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The conventional view of '''reality'''<ref name=Oxford/> is grounded upon perceptions of the world as we experience it, and reflection concerning such perception. This view is related to, but not identical with, [[empiricism]]. Perspectives depend upon a particular point of view. There could be as many perspectives as there are people. However, because reality relies to some extent on ''shared'' understanding concerning individual perceptions, reality falls within [[convention]]. Views of reality have greater or lesser degrees of refinement and organization. Some are highly systematized, for example, scientific theories that use specialized methods to verify their findings, and other views are based upon mores or societal institutions.  
The conventional view of '''reality'''<ref name=Oxford/> is grounded upon perceptions of the world as we experience it, and reflection concerning such perception. This view is related to, but not identical with, [[empiricism]]. Perspectives depend upon a particular point of view. There could be as many perspectives as there are people. However, because reality relies to some extent on ''shared'' understanding concerning individual perceptions, reality falls within [[convention]]. Views of reality have greater or lesser degrees of refinement and organization. Some are highly systematized, for example, scientific theories that use specialized methods to verify their findings, and other views are based upon mores or societal institutions.  


Because of the [[regress problem]], establishing a foundation of truth and reality is a problematic that underlies all disciplines, including mathematics. The regress problem in a nutshell is that every proposition rests upon premises, which in turn are based upon underlying premises, and so on. Thus, the underlying reality is subject to regress.<ref name=Aikin/> The desire to establish an underlying ground of all or part of reality, that is, to say what reality "really is," has been a long-standing preoccupation of philosophy and the sciences.
Because of the [[regress problem]], establishing a foundation of truth and reality is a problematic that underlies all disciplines, including mathematics. The regress problem (in a nutshell) is that every proposition rests upon premises, which in turn are based upon underlying premises, and so on. Thus, the underlying reality is subject to regress.<ref name=Aikin/> The desire to establish an underlying ground of all or part of reality, that is, to say what reality "really is," has been a long-standing preoccupation of philosophy and the sciences.
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==Platonic Realism==
==Platonic Realism==


Plato's philosophy concerns itself with the nature of [[Being]] itself, "what is." Platonic philosophy distinguishes between "what is" and material existence. What is Real is "what is" ''in itself''. In Plato, these are the Forms. Here is derived the term "Platonic Realism" which refers to a view of reality that grounds truth, the ultimate Reality, in a Being outside sensible reality, the Forms, and beyond the Forms, in the Good that is beyond Being. The Platonic [[Theory of Forms]] does not depend on sensible perception as a means to ascertain truth but, rather, on another form of 'seeing' only possible for the [[soul]][Ψυχή]. In the myth of the charioteer, in the ''Phaedrus'' dialogue, Plato argues, "For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being" (249c).<ref name=Phaedrus/>
[[Plato]]'s philosophy concerns the nature of [[Being]] itself, "what is" ; it distinguishes between "what is" and material existence. What is Real is "what is" ''in itself''; for Plato, these are the 'Forms'. Here is derived the term "Platonic Realism" which refers to a view of reality that grounds truth (the ultimate Reality) in a Being (the Forms) outside sensible reality, and beyond the Forms in the Good that is beyond Being. The Platonic [[Theory of Forms]] does not depend on sensible perception to ascertain truth but on another form of 'seeing' that is only possible for the [[soul]] [Ψυχή]. In the myth of the charioteer, Plato argues, ''"For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being"'' (249c).<ref name=Phaedrus/>


In Plato, Being is itself and nothing but itself. The Form of Justice is simply Justice itself.  To define, we use predicates but a Form would have no predicates in the usual sense that we are accustomed to thinking of such things, since a Form's definition would give you something that has the same thing on either side such that Justice=Justice. No matter what predicates you add to a thing itself [the Form], for Plato, it remains the same. On the other hand, when we say that Mary has blue eyes and Bill has brown eyes, we refer to items pertaining to sensibility and particular biological traits.
In Plato, Being is itself and nothing but itself. Thus, the ''Form'' of Justice is simply Justice itself.  To define, we use predicates, but a Form would have no predicates in the usual sense of such things insofar as a Form's definition would give you something that has the same thing on either side of the equation such that Justice=Justice. No matter what predicates you add to a thing itself [the Form], for Plato, it remains the same. On the other hand, when we say that Mary has blue eyes and Bill has brown eyes, we refer to items pertaining to sensibility and particular biological traits. It is a trait of sensible reality to be changeable. Plato holds to the idea of an unchangeable reality that underlies the world of experience.


