Building" that emphasized NATO's errors, Dobbins thought it taught much. In particular, using the same force levels as NATO had used would have called for 450,000 occupation troops. <ref name=BNB>{{citation
  | author = James Dobbins, ''et al.'' | year = 2003}}</ref> Dobbins was concerned that the Administration was dangerously ignoring lessons from the Balkans. While Rumsfeld had given a February speech "Beyond Nation-Building" that emphasized NATO's errors, Dobbins thought it taught much. In particular, using the same force levels as NATO had used would have called for 450,000 occupation troops. <ref name=BNB>{{citation
  | title = Beyond Nation Building
  | title = Beyond Nation Building
  | author = [[Donald Rumsfeld]] | date= February 14, 2003
  | author = Donald Rumsfeld | date= February 14, 2003
  | journal = DefenseLink
  | journal = DefenseLink
  | url = http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337}}</ref>
  | url = http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337}}</ref>
As the senior official, Garner was replaced in a month, on May 7, by [[L. Paul Bremer]] of the [[U.S. Department of State]], although Bremer took control 9 days later. <ref>DeLong, pp. 124-125</ref>  Bremer established the [[Coalition Provisional Authority]], which was not well coordinated with the military. Garner had assumed a quick transition to Iraqi provisional rule. <blockquote>Bremer reversed Garner’s plans for an early turnover of political power and announced the indefinite postponement of the formation of an Interim Iraqi Government. Instead of a temporary Iraqi sovereign body, the CPA would continue to serve as the chief political authority and the Coalition armed forces as the military arm of that authority. This decision, in the eyes of many Iraqis, transformed the intent of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483|United Nations (UN) Resolution 1483]], which recognized the United States and Great Britain as “[[occupying power]]s” and urged the two powers to promote the welfare of Iraqis and to administer the country until Iraqis were capable of self-governance. The resolution appeared to formalize the sense that the Coalition powers were acting like occupiers rather than liberators, and this perception fueled the disaffection of some in Iraq.<ref name=OPII-II-IV>{{citation
| author = Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese with the Contemporary Operations Study Team
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/onpoint/chap01-01.htm
| contribution =Part I. Setting the Stage. Chapter 1, Overview of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: May 2003 to January 2005
|title = ON POINT II: Transition to the New Campaign; The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January 2005
}}</ref></blockquote>


Bremer believed he reported directly to the President, and, in his book, said that some called him the “American viceroy” in Iraq.<ref name=Bremer>{{citation
Bremer believed he reported directly to the President, and, in his book, said that some called him the “American viceroy” in Iraq.<ref name=Bremer>{{citation
  | author = [[L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer]] with Malcolm McDonnell
  | author = L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer with Malcolm McDonnell
  | title = My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope
  | title = My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope
  | publisher = Simon & Schuster | year = 2006
  | publisher = Simon & Schuster | year = 2006
  | isbn= 9780743273893}}, p. 11</ref> At first, he was subordinate to the Secretary of Defense on paper, but had his reporting changed to the [[National Security Council]] in November 2003.  
  | isbn= 9780743273893}}, p. 11</ref> At first, he was subordinate to the Secretary of Defense on paper, but had his reporting changed to the National Security Council in November 2003.  


The [[Coalition Provisional Authority]] took control on 16 May 2003, effectively taking over from ORHA. <ref name=CPAReg1>{{citation
The Coalition Provisional Authority took control on 16 May 2003, effectively taking over from ORHA. <ref name=CPAReg1>{{citation
  | url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf
  | url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf
  | title = Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1
  | title = Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1
  | author = L. Paul Bremer
  | author = L. Paul Bremer
  | date = 16 May 2003}}</ref> Its Regulation Number 1 designated CENTCOM for military support. “As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of US Central Command shall directly support the CPA by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy generally.”
  | date = 16 May 2003}}</ref> Its Regulation Number 1 designated CENTCOM for military support. “As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of US Central Command shall directly support the CPA by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy generally.”
====Order No. 1====
CPA Order Number 1 set up [[debaathification]]. <ref name=CPA-Ord-1>{{citation
| url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf
| title = De-Ba`athification of Iraqi Society  | date =16 May 2003
| author = [[L. Paul Bremer]]
| publisher = [[Coalition Provisional Authority]]}}</ref>
In the Arabic documents from the CPA, the word used for debaathification was ''ijtithaath''. Literally, that means "uproot by root and branch", but the connotation was closer to "annihilation or eradication". According to John Maguire, it reminded Iraqis of the Final Solution. When he told Bremer it was a "heinous word...he blew it off." Maguire said the CIA station was cut out of CPA planning. <ref>Isikoff & Corn, p. 225</ref>
====Order No. 2====
The second order would dissolve the Iraqi Army.
Bremer wrote that he had told Rumsfeld, on May 19, that the proposal to dissolve the army would "generate a good deal of public support, despite its impact." Bremer said tha Feith had reviewed the proposal in detail on May 22, and asked for clarification of wording, which was done between Bremer's press officer, Dan Senor, and Rumsfeld's chief of staff, Larry di Rita. Bremer said Rumsfeld authorized him to proceed, and Bremer told the President in a videoconference.<ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', p. 57</ref> Feith, however, said he did not know Rumsfeld's reaction, although he assumed approval; he said that CENTCOM and the CPA had separate, uncoordinated plans for developing Iraqi security capability.<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 433-435</ref>
The implementation of Order #1, however, started crisis, by:<ref name=CPA-Ord-1>{{citation
| url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf
| title = Dissolution of Entities with Annex A  | date =23 August 2003
| author = [[L. Paul Bremer]]
| publisher = [[Coalition Provisional Authority]]}}</ref>
#Abolishing the Army, Defense Ministry, and intelligence agency
#Creating a "New Iraqi Corps". Feith discreetly suggested that the pronunciation of abbreviation, the proposed name for a security organization, the New Iraqi Corps, would be equivalent to an American organization called the Federal United Corps; the name was quickly changed to New Iraqi Army. <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 434</ref>
While Rumsfeld was aware of it, Rice and [[Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] GEN [[Peter Pace]] were unaware it was coming. Abizaid and McKiernan thought it was a major change affecting their plans.
Indeed, it differed from what Feith had briefed to the President in March, but was written by Bremer and a colleague, Walter Slocombe. Bremer's thinking that keeping a Sunni-dominated army would outrage the Kurds and Shi'ites, and also put a substantial financial obligation on the U.S.
Feith did not object, since the Army had dissolved and he did not think it advisable to recall. Chalabi had been arguing for such an action, as had the Kurds.
Franks, Abizaid, and McKiernan were in the awkward position of trying to change a decision that had been made and announced. They had been meeting with a former officer, Faris Naima, in a meeting set up by the CIA. Naima was not considered a supporter of Saddam and was seen as the head of a new general staff.<ref>COBRA II, pp. 480-481</ref>
In Mosul, the order led to rioting by unemployed Iraqi soldiers. Eventually, Bremer paid the soldiers, but got nothing in return. He also discovered that the Army, as opposed to the [[Republican Guard]] and other [[security organizations of Saddam Hussein]], had relatively few Baathists; that is why the Army units were kept far from Baghdad. <ref>COBRA II, pp. 482-485</ref>
In May, [[John Sawers]], the British Ambassador to Egypt, was designated as the chief British authority for Iraq. Four days after his arrival, he cabled his government to say that ORHA had been ineffective and the Coalition was losing support. In Basra, the British had been using frozen Iraqi funds to rebuild infrastructure, but Washington had not released them for Baghdad and the capital was both a public health and security nightmare. He thought the 3rd ID was worn out, and sugested sending the 16 British Air Assault Brigade to Baghdad to train police and help in security. MG Albert Whitley, the senior British officier, and another British general agreed, but London refused. <ref name=Guardian2006-03-14>{{citation
| title = US postwar Iraq strategy a mess, Blair was told
| author =  Ewen MacAskill, diplomatic editor
| journal = The Guardian | date = 14 March 2006
| url = http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/mar/14/uk.topstories31}}</ref> Sawers regarded cutting US troops as the greatest problem, followed by Franks' lack of interest in Phase IV, heavyhanded operation by 3ID, debaathification of infrastructure workers, and failure to restore electricity, water, and sewage treatment. Sawers did have confidence in Bremer and met frequently with him.
===CPA and the Military===
According to some parties present, the first thing Bremer said at V Corps headquarters in Baghdad was, “You all work for me.”<ref>Sanchez interview with ON POINT II team,  14 August 2006</ref> Lieutenant General Sanchez recalls this from some of the after-action reports and comments from V Corps staff officers who were present at the meeting. Sanchez, though not present at the time, heard credible accounts of this blunt statement and believed it set a particular tone, “So it started out fairly rough and it didn’t help that he completely cut out McKiernan and Wallace when he said, ‘I don’t want to deal with you guys. I want to deal with Sanchez.’”<ref>Sanchez interview with ON POINT II team,  14 August 2006; Wallace interview 22 May 2006</ref>
===Iraqi leders and the CPA===
There was a self-appointed  [[Iraqi Leadership Council]] (ILC), which Iraqi exiles in London had created in December 2002, and entered Iraq in late April 2003. Bremer was not willing to let the ILC be "the preesumptive nucleus of a new representative givernment" would have both the problems characteristic of a government in exile being distrusted by those that had suffered under the regime. Bremer also observed the ILC lacked a proper balance between Sunni and Shia, had an overrepresentation of Kurds, and no Christians, Turkmen or Women.
It was replaced, in mid-July 2003, by the CPA-appointed  [[Iraqi Governing Council]] (IGC), a body solely advisory in nature, as a quasi-partner.  The transition to a sovereign Iraqi Government would take another 11 months,when the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) assumed political authority from the CPA. While the IIG would be sovereign, there still would be a major and dominant US troop presence that would not withdraw fully from the cities until 2009.
Bremer published, on September 8, 2003, a seven-step document, "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty", which noted the first three steps were complete:<ref name=Path>{{citation
| url = http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/September/20030908072714nosnhojb0.6840784.html
| author = [[L. Paul Bremer]]
| date = 8 September 2003
| title = Bremer Describes a 7-Step Process of Political Evolution in Iraq (Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority administrator op-ed in Washington Post)
}}</ref>
#Creation of the [[Iraq Governing Council]] (IGC) broadly representative of Iraqi society.
#Establishing an IGC committee to plan the writing of a constitution
#Transfer of day-to-day operations, when the IGC named 25 Iraqis as ministers, reporting to the IGC. They are preparing the 2004 budget and must operate their ministries according to those budgets. The coalition wants them to exercise real power and will thrust authority at them.
#Beginning the writing of the constitution
#popular ratification of the constitution
#election of a government  to fill the elective offices specified in the constitution, with universal adult suffrage
#dissolving the CPA, which will hand over its authority to  the sovereign Iraqi government
According to Feith, this was not a schedule for the Administration's plan for early transition, but to the original State Department schedule, which was an occupation. Rumsfeld, Feith and Wolfowitz were unaware Bremer opposed the Defense Department concept. Feith saw Bremer's concern as the Governing Council having no mandate, being insufficiently representative and lacking public support. Nevertheless, Rumsfeld did not see keeping the U.S. in control as a better alterntive, and he moved to overrule Bremer, leading to the President's decision to shut down the CPA in June 2004 and recognize the interim government.<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 453-455</ref>
Bremer met, on 27 October, with Defense Department staff, and told Rumsfeld <blockquote>I don't think it would be responsible to turn over sovereignty to a nonelected Iraqi body with no constitution in place. There'd be no checks and balances on the entity we'd handed power to. We'd risk Iraq falling into civil war, with no constitution to shape Iraq's political structure and to guarantee individual and minority rights. I can't support such an outcome.</blockquote>
Bremer continued by questioning that a body "appointed by the Governing Council would somehow be more legitimate than the GC itself."<ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', p. 205</ref> In the context of this discussion, Feith said that when he or Rumsfeld said "end the occupation", Bremer would reply that Iraqis thought that they were under occupation so long as large numbers of American troops were in Iraq. Feith said he had a point, but the Defense officials thought it made a difference if the Iraqi government were run by Americans or Iraqis. While Feith said "there was a difference between occupation as an accusation and occupation as a legal fact",<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 463</ref> customary international law, such as the [[Fourth Geneva Convention]], would still consider the U.S. to have the obligation of Occupying Power, a [[term of art]], until a [[Status of Forces Agreement]] was executed.


Bremer met with the council and returned with a plan for an interim constitution and the creation of an elected interim government. In January 2004, a Principals meeting said that the U.S. did not want to seem opposed to elections, but Bremer pointed out that Ayatollah [[Ali al-Sistani]], the most powerful Shi'ite cleric in Iraq, had insisted the government be elected. <ref name=CFR-Sistani>{{citation
It quickly issued orders for de-Ba'athification, and disbanded the Iraqi Army. It was advised by the Iraqi Governing Council, and worked in parallel with the Coalition military. On June 28, 2004, it was replaced by the Interim Iraqi Government.
| title = Backgrounder: IRAQ: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
====De-Ba'athification and the military====
| author = Sharon Otterman
{{main|De-Ba'athification}}
| publisher = [[Council on Foreign Relations]] | date = 1 September 2004
Bremer issued more extensive de-Ba'athification orders than had existed under military government, dissolved the Iraqi military, and then handed the de-Ba'athification exception program to the Iraqi Governing Council. The IGC delegated it to a committee headed by Ahmed Chalabi.
| url = http://www.cfr.org/publication/7636/}}</ref> Sistani had issued a fatwa to this effect in June 2003; Feith asks if Bremer considered this before issuing a plan in September. <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 466</ref>
==Writing the Constitution==


Bremer, in February 2004, still saw the major constitutional problem as the role of Islam. The working draft read, <blockquote>Islam is the official religion of the State, and is to be considered <u>a</u> principal source among other soures of legislation. This Law shall respect the Islamic identity of the majority of the people of Iraq, but guarantees the complete freedom of all religions and their religious practices.<ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 295-296</ref></blockquote>
The CPA started to create a local security force rather than an army, called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. CENTCOM developed a separate program for Iraqis that could help in their operations.
====Writing the Constitution====
Bremer, in February 2004, still saw the major constitutional problem as the role of Islam. The working draft read, <blockquote>Islam is the official religion of the State, and is to be considered <u>a</u> principal source among other sources of legislation. This Law shall respect the Islamic identity of the majority of the people of Iraq, but guarantees the complete freedom of all religions and their religious practices.<ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 295-296</ref></blockquote>


He saw the sticking point as the Shi'ite Islamist demand to reword it to have Islam as <u>the</u> principal soure, which was unacceptable to the non-Islamist members of the IGC, as well as to Bremer and his staff. Sistani accepted a compromise that kept <u>a</u>, but added that "no law contradicting the 'basic tenets of Islam' could be enacted." Washington approved this language, which he considered better than the language in the recent Afghan constitution.
He saw the sticking point as the Shi'ite Islamist demand to reword it to have Islam as <u>the</u> principal soure, which was unacceptable to the non-Islamist members of the IGC, as well as to Bremer and his staff. Sistani accepted a compromise that kept <u>a</u>, but added that "no law contradicting the 'basic tenets of Islam' could be enacted." Washington approved this language, which he considered better than the language in the recent Afghan constitution.
Line 470: Line 576:
February 29th opened with some Kurdish issues, which Bremer negotiated personally.
February 29th opened with some Kurdish issues, which Bremer negotiated personally.
#Block grants from the treasury which was resolved
#Block grants from the treasury which was resolved
#The role of their militia, the [[peshmerga]]; an earlier compromise was tabled
#The role of their militia, the peshmerga; an earlier compromise was tabled
#veto of the ratification of the constitution
#veto of the ratification of the constitution


As Bremer negotiated this, Chalabi introduced new and "draconian" debaathification policy. When this came to Bremer, he told the Kurds that if he helped them on the demands above, he wanted their support against this proposal.  Later, [[Mowaffak al-Rubaie|al-Rubaie]] spoke for unity and got acceptance of the language about Islam.  
As Bremer negotiated this, Chalabi introduced new and "draconian" de-Ba'athification policy. When this came to Bremer, he told the Kurds that if he helped them on the demands above, he wanted their support against this proposal.  Later, Mowaffak al-Rubaie|al-Rubaie spoke for unity and got acceptance of the language about Islam.  


As the constitutional wrangling continued, there was increasing intra-Shi'a agitation, with [[Muqtada al-Sadr]] pushing [[Iraq war, insurgency#Early 2004|militarily]] for power<ref name=Independent2008-04-11>{{citation
As the constitutional wrangling continued, there was increasing intra-Shi'a agitation, with Muqtada al-Sadr pushing Iraq war, insurgency#Early 2004|militarily for power<ref name=Independent2008-04-11>{{citation
  | url = http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/warlord-the-rise-of-muqtada-alsadr-807698.html
  | url = http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/warlord-the-rise-of-muqtada-alsadr-807698.html
  | journal = Independent (U.K.)
  | journal = Independent (U.K.)
Line 481: Line 587:
  | author = Patrick Cockburn  
  | author = Patrick Cockburn  
  | date = 11 April 2008
  | date = 11 April 2008
}}</ref> as his rival, Sistani, pressured in the arguments over the TAL. Ayatollah Sistani told Bremer that he could not accept the idea that a two-thirds majority in any three provinces could block the ratification of the permanent constitution, which he called a "Kurdish veto". Bremer was angry, and concerned that the Shi'a were about to overturn the compromises that had gotten the document to that point.
}}</ref> as his rival, Sistani, pressured in the arguments over the TAL. Al-Sadr, son of Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, killed by Saddam, but not Sistani, believed they had authority for clerical rule under the doctrine of ''Wilawat al-faqih'', or rule of the jurisprudent. Ayatollah Sistani told Bremer that he could not accept the idea that a two-thirds majority in any three provinces could block the ratification of the permanent constitution, which he called a "Kurdish veto". Bremer was angry, and concerned that the Shi'a were about to overturn the compromises that had gotten the document to that point.


March 2 saw deadly attacks during the Shi'ite observance of [[Ashura]]; a three-day mourning period was observed.  At 2 PM on the 5th, many [[Iraqi Governing Council]] members wer ready for the ceremony, unaware of the tension; some, such as Ahmed Chalabi, were very aware and threatened to resign if the IGC did not sign. Yhe Shi'a split, and the Kurds hesitated. Chalabi and al-Rubaie mediated after talking with Bremer. There was no compromise that day.  Eventually, the Council convened at 7:37 PM. From Washington, Rice kept suggesting to Bremer that the Kurds be presured to soften their position on ratification, which offended Sistani. By 10:30, the meeting broke down. Bremer told Rice that keeping presure on the Shi'a and Sistani was high-risk, but it was his best judgment. <ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 302-307</ref>
March 2 saw deadly attacks during the Shi'ite observance of Ashura; a three-day mourning period was observed.  At 2 PM on the 5th, many IGC members wer ready for the ceremony, unaware of the tension; some, such as Ahmed Chalabi, were very aware and threatened to resign if the IGC did not sign. The Shi'a split, and the Kurds hesitated. Chalabi and al-Rubaie mediated after talking with Bremer. There was no compromise that day.  Eventually, the Council convened at 7:37 PM. From Washington, Rice kept suggesting to Bremer that the Kurds be pressured to soften their position on ratification, which offended Sistani. By 10:30, the meeting broke down. Bremer told Rice that keeping pressure on the Shi'a and Sistani was high-risk, but it was his best judgment. <ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 302-307</ref>


The Shi'a returned to Najaf to work with Sistani. Late on the 7th, Dr. al-Rubaie came to Bremer and said, "It was a forceps delivery, but we got what we wanted." Sistani approved.  
The Shi'a returned to Najaf to work with Sistani. Late on the 7th, Dr. al-Rubaie, an obstetrician when not delivering new nations, came to Bremer and said, "It was a forceps delivery, but we got what we wanted." Sistani approved.  


On 8 March 2004, the CPA issued the [[Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period]]<ref name=CPA-TL>{{citation
On 8 March 2004, the CPA issued the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period<ref name=CPA-TL>{{citation
  | url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html
  | url = http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html
  | date = 8 March 2004
  | date = 8 March 2004
  | title = Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
  | title = Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period
  | author = Coalition Provisional Authority}}</ref> It created or schedules:
  | author = Coalition Provisional Authority}}</ref> It created or schedules:
*[[Iraqi Interim Government]] to take power (from the [[Iraqi Governing Council]] on 30 June 2004.  This government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the [[Iraqi Governing Council]] and the [[Coalition Provisional Authority]] and possibly in consultation with the United Nations.   
*Interim Iraqi Government to take power (from the Iraqi Governing Council on 30 June 2004.  This government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations.   
*Elections for the National Assembly, preferably not beyond  31 December 2004, and, in any event, not beyond 31 January 2005.
*Elections for the National Assembly, preferably not beyond  31 December 2004, and, in any event, not beyond 31 January 2005.


IGC President Bahr al-Uloum said <blockquote>We gateher today for a great historical meeting in the spirit of brotherhood and true love that unites all Iraqi people. All the brothers, when they spoke, put the interests of the nation above all other interets. Let it be known that we came to this place and we are all one person today and one opinion.</blockquote>
IGC President Bahr al-Uloum said <blockquote>We gather today for a great historical meeting in the spirit of brotherhood and true love that unites all Iraqi people. All the brothers, when they spoke, put the interests of the nation above all other interets. Let it be known that we came to this place and we are all one person today and one opinion.</blockquote>


Kurdish leader [[Massoud Barzani]] simply said, "For the first time in my life I feel like an Iraqi."
Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani simply said, "For the first time in my life I feel like an Iraqi."


==Iraqi interim governance==
==Iraqi interim governance==
The goal was to transfer power to the [[Iraqi Interim Government]] after the TAL was signed, but the process was not automatic.  
The goal was to transfer power to the Interim Iraqi Government after the TAL was signed, but the process was not automatic.  
===Involving the UN===
===Involving the UN===
It was planned to have the UN envoy,  UN envoy [[Lakhdar Brahimi]], appoint the members, with the legitimacy of the UN. Unfortunately, there were Shi'ite objections to Brahimi, who they suspected as a Sunni nationalist. He had, in their opinion, not spoken strongly enough of Saddam's brutality, and a picture had been circulated of Brahimi smoking a cigar with Saddam. Bremer appealed to Sistani that no one group would be completely satisfied, but it was to Iraq's, and Sistani's interest to bring back the UN. On March 17th, there was a full Governing Council meeting, at which Bremer said "if the UN cannot help form an interim government, the Iraqi people will know who to bleme." Jaafari pointed out the Council had invited the UN back in January, and they accepted Brahimi's return. <ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 310-311</ref>
It was planned to have the UN envoy,  UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, appoint the members, with the legitimacy of the UN. Unfortunately, there were Shi'ite objections to Brahimi, who they suspected as a Sunni nationalist. He had, in their opinion, not spoken strongly enough of Saddam's brutality, and a picture had been circulated of Brahimi smoking a cigar with Saddam. Bremer appealed to Sistani that no one group would be completely satisfied, but it was to Iraq's, and Sistani's interest to bring back the UN. On March 17th, there was a full Governing Council meeting, at which Bremer said "if the UN cannot help form an interim government, the Iraqi people will know who to bleme." Jaafari pointed out the Council had invited the UN back in January, and they accepted Brahimi's return. <ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 310-311</ref>


Brahimi would become a key figure in the transition, arguably being in a better position than Bremer to negotiate terms acceptable to Sistani. <ref name=Slate>{{citation
Brahimi would become a key figure in the transition, arguably being in a better position than Bremer to negotiate terms acceptable to Sistani. <ref name=Slate>{{citation
Line 510: Line 616:
  | url = http://slate.msn.com/id/2100461/}}</ref>  
  | url = http://slate.msn.com/id/2100461/}}</ref>  


Brahimi was not only controversial in Iraq; he was strongly criticized by Americans, opponents of [[Pan-Arab nationalism]], about his silence, while Algerian foreign minister or an Arab League official, about Saddam's atrocities in the past. [[Fouad Ajami]] accused him of sympathies with Saddam's system: "Mr. Brahimi hails from the very same political class that has wrecked the Arab world..his technocracy is, in truth, but a cover for the restoration of the old edifice of power."<ref name=WSJ>{{citation
Brahimi was not only controversial in Iraq; he was strongly criticized by Americans, opponents of Pan-Arab nationalism, about his silence, while Algerian foreign minister or an Arab League official, about Saddam's atrocities in the past. Fouad Ajami accused him of sympathies with Saddam's system: "Mr. Brahimi hails from the very same political class that has wrecked the Arab world..his technocracy is, in truth, but a cover for the restoration of the old edifice of power."<ref name=WSJ>{{citation
  | url = http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108431652940408675,00.html
  | url = http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108431652940408675,00.html
  | title = The Curse of Pan-Arabia
  | title = The Curse of Pan-Arabia
  | author = [[Fouad Ajami]]
  | author = Fouad Ajami
  | journal = [[Wall Street Journal]] | date = 12 May 2004}}</ref>  [[Michael Rubin]] had similar comments in the National Review.
  | journal = Wall Street Journal | date = 12 May 2004}}</ref>  Michael Rubin had similar comments in the National Review.
===Security crises===
===Security crises===
Both the Shi'ite and Sunni regions had significant escalations of violence, which presented the problem that forceful suppression by the US might cause a backlash for the new government. Bremer expected violence to increase in the months before transition.  
Both the Shi'ite and Sunni regions had significant escalations of violence, which presented the problem that forceful suppression by the US might cause a backlash for the new government. Bremer expected violence to increase in the months before transition.  


Brahimi threatened to leave over the potential bloodshed in [[Iraq War, insurgency#First Battle of Fallujah|Fallujah]]; Bremer lectured him about Muqtada as an equal menace to Iraq. <ref>Bremer, pp. 326-327</ref> According to Feith, Bremer was also worried that Sunni members of the IGC might resign if the Council were not given an opportunity to resolve the Fallujah crisis by negotiation. Feith acknowledged that Abizaid believed that Council-requested delays could cause a collapse of security; Abizaid also said the Iraqis "don't want to fight for Americans."<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 481-484</ref>
Brahimi threatened to leave over the potential bloodshed in Iraq War, insurgency#First Battle of Fallujah|Fallujah; Bremer lectured him about Muqtada as an equal menace to Iraq. <ref>Bremer, pp. 326-327</ref> According to Feith, Bremer was also worried that Sunni members of the IGC might resign if the Council were not given an opportunity to resolve the Fallujah crisis by negotiation. Feith acknowledged that Abizaid believed that Council-requested delays could cause a collapse of security; Abizaid also said the Iraqis "don't want to fight for Americans."<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 481-484</ref>
 
Some have claimed that not only IGC stability, but to the sensitivity of the Iraq War, insurgency#Early 2004|American Presidential politics contributed to calling off the military stabilization of Fallujah.
 
During the May 13 visit of Rumsfeld and Myers, Bremer was not optimistic about easy answers with Muqtada and Fallujah. Sanchez said he was running out of specific Mahdi Army targets, and they agreed that they could move to economic stimuli in the south, engaging military targets that interfered. Fallujah remained more difficult; Bremer was not pleased with the lack of initiative of the new commander of the Iraqi Fallujah Brigade.  Muqtada, while allegedly seeking negotiations, also appeared to be trying to lure provocative attacks on holy places he was using.


Some have claimed that not only IGC stability, but to the sensitivity of the [[Iraq War, insurgency#Early 2004|American Presidential politics]] contributed to calling off the military stabilization of Fallujah.
The broader issue they discussed was involving the new Iraqi government in security, such as giving them a voice in combat tactics and air support to be used after the IIG took over. He warned they "will want to show distance from us, and they ''will'' make mistakes." They would also want security for the January elections, which would be difficult with both the shortage of Coalition troops and some restrictive rules of engagements.
===Abu Ghraib effects===
===Abu Ghraib effects===
CBS News broke the [[Abu Ghraib prison]] photographs in late April.<ref name=CBS>{{citation
{{main|Abu Ghraib prison}}
CBS News broke the Abu Ghraib prison photographs in late April.<ref name=CBS>{{citation
  | date=  April 28, 2004
  | date=  April 28, 2004
  | title = Abuse Of Iraqi POWs By GIs Probed: 60 Minutes II Has Exclusive Report On Alleged Mistreatment
  | title = Abuse Of Iraqi POWs By GIs Probed: 60 Minutes II Has Exclusive Report On Alleged Mistreatment
  | author = Rebecca Leung
  | author = Rebecca Leung
  | journal = 60 Minutes, CBS News
  | journal = 60 Minutes, CBS News
  | url = http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml}}</ref> Feith said that Rumsfeld, who offered to resign over it, saw it having critical strategic impacts, and that he and [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] GEN [[Richard Myers]] would deal with the matter. Rumsfeld told Wolfowitz, [[Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] GEN [[Peter Pace]], and Feith  not to become involved in the affair. <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 484-485</ref>
  | url = http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml}}</ref> Feith said that Rumsfeld, who offered to resign over it, saw it having critical strategic impacts, and that he and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Richard Myers would deal with the matter. Rumsfeld told Wolfowitz, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Peter Pace, and Feith  not to become involved in the affair. <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 484-485</ref>
 
Bremer, with Sanchez, met with the IGC on May 12, beginning with an apology. Council members, according to Bremer, "regretted the Abu Ghraib misconduct, but most went on to criticize the Arab and international news media for having ignored Saddam's repression for years."  Rumsfeld and Myers arrived on the 13th, and they discussed the frustration of difficulty of separating criminals who should be transferred to the Iraqi courts, and the true security cases. Suggestions including the creation of an Iraqi prisoner's ombudsman, putting Iraqi observers into field detention and screening centers, imroving screening, and reducing the authority of US intelligence to put indefinite holds on prisoners. The last was an action item for Sanchez. <ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 351-352</ref>
 
Sanchez also said the Council asked why the American press was not discussing Saddam's abuses. He said there was a wide range of responses. Questions from the council included whether there were Israeli interrogators there, what Intelligence interrogation/Catalogs|interrogation methods were in use. The council, accorded to Sanchez, did distinguish between abuse by guards and torture during interrogation, but expected there would be a worldwide call to response by jihadists.  He said that the Defense Department had no clear public relations plan, and the situation escalated on a partisan basis in Congress.<ref>Sanchez, ''Wiser in Battle'', pp. 375-380</ref>
===Building the interim government===
Since meeting with the full Council was awkward, Brahimi set up conferences with himself, Bremer and Blackwill, with a "troika" of the Council's immediate past, present, and future presidents:
*Massoud Barzani (Kurd)
*Izzadin Salim (Shiite)
*Sheikh Ghazi al-Yawar (Sunni)
 
Bremer had recommended that any new government should include ministers who had demonstrated they were doing a good job, especially those that were effectively technocrats. The real challenge would be the president and prime minister. He was also concerned about security in his last 60 days, and, through very private channels, requested more troops. This need became especially obvious when a car bomb killed Salim on May 17th. Ghazi stepped up in the rotation, and President Bush called him to offer condolences. Bush and Ghazi formed a quick rapport, leading to Blackwill and Bremer considering him for the presidency.
===Prime Minister===
As of May 19, no clear Prime Minister candidate had emerged.  Allawi was the first choice for Defense Minister, but he refused to serve under certain prime ministerial candidates.
 
In the May 25 troika meeting, all supported Allawi for prime minister. They were concerned he might not be acceptable to Sistani, as too secular.
===Transitional issues===
It was important, in Bremer's view, that the Governing Council disband once the new government was in place. He could order them disbanded, but preferred to do it. He offered a proposal that they disband a day before the new government took over, showing a peaceful transfer, and offered to "sweeten" the idea by creating a paid National Consultative Council that would take the IGC members that did not join the new government. It was also agreed to add a few face-saving ministers without portfolio. They agreed to the dissolution on May 27.
 
During this period, issues arose with Chalabi. A financial investigation, and search of his facilities, took place in late April. There was also a May 3 report from ''Newsweek'' that Chalabi was providing secret information to Iran.
===Presidency===
According to Bremer, the TAL had not assumed that the Presidency would have an activist role, which Adnan Pachachi, clearly wanting the job, expected. Ghazni, whom Pachachi regarded as his protege, also wanted the job.
 
Brahimi, on May 28, decided on Pachachi. Blackwill, on May 30, expressed concern about Pachachi's vision of the role. Rice told the CPA that either man was acceptable to the U.S. On the 31st, the plan was to offer it to Pachachi, but that assumed Ghazi would agree, gracefully, to end his quest. When Brahimi and the CPA leadership met with Ghazi on April 1, however, he said he could not withdraw, and left the meeting.  Barzani was furious with the selection of Pahachi.
 
Brahimi called Bremer to tell him that he was "dumbfounded", but Pachachi had declined the Presidency. With Barzani still there, Bremer told Brahimi to offer the Presidency to Ghazni and "pray to God he accepts it."  Barzani and the others, at that point, could only laugh.
 
Ghazi did accept, and, that afternoon, Brahimi, Ghazi, and Allawi presented the government to the world. They were able to announce that the IGC had agreed to dissolve.<ref>Bremer, ''My Year in Iraq'', pp. 371-377</ref>  On June 8, the UN Security Council welcomed the new government with Resolution 1546.
 
==Transfer==
While the announced date of transfer was June 30, security threats suggested that it would be wise to surprise opponents, and do the transfer on the 28th. It was agreed, and sovereignty passe at 10:26, Iraq time.
 
Bremer flew out of Iraq, having videotaped his departure speech. It closed with "Long live Iraq!"
 
===Transfer of power===
===Transfer of power===
The [[Iraqi Interim Government]] was appointed, on 1 June 2004, UN envoy [[Lakhdar Brahimi]], with the most input from the [[Iraqi Governing Council]], and advice from Bremer and  Ambassador [[Robert Blackwill]], representing [[Condaleeza Rice]], had significant input. According to the [[Council on Foreign Relations]], the [[Iraqi Governing Council]] (IGC), which dissolved itself on itself June 1, had the most influence.<ref name=CFR>{{citation
The Iraqi Interim Government was appointed, on 1 June 2004, UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, with the most input from the Iraqi Governing Council, and advice from Bremer and  Ambassador Robert Blackwill, representing Condaleeza Rice, had significant input. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which dissolved itself on itself June 1, had the most influence.<ref name=CFR>{{citation
  | url = http://www.cfr.org/publication/7664/
  | url = http://www.cfr.org/publication/7664/
  | title = IRAQ: The interim government leaders
  | title = IRAQ: The interim government leaders
Line 537: Line 681:


Bremer and Sanchez announced the actual handover on June 28, a deliberate early transfer to avoid disruption by insurgents. Allawi was Prime Minister and Sheikh al-Yawar was President. Feith wrote that the Allawi government did no worse than the CPA; even though it was primarily made up of externals, it had legitimacy. He argues that it could have been created fourteen months earlier, and the delay was the State-CIA opposition to Chalabi.<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 494-495</ref>
Bremer and Sanchez announced the actual handover on June 28, a deliberate early transfer to avoid disruption by insurgents. Allawi was Prime Minister and Sheikh al-Yawar was President. Feith wrote that the Allawi government did no worse than the CPA; even though it was primarily made up of externals, it had legitimacy. He argues that it could have been created fourteen months earlier, and the delay was the State-CIA opposition to Chalabi.<ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', pp. 494-495</ref>
==Security operations==
CJTF-7 conducted operations to root out resistance, especially by Saddam loyalists. Operation PENINSULA STRIKE, on  June 9-12, cordoned and swept areas of the [[Sunni Triangle]].<ref>{{citation
| title = Operation Peninsula Strike,June 9-12, 2003
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/peninsula_strike.htm
| journal = Globalsecurity}}</ref>  Operation DESERT SCORPION, from June 15 to 19, swept the [[Sunni Triangle]] with raids  based on targeted intelligence, and also conducted some humanitarian operations.  <ref>{{citation
| title = Operation Desert Scorpion Continues Throughout Iraq | author = Jim Garamone
| journal = American Forces Press Service
| date = 17 June 2003
| url = http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28865}}</ref>"These are highly coordinated, intelligence- driven operations," according to a V Corps spokesman.  "These are places where we've been shot at, ambushed from and we have tracked the actions to these people." 


Operation VICTORY BOUNTY went through the same areas on July 26 to 29, but Sanchez decided to reduce the sweep operations, in part innocent Iraqis were being taken into custody, and the custody facilities were overloaded. It was unclear how to treat detainees that were not clearly military, but he ordered, in June, for them to be treated under the rules of the [[Fourth Geneva Convention]]. Following VICTORY BOUNTY, he examined the Abu Ghraib and Khan Bani Sadh prisons as potential detention sites, but found the second essentially destroyed. Abu Ghraib was the only available facility, although Sanchez ruled that the torture and execution chambers had to be sealed. <ref>Sanchez, ''Wiser in Battle'', pp. 206-207</ref> It was not fully understood that the division commanders were doing little screening of detainees, which contributed to overcrowding. BG [[Barbara Karpinski]] said the 4th ID was the least selective, the 82nd Airborne the best, the 101st fairly good, and the 1st Armored would also send too many.<ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco'', p. 239</ref>
As Bremer left, a viceroy no longer needed, he was replaced by an ambassador accredited to the Iraqi government, John Negroponte.  George Casey, a four-star general, took command of the strategic-level Multi-National Force-Iraq. Negroponte and Casey formed a good working relationship, different, however, than that of the United States Mission to the Republic of Vietnam. In the Vietnam War, the military commander reported to the Ambassador, but the military and civilian sides in Iraq had parallel chains of command.
===U.S. politics===
There was increasing domestic opposition. A Out of Iraq Caucus formed in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2005, but there was never a major antiwar movement as there was during the Vietnam War.


While it is a danger to micromanage, some officers felt Sanchez had little overall vision and the various divisions had different styles. In the north, the [[101st Airborne Division]], under MG [[David Petraeus]], was having good success both with security and nation-building, but it was also dealing with the more cooperative Kurds. Still, Petraeus was the Army's counterinsurgency expert and took a different approach than other commanders.<ref name=Gentile>{{citation
==Insurgency and communal conflict==
| title = A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects
| author = Gian P. Gentile
| journal = World Affairs | date = Summer 2008
| url = http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Gentile.html}}</ref>
The [[4th Infantry Division]], under MG [[Ray Odierno]], was having a difficult time in the Sunni Triangle, and used the most force; a retired general at CPA said it fueled the insurgency <ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco'', pp. 232-233</ref> The [[101st Airborne Division]], commanded by MG [[Charles Swannack]], was having slightly better luck closer to Baghdad. <ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco'', pp. 226-232</ref>
 
==Insurgency==
{{main|Iraq War, insurgency}}
{{main|Iraq War, insurgency}}
A full-fledged [[insurgency]] was in progress by July or August, although there was not a public announcement. There had been specific warnings, certainly as early as May.
A full-fledged insurgency was in progress by July or August, although there was not a public announcement. There had been specific warnings, certainly as early as May. Also in 2004, conflict on ethnic and religious lines were growing more severe. <ref name=Kilcullen-Counter>{{citation
| author = David Kilcullen
| title = Countering Global Insurgency, Appendix 1
| date = 2004
| url = http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/kilcullen.pdf
| publisher = Small Wars Journal}}</ref>


In  May, Gen al-Shawani, leader of the [[Scorpions (Iraq War)|Scorpions]] and CIA-favored (as opposed to Chalabi), met with Bush, Cheney, Rice, Tenet and Card. He said <blockquote>Sir, I'm going to tell you something. You need to know the truth. Baghdad is almost surrounded by insurgents. If you can't secure the airort highway, you can't secure all of Iraq.<ref>Isikoff & Corn, p. 357</ref></blockquote>
In  May, Gen al-Shawani, leader of the Scorpions and CIA-favored (as opposed to Chalabi), met with Bush, Cheney, Rice, Tenet and Card. He said <blockquote>Sir, I'm going to tell you something. You need to know the truth. Baghdad is almost surrounded by insurgents. If you can't secure the airport highway, you can't secure all of Iraq.<ref>Isikoff & Corn, p. 357</ref></blockquote>


The CIA station confirmed Shawani's impression. Bremer said he saw an Iraqi intelligence service document, toward the end of July 2003, describing how to conduct insurgency, followed by three major bombings in August.. <ref name=Bremer-PBS>{{citation
The CIA station confirmed Shawani's impression. Bremer said he saw an Iraqi intelligence service document, toward the end of July 2003, describing how to conduct insurgency, followed by three major bombings in August.. <ref name=Bremer-PBS>{{citation
Line 566: Line 701:
  | contribution = Interview: L. Paul Bremer III
  | contribution = Interview: L. Paul Bremer III
  | title = The Lost Year in Iraq
  | title = The Lost Year in Iraq
  | journal = PBS Frontline | date = June 26 and Aug. 18, 2006.}}</ref> The large attacks in August were on the Jordanian Embassy, then the UN Mission, and then in the holy Shi'ite ares of [[Najaf]]. Feith considers the UN bombing, on August 19th, as the start of the insurgency. <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 449</ref>  
  | journal = PBS Frontline | date = June 26 and Aug. 18, 2006.}}</ref> The large attacks in August were on the Jordanian Embassy, then the UN Mission, and then in the holy Shi'ite areas of Najaf. Feith considers the UN bombing, on August 19th, as the start of the insurgency. <ref>Feith, ''War and Decision'', p. 449</ref>  
===Military organization===
===Military organization===
GEN [[John Abizaid]], Franks' deputy, took over the command, on July 8, when Franks retired. On the 11th, he stopped the troop withdrawal ordered by Franks.<blockquote>The operational environment in Iraq is fluid...in light of the current situation, [forces previously intended to redeploy]] will remain in Iraq until replaced by equivalent U.S. or coalition capability.<ref>Sanchez, p. 227</ref></blockquote>
GEN John Abizaid, Franks' deputy, took over the command, on July 8, when Franks retired. On the 11th, he stopped the troop withdrawal ordered by Franks.<blockquote>The operational environment in Iraq is fluid...in light of the current situation, [forces previously intended to redeploy will remain in Iraq until replaced by equivalent U.S. or coalition capability.<ref>Sanchez, p. 227</ref></blockquote>


The original headquarters for Phase IV was [[Multi-National Corps-Iraq]], based on the assets of [[V Corps]], now under Ricardo Sanchez.
The original headquarters for Phase IV was Multi-National Corps-Iraq, based on the assets of V Corps, now under Ricardo Sanchez.


The headquarters for foreign military units in Iraq is now [[Multi-national Force-Iraq]] (MNF-I), which was created, under Sanchez, on 15 May 2004.  On an overall basis, it reports to the [[United States Central Command]], which also commands the U.S. troops in MNF-I. Other units report to their home nations, although there are a number of non-US commanders from the MNF-I Deputy Commanding General, and Australian, British and Polish commanders at [[division]] level.
The headquarters for foreign military units in Iraq is now Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I), which was created, under Sanchez, on 15 May 2004.  On an overall basis, it reports to the United States Central Command, which also commands the U.S. troops in MNF-I. Other units report to their home nations, although there are a number of non-US commanders from the MNF-I Deputy Commanding General, and Australian, British and Polish commanders at division level.
===Perceptions of insurgency===
===Perceptions of insurgency===
Abizaid used the term "classic insurgency" in a press conference in May, and was immediately corrected by Rumsfeld. As Abizaid told Sanchez afterwards, "Well, there's no appetite in Washington to use the word 'insurgency'. And, by the way, we're not 'occupiers', either. We're 'liberators'"<ref>Sanchez, p. 231</ref>
Abizaid used the term "classic insurgency" in a press conference in May, and was immediately corrected by Rumsfeld. As Abizaid told Sanchez afterwards, "Well, there's no appetite in Washington to use the word 'insurgency'. And, by the way, we're not 'occupiers', either. We're 'liberators'"<ref>Sanchez, p. 231</ref>


Not all commanders agreed they then faced an insurgency. MG [[Ray Odierno]], commanding the [[4th Infantry Division (U.S.)]], told reporters, on June 18, "this is not guerilla warfare. It is not close to guerilla warfare," and described the operations he launched as mopping up. Asked about it a year later, he said "I didn't believe it was an insurgency until about July. What we really thought was, Remnant."<ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco'', pp. 170-171</ref>
Not all commanders agreed they then faced an insurgency. MG Ray Odierno, commanding the 4th Infantry Division, told reporters, on June 18, "this is not guerrilla warfare. It is not close to guerrilla warfare," and described the operations he launched as mopping up. Asked about it a year later, he said "I didn't believe it was an insurgency until about July. What we really thought was, Remnant."<ref>Ricks, ''Fiasco'', pp. 170-171</ref>
===The Surge===
{{main|Iraq War, Surge}}
Security remained a problem, but the US could not do the job alone or stay indefinitely. In January 2007, President Bush announced a US-Iraqi agreement to augment the US security forces temporarily, to bring down violence to a level that the Iraqis could handle.


==Transfer of sovereignty==
==Transfer of sovereignty==
Full authority passed to the elected Iraqi government on 30 June 2009.
Full authority passed to the elected Iraqi government on 30 June 2009. Muqtada and the fighters in Fallujah were still active, and there were major acts of infrastructure sabotage. Iraqis, however, could begin to fight for an Iraqi government.
 
Thomas Ricks said that <blockquote>The best-case scenario is that Iraq isn’t going to look anything like a success to Americans. It’s not going to be democratic, it’s not going to be stable, and it’s not going to be pro-American. Ambassador Crocker predicts in the book that the future of Iraq is probably something like Lebanon today. Most of the other experts I’ve talked to consider that wildly optimistic.<ref name=Ricks-FPRI>{{citation
| title = Understanding the Surge in Iraq and What’s Ahead
| author = Thomas Ricks
| date = May 2009 | journal = E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute
| url = http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200905.ricks.understandingsurgeiraq.html}}</ref></blockquote>


==References==
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}
{{Reflist|2}}
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The Iraq War was the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a multinational coalition led by the United States of America. Military operations were conducted by forces from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland, and was supported in various ways by many other countries, some of which allowed attacks to be launched or controlled from their territory. The United Nations neither approved nor censured the invasion, which was never a formally declared a war. The U.S. refers to it as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Continuing operations are under the command of Multi-National Force-Iraq.

From the U.S. operational view, Operation Iraqi Freedom ended when the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the last operational brigade in Iraq, left in August 2010. [1] Six other brigades actually remain, but they are called "advise and assist" units charged with training.

This war is to be distinguished from the Gulf War of 1991, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The Gulf War had United Nations authorization. Further, both these wars should be differentiated from the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988.

The war had quick result of the removal (and later execution) of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the formation of a democratically elected parliament and ratified constitution, which won UN approval. However, an amorphous insurgency since then has produced large numbers of civilian deaths and an unstable Iraqi government. It has generated enormous political controversy in the U.S. and other countries.

It also changed the dynamics of the region. According to Anthony Zinni, [2], it produced the "first Shi'a Arab state in modern history." Earlier advocates of regime change in Iraq, such as David Wurmser, had proposed replacing Saddam Hussein with a government of Iraqi exiles centered around Ahmed Chalabi; such a government would be in close alliance with Jordan.[3] There have been constant questions of Iraq splitting along the ethnic and religious lines of the three Ottoman Empire provinces from which the British Empire created it: Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd.

Sovereignty has been transferred to a new elected Iraqi government, with U.S. forces withdrawn from the cities. Security problems still exist, although they are reduced from the worst times of the insurgency.

See also: Iraq War, origins of invasion
See also: Iraq War, major combat phase
See also: Iraq War, Surge

Rationale

There had been some sentiment, in the 1991 Gulf War, that the invasion force should have continued to Baghdad and overthrown Saddam Hussein, but most agree that would have been far beyond the UN mandate and the realities of the coalition. Nevertheless, there was increasingly strong pressure among American policy influencers, from the mid-1990s on, that regime change in Iraq was important to the overall goals of American foreign policy. The 1998 Iraq Liberation Act formalized this as a Congressional statement of direction.

The main rationale for the invasion was Iraq’s continued violation of the 1991 agreement (in particular United Nations Resolution 687) that the country allow UN weapons inspectors unhindered access to nuclear facilities, as well as the country’s failure to observe several UN resolutions ordering Iraq to comply with Resolution 687. The US government cited intelligence reports that Iraq was actively supporting terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as additional and acute reasons to invade. Though there was some justification before October 2002 for believing this intelligence credible, a later Senate investigation found that the intelligence was inaccurate and that the intelligence community failed to communicate this properly to the Bush administration[4].

Factors Leading Up to the Invasion

For more information, see: Iraq War, origins of invasion.

There was wide support for the view that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had a negative effect on regional and world stability, although many of the opinion makers intensely disagreed on the ways in which it was destabilizing. This idea certainly did not begin with 9/11, but 9/11 intensified the concern in the Bush Administration.[5] Nevertheless, U.S. military action against Iraq goes back to unconventional warfare during the Iran-Iraq War under Ronald Reagan, the Gulf War under George W. Bush and various operations under Bill Clinton.

Iraq had had and used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War and had active missile, biological weapon and nuclear weapon development programs. These provided Saddam with both a means of threatening and deterring within the region. He also supported regional terrorists, but there is now little evidence he had operational control of terrorists acting outside the region. Saddam had attempted an assassination of former President George H. W. Bush.

The issue of non-national terrorism, however, took on new intensity after the 9/11 attack. Some analysts, such as Michael Scheuer, believe that many decision makers found it hard to accept that such an attack could come from other than a nation-state.

The Authorization for the Use of Military Force that gave the George W. Bush Administration its legal authority to attack Iraq did not specifically depend on a proven relationship between Iraq and 9-11, or a specific WMD threat to the United States. Both, however, were assumed.

Strategic preparation

Not all the planning dates may seem in proper sequence; this is not anything suspicious as some of the work was already in progress as part of routine staff activity, while other work was started by informal communications.

Even before the 9/11 attacks, regime change in Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a high priority of the George W. Bush Administration. According to This is not to suggest that previous Administrations had not been considering it, and had been steadily carrying out air attacks in support of the no-fly zones (Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and Operation NORTHERN WATCH), as well as air strikes (Operation DESERT FOX). Nevertheless, the priorities changed.

In part using the cover of the no-fly zones, in part using clandestine operations, and in part activities in areas outside Iraq, work proceeded in what is now termed Operational Preparation of the Environment. This includes Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Operational Preparation of the Battlespace, and logistics (military)|logistical and other combat support and combat service support.

Another change, in the Bush Administration, was an emphasis on not "fighting the last war". Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a constant advocate of transformation, emphasizing higher technology, more flexibility, and smaller forces, rather than the large heavy forces that were optimized to fight the Soviet Union. This was especially true after early operations in the Afghanistan War (2001-2021), where large U.S. ground forces were not used, but instead extensive special operations working with Afghan forces and using air power. Every war is different, however, and the reality in Afghanistan is there was an existing civil war and substantial indigenous resistance forces.

Assumed links between 9/11 and Iraq

Late in the evening of 9/11, the President had been told, by CIA chief George Tenet, that there was strong linkage to al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attack proper. Tenet did not discuss Iraq in this context. [6] On September 12, President Bush directed counterterrorism adviser Richard Clarke to review all information and reconsider if Saddam was involved in 9/11.[7]

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz sent Rumsfeld a memo, on September 17, called "Preventing More Events"; it argued that there was a better than 1 in 10 chance that Saddam was behind 9/11. [8] He had been told, by the CIA and FBI, that there was clear linkage to al-Qaeda, but said the CIA lacked imagination. [9] On September 19, 2001, the Defense Advisory Board, chaired by Richard Perle, met for two days. Iraq was the focus. Among the speakers was Ahmed Chalabi, a controversial Iraqi exile who argued for an approach similar to the not-yet-executed approach to Afghanistan: U.S. air and other support to insurgent Iraqis. [10] Chalabi had the greatest support among Republican-identified neoconservatives, but also had Democratic supporters such as former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey.[11]

One reason Wolfowitz pushed for attacking Iraq was that he worried about what was then assumed would be a large American force in the treacherous terrain of Afghanistan. Since he believed, although without specific evidence, that there was between a 10 and 50 percent chance that Saddam was involved in 9/11, he thought Iraq, a brittle regime, might be the easier target. [12]

On the same day, Bush had told Tenet that he wanted links between Iraq and 9/11 explored. [13]

While Tenet agreed there was a connection between al-Qaeda and 9-11, and that Saddam was supporting Palestinian and European terrorists, he said that the CIA could not make a firm connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq. While CIA continued its analysis, it accepted a briefing from a Pentagon group, under Douglas Feith, to share its ideas about an Iran-9/11 connection. This was presented at CIA headquarters on August 14, 2002. According to Tenet, while Feith's team felt they had found things, in raw reports, that CIA had missed, they were not using the skills of professional intelligence analysts to consider other than the desired conclusion. His attention immediately was caught by a naval reservist working for Feith, Tina Shelton, who said the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq was an "open and shut case...no further analysis is required." A slide said there was a "mature, symbiotic relationship", which Tenet did not believe was supported. Pre-9/11 coordination between an al-Qaeda operative in Prague with the Iraqi intelligence service had become likely; Tenet described this association, which was later disproved, He called aside VADM Jake Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and telling him he worked for Rumsfeld and Tenet, and was to remove himself from Feith's policy channels. Later, Tenet learned that the Feith team was presenting to the White House, NSC, and Office of the Vice President. [14]

It appeared a matter of certainty in the White House, especially with Cheney, that a link existed between al-Qaeda and 9/11, and Iraq War policy assumed it. A February 2007 report by the Department of Defense Inspector General said no laws were broken, but Feith's group bypassed Intelligence Community safeguards [15] On June 1, 2009, Cheney agreed that the evidence shows no direct link, but the invasion was still warranted due to Saddam's general support of terror.[16]

W. Patrick Lang, DIA national intelligence officer for the Middle East, said

The Pentagon has banded together to dominate the government’s foreign policy, and they’ve pulled it off. They’re running Chalabi. The D.I.A. has been intimidated and beaten to a pulp. And there’s no guts at all in the C.I.A.”[11]

Reviews by Rumsfeld

CENTCOM had a contingency plan for a new war with Iraq, designated OPLAN 1003-98. It assumed Iraq would launch an attack as it had done in 1990. Rumsfeld had OPLAN 1003-98 presented by LTG Greg Newbold, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in late 2001. Rumsfeld believed the plan, which called for up to 500,000 troops, was far too large; Rumsfeld thought that no more than 125,000 would be needed. Newbold later said he regretted he did not say, at the time,

Mr. Secretary, if you try to put a number on a mission like this, you may cause enormous mistakes. Give the military the task, give the military what you would like to see them do, and let them come up with it. I was the junior military man in the room, but I regret not saying it[17]

Informally, Franks had called it "Desert Storm II", using three corps as in 1991, but to force collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. On November 27, he told the Secretary of Defense that he had a new concept, but that detailed planning would be needed. [18] Franks told Rumsfeld, during a videoconference on December 4, 2001, that it was a stale, troop-heavy concept. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Dick Myers, Vice CJCS Peter Pace, and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith were on the Washington end. Franks intended to ignore Feith, who he described as a "master of the off-the-wall question that rarely had relevance to operational problems." [19]

Franks proposed three basic options:

  • ROBUST OPTION: Every country in the region providing support; operations from Turkey in the north, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the south, air and naval bases in the Gulf states, with support bases in Egypt, Central Asia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. This would allow near-simultaneous ground and air operations.
  • REDUCED OPTION: A lesser number of countries supporting would mean a sequential air and ground operation.
  • UNILATERAL OPTION: If launching forces from Kuwait, U.S. ships, and U.S. aircraft from distant bases, the air and ground operations would be "absolutely sequential" due to the lack of infrastructure to bring in all ground forces at once.

Franks wrote that during the Afghanistan planning, he had developed a technique that presented, visually, the tasks to be done ("lines of operation") and the country or resource that would be affected by these tasks ("slices"). It is not clear when he first drew this visual aid for Iraq, although it was part of the December 12 briefing to Rumsfeld; the version reproduced in his book was dated December 8.

Image:Franks slices and lines.png|thumb|left |550px|Franks model, from sketch dated December 8, 2001 In this model, operational fires are strikes by aircraft, artillery, and missiles. Special Operations Forces operations are principally special reconnaissance and direct action (military); unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)|unconventional warfare involves both military and CIA guerrillas. Information operations, as a line, includes psychological operations, electronic warfare, deception, and computer network operations; politicomilitary and civil-military operations are doctrinally part of information operations but are shown separately here. RG and SRG are, respectively, the Iraqi Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard elite combat formations.









Rumsfeld liked the presentation. He asked Franks what came next, and Franks said improving the forces in the region. Rumsfeld cautioned him that the President had not made the go-to-war decision, and Franks clarified that he referred to preparation:

  • Triple the size of the ground forces now in Kuwait
  • Increase the number of carrier strike groups in the area
  • Improve infrastructure
  • Discuss contingency requirements with allies

Franks said the activities could look like routine training. He pointed out that an additional 100,000 troops and 250 aircraft would not fit into Kuwait, and more basing would be needed. Rumsfeld urged that it would have to be done faster "more quickly than the military usually works". The next step was a face-to-face briefing on December 27. [20]

Rumsfeld calls for new planning

Early warning of Rumsfeld's desires came to LTC Thomas Reilly, chief of planning for Third United States Army, still based at Fort McPherson in the U.S. While Third Army would become the Coalition Forces Land Component of CENTCOM, it had not yet been so designated, when Reilly received the notice on September 13, 2001. It used the term POLO STEP, the code word for Franks' concept of operations. [21]

On October 9, 2002, GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, told staff officers "From today forward the main effort of the US Army must be to prepare for war with Iraq". [22]

In the planning process, there were two key areas of friction between the civilians in the Department of Defense and the military:[23]

  • The role of the civilians in detailed operational planning
  • Caps on the number and type of troops that would be assigned

Intensified overt operations

For a number of years, the US and UK had been patrolling the "no-fly" zones of Iraq, and attacking air defense sites that directly threatened them. On September 4, 2002, however, there was a 100-aircraft strike that expanded the scope of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, doing major damage to the H-3 and al-Baghdadi air bases near Jordan. These were more general-purpose than strictly air defense sites, and degraded a range of Iraqi capabilities. [24]

Secret operations in Iraq

The Central Intelligence Agency, as well as military special operations, conducted a wide range of activities in Iraq well before the invasion. They included Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace such as adding intelligence collection, and Operational Preparation of the Battlespace such as destabilization and planning for using Iraqis in combat.

George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, had a major role in the decision to go to war, but also how it was to be fought. A lesson learned from Afghanistan was that "covert action, effectively coupled with a larger military plan, could succeed. What we were telling the vice president that day [in early 2002] was that CIA could not go it alone in toppling Saddam...in Iraq, unlike in Afghanistan, CIA's role was to provide information to the military...assess the political environment...coordinate the efforts of indigenous networks of supporters for U.S. military advances..." In February 2002, the Agency re-created the Northern Iraq Liaison Element (NILE) teams to work with the Kurds. Later, CIA officers worked to encourage surrender, but this soon proved impractical; the U.S. forces were so small that the prisoners would have outnumbered the invaders. [25]

DBANABASIS: Destabilization

At White House direction, the CIA had created a program, under the compartmented control system#Cryptonyms and pseudonyms|cryptonym DBANABASIS, for destabilizing Saddam. The deputy chief of the Iraq Operations Group assigned, by Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt, to run the program, starting in late 2001, was John Maguire; the other, whose identity remains classified, is known as Luis. In the mid-nineties, CIA had found that a first coup attempt simply had gotten Iraqi CIA assets killed; Maguire had been involved in that operation, the failure of which he blamed, in large part, on Ahmed Chalabi. [26]

On February 16, 2002, the President signed a Finding authorizing ANABASIS operations. The Congressional leadership was briefed. As opposed to the 1995 plan, ANABASIS would involve considerably more lethal activities. When they mentioned, for example, destroying railroad likes, Tyler Drumheller, chief of the European Division, said "you're going to kill people if you do this." Cofer Black, director of the Counterterrorism Center, had said "the gloves are off" soon after 9/11; this was an example of that change. Again as with Afghanistan, the CIA would make the initial political contacts with the resistance groups:

  • Kurdish Democratic Party headed by Massoud Barzani
  • Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani

Maguire's team entered in April, and met with both Barzani and Talabani. They met Iraqi troops who seemed eager for an American invasion. [27]

DBROCKSTARS: intelligence collection

In July 2002, a CIA team drove from Turkey to a base at Sulaymaniyah, 125 miles into Iraq from the Turkish border, and a few miles from the Iranian border. Turkey had been told that they were there primarily for collecting intelligence on Ansar al-Islam, a radical group opposed to the secular Kurdish parties, allied with al-Qaeda, and experimenting with poisons. It was based at Sargat, 25 miles from his base, at a location called Khurmal. The team was helped by Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

The supplementary assignment for the team, beyond Anwar al-Islam, was for covert action to overthrow Saddam. They had been ordered to penetrate the regime's military, intelligence, and security services. Confusing the situation was that they had Turkish escorts. Even with difficulties, they established liaison with a well-connected religious group, which access to the inner circles of Saddam's organizations, and irritation with the PUK. Their reports were to be identified as DBROCKSTARS. [28] By February 2003, the informants were providing significant information, including communications from Saddam's Special Security Organization. Air defense installations were confirmed and bombed. [29] 87 secure satellite telephones were made available, but, probably in early March, one asset was captured; 30 of the assets never reported again. [30]

Unconventional warfare

Franks also intensively explored the potential for military special operations, both direct action by U.S. personnel, and, as in Afghanistan, using native resistance elements. In particular, it was agreed that United States Army Special Forces teams could lead up to 10,000 Kurds in Unconventional warfare (United States doctrine)|guerrilla warfare, a number large enough to be effective but not large enough to threaten Turkish sensitivity about spillover of Kurdish nationalism into Turkey. [31] The usually antagonistic KDP and PUK worked with Special Forces against units of Saddam Hussein's military at the start of the war, although [32] yhis was later to result in partitioning Kurdistan into KDP and PUK areas. There eventually was a unified Kurdistan Regional Government by 2008.

On March 15, a Kurdish group, with CIA technical assistance, derailed an Iraqi troop train by blowing up the railroad tracks, a more visible activity than expected by Washington. There were several dozen harassing attacks in Kurdistan, and a march by 20,000 protesters on Ba'ath Party headquarters in Kirkuk.[33]

JTFI: WMD intelligence

Separate from DBANABASIS was the Joint Task Force on Iraq (JTFI) in the Counterproliferation Division. Its mission was not destabilization, but precise intelligence on WMD. Valerie Plame Wilson was its operations chief. JTFI developed sources inside Iraq, but worked from outside the country. Isikoff and Corn wrote that JTFI felt accurate intelligence was important, but "Bush, Cheney, and a handful of other senior officials already believed they had enough information to know what to do about Iraq". Rumsfeld, Perle, Wolfowitz, Libby and Feith believed Saddam was the principal danger to the U.S. and "we know what we are doing." [34] They considered Saddam a greater threat than bin Laden.

Legislative authorization

Joint Resolution 114 of October 11, 2002 is the primary legislative authorization for combat operations, although some advocates of presidential authority maintained it was within the inherent powers of the Presidency.

Voting was not strictly on party lines. In the Senate, it was opposed by the Independent and some Democrats.

  • Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii)
  • Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico)
  • Barbara Boxer (D-California)
  • Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia)
  • Lincoln Chaffee (R-Rhode Island)
  • Kent Conrad (D-North Dakota)
  • Jon Corzine (D-New Jersey)
  • Mark Dayton (D-Minnesota)
  • Dick Durbin (D-Illinois)

  • Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin)
  • Bob Graham (D-Florida)
  • Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
  • Jim Jeffords (I-Vermont)
  • Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts)+
  • Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont)
  • Carl Levin (D-Michigan)

  • Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland)
  • Patty Murray (D-Washington)
  • Jack Reed (D-Rhode Island)
  • Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryland)
  • Debbie Stabenow (D-Michigan)
  • Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota)+
  • Ron Wyden (D-Oregon)

The House also was not on strict party lines. Voting against were:

  • Neil Abercrombie (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Hawaii)
  • Tom Allen (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maine)
  • Joe Baca (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Brian Baird (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
  • John Baldacci (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maine)§°
  • Tammy Baldwin (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Wisconsin)
  • Gresham Barrett (R-South Carolina)
  • Xavier Becerra (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Earl Blumenauer (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)
  • David Bonior (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan) §
  • Robert Brady (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania)
  • Corinne Brown (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Florida)
  • Sherrod Brown (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
  • Lois Capps (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Michael Capuano (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
  • Benjamin Cardin (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maryland)
  • Julia Carson (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Indiana)
  • William Clay (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Missouri)
  • Eva Clayton (Democratic Party (United States)|D-North Carolina) §
  • James Clyburn (Democratic Party (United States)|D-South Carolina)
  • Gary Condit (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California) §
  • John Conyers (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
  • Jerry Costello (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
  • William Coyne (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania) §
  • Elijah Cummings (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maryland)
  • Susan Davis (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Danny Davis (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
  • Peter DeFazio (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)
  • Diana DeGette (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Colorado)
  • Bill Delahunt (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
  • Rosa DeLauro (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Connecticut)
  • John Dingell (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
  • Lloyd Doggett (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
  • Mike Doyle (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania)
  • John Duncan, Jr. (R-Tennessee)
  • Anna Eshoo (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Lane Evans (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
  • Sam Farr (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Chaka Fattah (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Pennsylvania)
  • Bob Filner (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Barney Frank (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
  • Charles Gonzalez (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
  • Luis Gutierrez (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)

  • Alice Hastings (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Florida)
  • Earl Hilliard (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Alabama)§
  • Maurice Hinchey (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Ruben Hinojosa (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
  • Rush Holt (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
  • Mike Honda (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Darlene Hooley (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)
  • John Hostettler (R-Indiana)
  • Amo Houghton (R-New York) §
  • Jay Inslee (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
  • Jesse Jackson, Jr. (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
  • Sheila Jackson-Lee (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
  • Eddie Bernice Johnson (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
  • Stephanie Tubbs Jones (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
  • Marcy Kaptur (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
  • Dale Kildee (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
  • Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
  • Jerry Kleczka (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Wisconsin)
  • Dennis Kucinich (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio) §
  • John LaFalce (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • James Langevin (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Rhode Island)
  • Rick Larsen (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
  • John Larson (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Connecticut)
  • Jim Leach (R-Iowa)
  • Barbara Lee (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Sandy Levin (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan)
  • John Lewis (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Georgia)
  • Bill Lipinski (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois) §
  • Zoe Lofgren (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • James Maloney (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Connecticut) §
  • Robert Matsui (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California) +
  • Karen McCarthy (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Missouri) §
  • Betty McCollum (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Minnesota)
  • Jim McDermott (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Washington)
  • Jim McGovern (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
  • Cynthia McKinney (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Georgia)
  • Carrie Meek (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Florida) §
  • Gregory Meeks (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Robert Menendez (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
  • Juanita Millender-McDonald (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • George Miller (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Alan Mollohan (Democratic Party (United States)|D-West Virginia)
  • Jim Moran (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Virginia)
  • Connie Morella (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Maryland)

  • Jerrold Nadler (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Grace Napolitano (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Richard Neal (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
  • Jim Oberstar (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Minnesota)
  • David Obey (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Wisconsin)
  • John Olver (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
  • Major Owens (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Frank Pallone, Jr. (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
  • Ed Pastor (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Arizona)
  • Ron Paul (R-Texas)
  • Donald Payne (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Jersey)
  • Nancy Pelosi (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • David Price (Democratic Party (United States)|D-North Carolina)
  • Nick Rahall (Democratic Party (United States)|D-West Virginia)
  • Charles Rangel (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Silvestre Reyes (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
  • Lynn Rivers (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Michigan) §
  • Ciro Rodriguez (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Texas)
  • Lucille Roybal-Allard (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California) §
  • Bobby Rush (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
  • Martin Olav Sabo (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Minnesota)
  • Loretta Sanchez (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont)
  • Thomas Sawyer (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
  • Jan Schakowsky (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Illinois)
  • Bobby Scott (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Virginia)
  • Jose Serrano (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Louise Slaughter (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Vic Snyder (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Arkansas)
  • Hilda Solis (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Pete Stark (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Ted Strickland (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Ohio)
  • Burt Stupak (Michigan)
  • Mike Thompson (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Bennie Thompson (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Mississippi)
  • John Tierney (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Massachusetts)
  • Edolphus Towns (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Mark Udall (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Colorado)
  • Tom Udall (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New Mexico)
  • Nydia Velaquez (Democratic Party (United States)|D-New York)
  • Pete Visclosky (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Indiana)
  • Maxine Waters (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Diane Watson (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • Melvin Watt (Democratic Party (United States)|D-North Carolina)
  • Lynn Woolsey (Democratic Party (United States)|D-California)
  • David Wu (Democratic Party (United States)|D-Oregon)

+ Deceased
§ Retired from office
° Now Governor

Theater/operational planning

Detailed planning by CENTCOM began while active combat was ongoing in Afghanistan, in December 2002.[35] At the time, GEN Eric Shinseki, then Chief of Staff of the Army, testified to Congress that the number of troops approved by Rumsfeld was inadequate. Shinseki, however, was not in the chain of command for operational deployment. Although the Chief of Staff is the senior officer of the United States Army, he is responsible for developing doctrine and preparing forces for use by the combatant commanders.

The responsible combatant commander was GEN Tommy Franks, commanding United States Central Command. Franks had already begun contingency planning. Franks discussed high-level concepts with Rumsfeld and his staff, and returned with alternatives. Once the broad theater-level concept was ready, Franks tasked his subordinate land, air, special operations and naval commanders to go to the next level.

Criticism by senior officers

A number of generals were highly critical of the plan or its execution, focused especially on what they considered the unrealistic goals of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, or on Rumsfeld's management of the occupation. [36] They include Paul Eaton, who headed training of the Iraqi military in 2003-2004;[37] former chiefs of United States Central Command (Anthony Zinni and Joseph Hoar); Greg Newbold, Director of the Joint staff from 2000 to 2002;[38] John Riggs, a planner who had criticized personnel levels, in public, while on duty; division|division commanders Charles Swannack and John Batiste.

Newbold regretted he had not resigned when the proposals were first made. Swannack retired two days after ending a command tour in Iraq. Eaton also quit his assignment in Iraq.

Major combat phase

For more information, see: Iraq War, major combat phase.

Ground combat was directed by an intermediate headquarters in Iraq, based on Third United States Army, called Coalition Forces Land Combat Command (CFLCC) under LTG David McKiernan.

While the start of major combat is often stated as March 20, 2003, operations actually had started well before then. Special operations forces were in the country, and there had been a gradual intensification of bombing under the "no-fly" programs, Operation NORTHERN WATCH and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.

A "running start" had been planned, and it was fully expected that the plan would alter with events, as it is a truism no plan survives contact with the enemy. Both sides did consider Baghdad the key centers of gravity (military)|center of gravity, but both made incorrect assumptions about the enemy's plans. The U.S. was still sensitive over the casualties taken by a too-light raid in Operation GOTHIC SERPENT in Mogadishu, Somalia. As a result, the initial concept of operations was to surround Baghdad with tanks, while airborne and air assault infantry cleared it block-by-block. [39] Iraq, in turn, both assumed a siege of Iraq, but, unknown to the Coalition, expected to use irregulars to harass the supply lines of advancing forces.

The Coalition did not expect to be able to reach Baghdad in a single bound; there was always an intention to make entry, regroup, and then make a final assault. Baghdad was not the only target; there were urgent needs to secure the oilfields against destruction, and to take control of the southern port of Umm Qasr. Kurds in the north were already semi-autonomous and wanted to take action; the relations between the Kurds in Iraq and Kurds in Turkey was extremely sensitive.

Baghdad was effectively in U.S. hands by April 9. Deputy CENTCOM commander Mike DeLong said three factors made looting much worse than expected:[40]

  • Saddam opened his prison doors and let prisoners free; these were primarily "ordinary decent criminals" rather than dissenters; it added 30,000-50,000 outlaws to the confusion
  • The "resignation" of the Iraqi police, which DeLong said was the most unexpected. He is unsure that the information operations campaign urging the military to disarm also affected the police
  • The dissolution of the Iraqi army, both by its soldiers and as a political decision, putting large numbers of unemployed young men onto the streets.

Interim Military Government

There had been confusion on who was planning Phase IV, and there was even more confusion as to who would execute it. "At the most fundamental level, many were not sure who was in charge of the overall Phase IV effort: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer (Garner’s successor) or the CJTF-7 commander. Military officers believed there was a clear division of labor between the military and civilian elements – CJTF-7 handled all military efforts, for example – while civilians believed CPA led the entire effort."[41] The bureaucratic infighting was worst between State and Defense, probably with involvement from the Office of the Vice President and the National Security Council. The role of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in such circumstances, is supposed to be collecting the positions and submitting them to the President when he is the only one that can make the decision. This did not happen.

While the fighting was in progress, Franks asked for a provisional government to be established.

Changes from the White House

Rumsfeld and the White House made rapid changes. The decision was made to bring in L. Paul Bremer|L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer, who had been Henry Kissinger's chief of staff, Ambassador to the Netherlands, and head of the State Department counterterrorism office. He had no Middle East experience, which Rumsfeld considered an advantage: Rumsfeld had rejected some of Garner's appointments because they were State Department Arabists who might not be sympathetic to the President's goal of remaking Iraqi society.

President Bush publicly announced the decision on 6 May 2003, 17 days after Garner arrived in Baghdad as the head of ORHA. The US Government never issued a formal order dissolving the ORHA. Some of its staff members, such as Meghan O'Sullivan. joined the CPA, and Garner returned to civilian life.[42]

Bremer, in turn, wanted full authority. At first, he was to share authority with Khalizad, who was the point of contact to Iraqis who might be in a full government. When Bremer's appointment was announced on May 6 by the White House, Khalizad had just been told he was not included in the solution, amazing Powell. When Powell asked Rice for an explanation, she said she had nothing to do with it.[43]

Force drawdown and command reorganization

On April 16, Franks declared the end of major combat,[44] and ordered the withdrawal of the major U.S. combat units. The CENTCOM forward headquarters in Qatar and I MEF were to be withdrawn. U.S. forces would be reduced to 30,000 by the end of August, which the U.S. believed was adequate. [45]

While regular Iraqi military units were no longer fighting, resistance by irregulars continued, first by Ba'ath loyalists, then random Iraqis objecting to an invasion, but then sectarian fighting among the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds, and their various factions. A full-fledged insurgency, however, was not underway until July. Since the Iraqi police as well as the Iraqi army had dissolved, providing population security fell to the military, which was not organized for it, as, for example, the WWII Constabulary in Germany had been.

CFLCC was redesignated Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) on May 1, but McKiernan's headquarters was replaced by V Corps, then under LTG Wallace. MG Ricardo Sanchez, then commanding 1st Armored Division (U.S.) in Germany, was promoted to LTG and given command of V Corps. According to Sanchez, Franks had not specified a specific Phase IV role for CENTCOM or V Corps. [46]

De-Ba'athification, retention of Army and Police

For more information, see: De-Ba'athification.

Franks and DeLong recommended that only the senior Ba'ath Party leadership be blacklisted, on the assumption, much as with the Soviet Communist Party, that Party members ran most of the basic government services. Nevertheless, the Party was dissolved on May 12, and CENTCOM was faced with the job of creating a new civilian infrastructure. Garner said that he had protested full de-Ba'athification to Bremer, who said "These are the directions I have. I have directions to execute this..." [47]

Resources from other nations

CENTCOM tried to get peacekeeping resources from other nations. The Administration preemption doctrine had assumed that while the US might have acted unilaterally, successful operations might cause allies to share the postwar work. The immediate operations were so confused, however, that this was never really evaluated.

Promises of a Muslim peacekeeping unit did not materialize. The Saudis did not want to be under U.S. command, and the US was nervous about the hospital they did volunteer, believing the staff might contain Wahhabist activists. The United Arab Emirates was not interested in policing the south.

India considered sending troops, in response to a request delivered by BG E.J. Sinclair, assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne Division. From the Indian perspective, reasons to participate were to be recognized as more of a great power. Reasons against included an April parliamentary resolution that the war was illegal, and a general question of risks and benefits for India. India is extensively experienced in peacekeeping, but always under UN auspices. The proposal was that it put its troops under US and UK command. Given the unpopularity of the war, what would be the Indian public perception of Indian lives lost, and Indians seen as occupiers, especially among India's Muslim population and in the Middle East? How would this affect US support of Pakistan, or would Pakistan seize the opportunity if India did not?[48]

Poland led a division, but of uneven quality. A Polish official, Marek Belka, was deputy head of ORHA. Poland does have peacekeeping experience, but not in this sensitive environment. It would get general assistance from NATO, but NATO was not itself going to be seen as part of the peacekeeping force.[49] The Poles also would command a Spanish force with restrictive rules of engagement.

A Ukraine|Ukrainian brigade was sent, but was of minimal ability; only the UK forces, with Italian and other NATO supplements, were effective. [50]

Security operations

CJTF-7 conducted operations to root out resistance, especially by Saddam loyalists. Operation PENINSULA STRIKE, on June 9-12, cordoned and swept areas of the Sunni Triangle.[51] Operation DESERT SCORPION, from June 15 to 19, swept the Sunni Triangle with raids based on targeted intelligence, and also conducted some humanitarian operations. [52]"These are highly coordinated, intelligence- driven operations," according to a V Corps spokesman. "These are places where we've been shot at, ambushed from and we have tracked the actions to these people."

Operation VICTORY BOUNTY went through the same areas on July 26 to 29, but Sanchez decided to reduce the sweep operations, in part innocent Iraqis were being taken into custody, and the custody facilities were overloaded. It was unclear how to treat detainees that were not clearly military, but he ordered, in June, for them to be treated under the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Following VICTORY BOUNTY, he examined the Abu Ghraib and Khan Bani Sadh prisons as potential detention sites, but found the second essentially destroyed. Abu Ghraib was the only available facility, although Sanchez ruled that the torture and execution chambers had to be sealed. [53] It was not fully understood that the division commanders were doing little screening of detainees, which contributed to overcrowding. BG Barbara Karpinski said the 4th ID was the least selective, the 82nd Airborne the best, the 101st fairly good, and the 1st Armored would also send too many.[54]

While it is a danger to micromanage, some officers felt Sanchez had little overall vision and the various divisions had different styles. In the north, the 101st Airborne Division, under MG David Petraeus, was having good success both with security and nation-building, but it was also dealing with the more cooperative Kurds. Still, Petraeus was the Army's counterinsurgency expert and took a different approach than other commanders.[55] The 4th Infantry Division, under MG Ray Odierno, was having a difficult time in the Sunni Triangle, and used the most force; a retired general at CPA said it fueled the insurgency [56] The 101st Airborne Division, commanded by MG Charles Swannack, was having slightly better luck closer to Baghdad. [57]

There were also personality clashes and communications failures between Bremer and Sanchez. In the summer of 2003, COL Teddy Spain, the military police commander in Baghdad, could get no clear answer to "who is in charge". In theory, Bremer and Sanchez ultimately reported to Rumsfeld, but Rumsfeld generally assumed he reported to the White House. Spain said he would get conflicting orders from the CPA and from CJTF-7.[58]

WMD assessment

In October, David Kay, under the direction of Tenet, issued a report saying:[59]

  • Saddam had a significant history, capabilities and programs related to WMD; laboratories existed within the security organizations
  • Saddam had no WMD stockpiles

Feith believes that the finding of infrastructure supported the WMD justification for the war, but the Administration quickly got off-message with it and essentially changed arguments to democracy promotion.

American civilian government

There was a brief period in which the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was responsible for peace operations, but the responsibility soon passed to the #Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). L. Paul Bremer, head of CPA, told Feith he wanted to arrive with one key message: "the Ba'athists are not coming back."

As the senior official, Garner was replaced in a month, on May 7, by L. Paul Bremer of the U.S. Department of State, although Bremer took control 9 days later. [60] Bremer established the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was not well coordinated with the military. Garner had assumed a quick transition to Iraqi provisional rule.

Bremer reversed Garner’s plans for an early turnover of political power and announced the indefinite postponement of the formation of an Interim Iraqi Government. Instead of a temporary Iraqi sovereign body, the CPA would continue to serve as the chief political authority and the Coalition armed forces as the military arm of that authority. This decision, in the eyes of many Iraqis, transformed the intent of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483|United Nations (UN) Resolution 1483, which recognized the United States and Great Britain as “occupying powers” and urged the two powers to promote the welfare of Iraqis and to administer the country until Iraqis were capable of self-governance. The resolution appeared to formalize the sense that the Coalition powers were acting like occupiers rather than liberators, and this perception fueled the disaffection of some in Iraq.[42]

ORHA

For more information, see: Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

In April, Leonard Di Rita, a close aide of Rumsfeld, came to Kuwait and joined ORHA. Di Rita said State had mismanaged other peace operations, and this would be different, following Rumsfeld's "Beyond Nation-Building" doctrine. When asked by an AID official about reconstruction, he said "We don't owe the people of Iraq anything," Di Rita said. "We're giving them their freedom. That's enough," according to Packer. The U.S. wouldn't get bogged down in Iraq, Di Rita later told war planners at a major meeting: "We're going to stand up an interim Iraqi government, hand power over to them, and get out of there in three to four months," Di Rita said, speaking for Rumsfeld.[61]

Garner waited in Kuwait, in early May, to come to Baghdad. The original plan had him arriving 60 days after the end of the war, with the initial preparation being done by CENTCOM civil affairs teams and engineers. The White House assumed the Americans would be welcomed. Rice had said "The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces. You would be able to bring new leadership but keep the body in place." Under the changing situation, Garner saw himself in that leadership role, but as a partner, not director, of Iraqis. [62]

In the PBS interview, Garner's interviewer asked him if his superiors wanted him simply prepare for Chalabi, a neoconservative favorite, to take over. Garner denied this was Rumsfeld's plan, quoting him as saying "I don't have a candidate. The best man will rise." Garner did say that Chalabi "certainly he was the darling of Douglas Feith|Doug Feith and [former Defense Policy Board Chairman] Richard Perle and probably ...Paul Wolfowitz, perhaps (Vice-President) Dick Cheney. I'm not sure." He said that he was prepared to bring back the Army,

By the 15th of May, we had a large number of Iraqi army located that were ready to come back, and the Treasury guys were ready to pay them. When the order came out to disband, [it] shocked me, because I didn't know we were going to do that. All along I thought we were bringing back the Iraqi army. ... Why we didn't do that, I don't know.

Coalition Provisional Authority

For more information, see: Coalition Provisional Authority.

Bremer, before leaving with Iraq, met with Rumsfeld's staff, specifically being sent to Douglas Feith to draft the de-Ba'athification order. Feith said his staff had briefed Bremer extensively about the interagency work on de-Ba'athification, which had been approved, in draft form, by the President on March 10. Bremer asked for a delay, wanting to make he announcement himself. Walter Slocombe, who had drafted Orders 1 and 2 with Bremer, showed them to Feith on May 9. [63]

Bremer did have some concerns about conflicting advice from James Dobbins, later a RAND Corporation researcher and a former State Department expert on peace operations#nation-building|nation-building. While Dobbins did not want to join CPA, he did point Bremer to a recent study that, among other things, suggested large peacekeeping forces were better than small ones. [64] Dobbins was concerned that the Administration was dangerously ignoring lessons from the Balkans. While Rumsfeld had given a February speech "Beyond Nation-Building" that emphasized NATO's errors, Dobbins thought it taught much. In particular, using the same force levels as NATO had used would have called for 450,000 occupation troops. [65]

Bremer believed he reported directly to the President, and, in his book, said that some called him the “American viceroy” in Iraq.[66] At first, he was subordinate to the Secretary of Defense on paper, but had his reporting changed to the National Security Council in November 2003.

The Coalition Provisional Authority took control on 16 May 2003, effectively taking over from ORHA. [67] Its Regulation Number 1 designated CENTCOM for military support. “As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of US Central Command shall directly support the CPA by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy generally.”

It quickly issued orders for de-Ba'athification, and disbanded the Iraqi Army. It was advised by the Iraqi Governing Council, and worked in parallel with the Coalition military. On June 28, 2004, it was replaced by the Interim Iraqi Government.

De-Ba'athification and the military

For more information, see: De-Ba'athification.

Bremer issued more extensive de-Ba'athification orders than had existed under military government, dissolved the Iraqi military, and then handed the de-Ba'athification exception program to the Iraqi Governing Council. The IGC delegated it to a committee headed by Ahmed Chalabi.

The CPA started to create a local security force rather than an army, called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. CENTCOM developed a separate program for Iraqis that could help in their operations.

Writing the Constitution

Bremer, in February 2004, still saw the major constitutional problem as the role of Islam. The working draft read,

Islam is the official religion of the State, and is to be considered a principal source among other sources of legislation. This Law shall respect the Islamic identity of the majority of the people of Iraq, but guarantees the complete freedom of all religions and their religious practices.[68]

He saw the sticking point as the Shi'ite Islamist demand to reword it to have Islam as the principal soure, which was unacceptable to the non-Islamist members of the IGC, as well as to Bremer and his staff. Sistani accepted a compromise that kept a, but added that "no law contradicting the 'basic tenets of Islam' could be enacted." Washington approved this language, which he considered better than the language in the recent Afghan constitution.

February 29th opened with some Kurdish issues, which Bremer negotiated personally.

  1. Block grants from the treasury which was resolved
  2. The role of their militia, the peshmerga; an earlier compromise was tabled
  3. veto of the ratification of the constitution

As Bremer negotiated this, Chalabi introduced new and "draconian" de-Ba'athification policy. When this came to Bremer, he told the Kurds that if he helped them on the demands above, he wanted their support against this proposal. Later, Mowaffak al-Rubaie|al-Rubaie spoke for unity and got acceptance of the language about Islam.

As the constitutional wrangling continued, there was increasing intra-Shi'a agitation, with Muqtada al-Sadr pushing Iraq war, insurgency#Early 2004|militarily for power[69] as his rival, Sistani, pressured in the arguments over the TAL. Al-Sadr, son of Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, killed by Saddam, but not Sistani, believed they had authority for clerical rule under the doctrine of Wilawat al-faqih, or rule of the jurisprudent. Ayatollah Sistani told Bremer that he could not accept the idea that a two-thirds majority in any three provinces could block the ratification of the permanent constitution, which he called a "Kurdish veto". Bremer was angry, and concerned that the Shi'a were about to overturn the compromises that had gotten the document to that point.

March 2 saw deadly attacks during the Shi'ite observance of Ashura; a three-day mourning period was observed. At 2 PM on the 5th, many IGC members wer ready for the ceremony, unaware of the tension; some, such as Ahmed Chalabi, were very aware and threatened to resign if the IGC did not sign. The Shi'a split, and the Kurds hesitated. Chalabi and al-Rubaie mediated after talking with Bremer. There was no compromise that day. Eventually, the Council convened at 7:37 PM. From Washington, Rice kept suggesting to Bremer that the Kurds be pressured to soften their position on ratification, which offended Sistani. By 10:30, the meeting broke down. Bremer told Rice that keeping pressure on the Shi'a and Sistani was high-risk, but it was his best judgment. [70]

The Shi'a returned to Najaf to work with Sistani. Late on the 7th, Dr. al-Rubaie, an obstetrician when not delivering new nations, came to Bremer and said, "It was a forceps delivery, but we got what we wanted." Sistani approved.

On 8 March 2004, the CPA issued the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period[71] It created or schedules:

  • Interim Iraqi Government to take power (from the Iraqi Governing Council on 30 June 2004. This government shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive deliberations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations.
  • Elections for the National Assembly, preferably not beyond 31 December 2004, and, in any event, not beyond 31 January 2005.
IGC President Bahr al-Uloum said

We gather today for a great historical meeting in the spirit of brotherhood and true love that unites all Iraqi people. All the brothers, when they spoke, put the interests of the nation above all other interets. Let it be known that we came to this place and we are all one person today and one opinion.

Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani simply said, "For the first time in my life I feel like an Iraqi."

Iraqi interim governance

The goal was to transfer power to the Interim Iraqi Government after the TAL was signed, but the process was not automatic.

Involving the UN

It was planned to have the UN envoy, UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, appoint the members, with the legitimacy of the UN. Unfortunately, there were Shi'ite objections to Brahimi, who they suspected as a Sunni nationalist. He had, in their opinion, not spoken strongly enough of Saddam's brutality, and a picture had been circulated of Brahimi smoking a cigar with Saddam. Bremer appealed to Sistani that no one group would be completely satisfied, but it was to Iraq's, and Sistani's interest to bring back the UN. On March 17th, there was a full Governing Council meeting, at which Bremer said "if the UN cannot help form an interim government, the Iraqi people will know who to bleme." Jaafari pointed out the Council had invited the UN back in January, and they accepted Brahimi's return. [72]

Brahimi would become a key figure in the transition, arguably being in a better position than Bremer to negotiate terms acceptable to Sistani. [73]

Brahimi was not only controversial in Iraq; he was strongly criticized by Americans, opponents of Pan-Arab nationalism, about his silence, while Algerian foreign minister or an Arab League official, about Saddam's atrocities in the past. Fouad Ajami accused him of sympathies with Saddam's system: "Mr. Brahimi hails from the very same political class that has wrecked the Arab world..his technocracy is, in truth, but a cover for the restoration of the old edifice of power."[74] Michael Rubin had similar comments in the National Review.

Security crises

Both the Shi'ite and Sunni regions had significant escalations of violence, which presented the problem that forceful suppression by the US might cause a backlash for the new government. Bremer expected violence to increase in the months before transition.

Brahimi threatened to leave over the potential bloodshed in Iraq War, insurgency#First Battle of Fallujah|Fallujah; Bremer lectured him about Muqtada as an equal menace to Iraq. [75] According to Feith, Bremer was also worried that Sunni members of the IGC might resign if the Council were not given an opportunity to resolve the Fallujah crisis by negotiation. Feith acknowledged that Abizaid believed that Council-requested delays could cause a collapse of security; Abizaid also said the Iraqis "don't want to fight for Americans."[76]

Some have claimed that not only IGC stability, but to the sensitivity of the Iraq War, insurgency#Early 2004|American Presidential politics contributed to calling off the military stabilization of Fallujah.

During the May 13 visit of Rumsfeld and Myers, Bremer was not optimistic about easy answers with Muqtada and Fallujah. Sanchez said he was running out of specific Mahdi Army targets, and they agreed that they could move to economic stimuli in the south, engaging military targets that interfered. Fallujah remained more difficult; Bremer was not pleased with the lack of initiative of the new commander of the Iraqi Fallujah Brigade. Muqtada, while allegedly seeking negotiations, also appeared to be trying to lure provocative attacks on holy places he was using.

The broader issue they discussed was involving the new Iraqi government in security, such as giving them a voice in combat tactics and air support to be used after the IIG took over. He warned they "will want to show distance from us, and they will make mistakes." They would also want security for the January elections, which would be difficult with both the shortage of Coalition troops and some restrictive rules of engagements.

Abu Ghraib effects

For more information, see: Abu Ghraib prison.

CBS News broke the Abu Ghraib prison photographs in late April.[77] Feith said that Rumsfeld, who offered to resign over it, saw it having critical strategic impacts, and that he and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Richard Myers would deal with the matter. Rumsfeld told Wolfowitz, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Peter Pace, and Feith not to become involved in the affair. [78]

Bremer, with Sanchez, met with the IGC on May 12, beginning with an apology. Council members, according to Bremer, "regretted the Abu Ghraib misconduct, but most went on to criticize the Arab and international news media for having ignored Saddam's repression for years." Rumsfeld and Myers arrived on the 13th, and they discussed the frustration of difficulty of separating criminals who should be transferred to the Iraqi courts, and the true security cases. Suggestions including the creation of an Iraqi prisoner's ombudsman, putting Iraqi observers into field detention and screening centers, imroving screening, and reducing the authority of US intelligence to put indefinite holds on prisoners. The last was an action item for Sanchez. [79]

Sanchez also said the Council asked why the American press was not discussing Saddam's abuses. He said there was a wide range of responses. Questions from the council included whether there were Israeli interrogators there, what Intelligence interrogation/Catalogs|interrogation methods were in use. The council, accorded to Sanchez, did distinguish between abuse by guards and torture during interrogation, but expected there would be a worldwide call to response by jihadists. He said that the Defense Department had no clear public relations plan, and the situation escalated on a partisan basis in Congress.[80]

Building the interim government

Since meeting with the full Council was awkward, Brahimi set up conferences with himself, Bremer and Blackwill, with a "troika" of the Council's immediate past, present, and future presidents:

  • Massoud Barzani (Kurd)
  • Izzadin Salim (Shiite)
  • Sheikh Ghazi al-Yawar (Sunni)

Bremer had recommended that any new government should include ministers who had demonstrated they were doing a good job, especially those that were effectively technocrats. The real challenge would be the president and prime minister. He was also concerned about security in his last 60 days, and, through very private channels, requested more troops. This need became especially obvious when a car bomb killed Salim on May 17th. Ghazi stepped up in the rotation, and President Bush called him to offer condolences. Bush and Ghazi formed a quick rapport, leading to Blackwill and Bremer considering him for the presidency.

Prime Minister

As of May 19, no clear Prime Minister candidate had emerged. Allawi was the first choice for Defense Minister, but he refused to serve under certain prime ministerial candidates.

In the May 25 troika meeting, all supported Allawi for prime minister. They were concerned he might not be acceptable to Sistani, as too secular.

Transitional issues

It was important, in Bremer's view, that the Governing Council disband once the new government was in place. He could order them disbanded, but preferred to do it. He offered a proposal that they disband a day before the new government took over, showing a peaceful transfer, and offered to "sweeten" the idea by creating a paid National Consultative Council that would take the IGC members that did not join the new government. It was also agreed to add a few face-saving ministers without portfolio. They agreed to the dissolution on May 27.

During this period, issues arose with Chalabi. A financial investigation, and search of his facilities, took place in late April. There was also a May 3 report from Newsweek that Chalabi was providing secret information to Iran.

Presidency

According to Bremer, the TAL had not assumed that the Presidency would have an activist role, which Adnan Pachachi, clearly wanting the job, expected. Ghazni, whom Pachachi regarded as his protege, also wanted the job.

Brahimi, on May 28, decided on Pachachi. Blackwill, on May 30, expressed concern about Pachachi's vision of the role. Rice told the CPA that either man was acceptable to the U.S. On the 31st, the plan was to offer it to Pachachi, but that assumed Ghazi would agree, gracefully, to end his quest. When Brahimi and the CPA leadership met with Ghazi on April 1, however, he said he could not withdraw, and left the meeting. Barzani was furious with the selection of Pahachi.

Brahimi called Bremer to tell him that he was "dumbfounded", but Pachachi had declined the Presidency. With Barzani still there, Bremer told Brahimi to offer the Presidency to Ghazni and "pray to God he accepts it." Barzani and the others, at that point, could only laugh.

Ghazi did accept, and, that afternoon, Brahimi, Ghazi, and Allawi presented the government to the world. They were able to announce that the IGC had agreed to dissolve.[81] On June 8, the UN Security Council welcomed the new government with Resolution 1546.

Transfer

While the announced date of transfer was June 30, security threats suggested that it would be wise to surprise opponents, and do the transfer on the 28th. It was agreed, and sovereignty passe at 10:26, Iraq time.

Bremer flew out of Iraq, having videotaped his departure speech. It closed with "Long live Iraq!"

Transfer of power

The Iraqi Interim Government was appointed, on 1 June 2004, UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, with the most input from the Iraqi Governing Council, and advice from Bremer and Ambassador Robert Blackwill, representing Condaleeza Rice, had significant input. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which dissolved itself on itself June 1, had the most influence.[82]

Bremer and Sanchez announced the actual handover on June 28, a deliberate early transfer to avoid disruption by insurgents. Allawi was Prime Minister and Sheikh al-Yawar was President. Feith wrote that the Allawi government did no worse than the CPA; even though it was primarily made up of externals, it had legitimacy. He argues that it could have been created fourteen months earlier, and the delay was the State-CIA opposition to Chalabi.[83]

As Bremer left, a viceroy no longer needed, he was replaced by an ambassador accredited to the Iraqi government, John Negroponte. George Casey, a four-star general, took command of the strategic-level Multi-National Force-Iraq. Negroponte and Casey formed a good working relationship, different, however, than that of the United States Mission to the Republic of Vietnam. In the Vietnam War, the military commander reported to the Ambassador, but the military and civilian sides in Iraq had parallel chains of command.

U.S. politics

There was increasing domestic opposition. A Out of Iraq Caucus formed in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2005, but there was never a major antiwar movement as there was during the Vietnam War.

Insurgency and communal conflict

For more information, see: Iraq War, insurgency.

A full-fledged insurgency was in progress by July or August, although there was not a public announcement. There had been specific warnings, certainly as early as May. Also in 2004, conflict on ethnic and religious lines were growing more severe. [84]

In May, Gen al-Shawani, leader of the Scorpions and CIA-favored (as opposed to Chalabi), met with Bush, Cheney, Rice, Tenet and Card. He said

Sir, I'm going to tell you something. You need to know the truth. Baghdad is almost surrounded by insurgents. If you can't secure the airport highway, you can't secure all of Iraq.[85]

The CIA station confirmed Shawani's impression. Bremer said he saw an Iraqi intelligence service document, toward the end of July 2003, describing how to conduct insurgency, followed by three major bombings in August.. [86] The large attacks in August were on the Jordanian Embassy, then the UN Mission, and then in the holy Shi'ite areas of Najaf. Feith considers the UN bombing, on August 19th, as the start of the insurgency. [87]

Military organization

GEN John Abizaid, Franks' deputy, took over the command, on July 8, when Franks retired. On the 11th, he stopped the troop withdrawal ordered by Franks.

The operational environment in Iraq is fluid...in light of the current situation, [forces previously intended to redeploy will remain in Iraq until replaced by equivalent U.S. or coalition capability.[88]

The original headquarters for Phase IV was Multi-National Corps-Iraq, based on the assets of V Corps, now under Ricardo Sanchez.

The headquarters for foreign military units in Iraq is now Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I), which was created, under Sanchez, on 15 May 2004. On an overall basis, it reports to the United States Central Command, which also commands the U.S. troops in MNF-I. Other units report to their home nations, although there are a number of non-US commanders from the MNF-I Deputy Commanding General, and Australian, British and Polish commanders at division level.

Perceptions of insurgency

Abizaid used the term "classic insurgency" in a press conference in May, and was immediately corrected by Rumsfeld. As Abizaid told Sanchez afterwards, "Well, there's no appetite in Washington to use the word 'insurgency'. And, by the way, we're not 'occupiers', either. We're 'liberators'"[89]

Not all commanders agreed they then faced an insurgency. MG Ray Odierno, commanding the 4th Infantry Division, told reporters, on June 18, "this is not guerrilla warfare. It is not close to guerrilla warfare," and described the operations he launched as mopping up. Asked about it a year later, he said "I didn't believe it was an insurgency until about July. What we really thought was, Remnant."[90]

The Surge

For more information, see: Iraq War, Surge.

Security remained a problem, but the US could not do the job alone or stay indefinitely. In January 2007, President Bush announced a US-Iraqi agreement to augment the US security forces temporarily, to bring down violence to a level that the Iraqis could handle.

Transfer of sovereignty

Full authority passed to the elected Iraqi government on 30 June 2009. Muqtada and the fighters in Fallujah were still active, and there were major acts of infrastructure sabotage. Iraqis, however, could begin to fight for an Iraqi government.

Thomas Ricks said that

The best-case scenario is that Iraq isn’t going to look anything like a success to Americans. It’s not going to be democratic, it’s not going to be stable, and it’s not going to be pro-American. Ambassador Crocker predicts in the book that the future of Iraq is probably something like Lebanon today. Most of the other experts I’ve talked to consider that wildly optimistic.[91]

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