Given his definition of Reality, it is easier to see why, for Plato, knowledge is not 'acquired' but instead involves [[anamnesis]]. Real knowledge involves a vision of the shining of the Beautiful, its [[Eidos]]. For one thing, how would we bring something immutable into material life, such that we could acquire it? For another, would we acquire the Being of the Beautiful or merely another image of the Beautiful? Contrary to this, the objects of immanent, sensible experience remind us of the things themselves. We see a bed and this evokes the Idea of a bed, and so on. Knowledge is the extent to which you can connect the bed of experience to the immutable Form of the bed (597a-598b).<ref name=Republic/>
Given his definition of Reality, it is easier to see why, for Plato, knowledge is not 'acquired', but involves [[anamnesis]], that is, the recollection of the Ideas, which the soul had known in a previous existence, especially by means of reasoning. Real knowledge involves a vision of the shining of the Beautiful, its [[Eidos]]. For one thing, how would we bring something immutable into material life, such that we could acquire it? For another, would we acquire the Being of the Beautiful or merely another image of the Beautiful? Conversely, the objects of immanent, sensible experience remind us of the things themselves: we see a bed, and this evokes the Idea of a bed, and so on. Knowledge is the extent to which you can connect the bed of experience to the immutable Form of the bed (597a-598b).<ref name=Republic/>


So there is a Form of the relation between numbers, the Form of specific numbers, and the Form of the abstraction of 'number' itself. In immanent existence, the forms are all mixed up in matter and predicates abound. But what of the varying degree to which some of us are able to make these relations, to gain knowledge? I may see a beetle climbing on a branch and think about bugs. If I am no entomologist I may not go to the specific Form of beetle, only the form of a beetle in general. My inability to understand the intricacy of number does not prevent me from a vision of the form of 'number' in general or its abstraction but may prevent me from seeing the intricacy of their relationships.  
So there is a Form of the relation between numbers, the Form of specific numbers, and the Form of the abstraction of 'number' itself. In immanent existence, these forms are all mixed up in matter and predicates abound. But what of the varying degree to which some of us are able to make these relations, to gain knowledge? I may see a beetle climbing on a branch and think about bugs. If I am no entomologist I may not go to the specific Form of 'beetle', only the form of a beetle in general. My inability to understand the intricacy of number does not prevent me from a vision of the form of 'number' in general or its abstraction, but may prevent me from seeing the intricacy of their relationships.  


Because the Forms are external to the sensible copies of reality, it does not seem that there can be change in something like Beauty or Justice. Immanent life seems to confirm this finding because objects of sensation appear to be all mixed up together. We see justice and truth in varying degrees, as composed in matter, rather than by themselves.  These break, degrade, disperse or scatter. Plato's explanation is that the beautiful we experience is beautiful because it participates in the Form of Beauty, not because it is beautiful in itself. Accordingly, if I want to know if a a sunset is beautiful, I go to the Form that gives the sunset its beauty.  The relation of the particular sunset to Beauty remains temporary. The sun goes down although the beauty of the sunset cannot fade. Perception of beauty in this world involves establishment of such a relationship between objects of sensation and that which is truly Beautiful. Unlike finite beauty, the Form of the Beautiful has no beginning or end. When we perceive the beautiful sunset as being present, we are soon dissuaded of this reality when we perceive that the facts have changed and are now otherwise once the sun goes down. Further, in order to understand Plato's conception of Reality, we must get around the idea of causality. The Real does not come to be and cease to be in a material sense. The scientific cause of the 'appearance' of a sunset, the appearance that the sun moves, for us has to do with the movements of bodies in space but from a Platonic view implies a connection to the Form that is the underlying cause of the sun or of a sunset seen in in our experience. The bond to the Beautiful of the sunset or to the Form of the sun itself ''is'' real but the objects we think of as sun or sunset do not amount to things in themselves. All we have done in locating these objects is to establish a relation to Reality.
Because the Forms are external to the sensible copies of reality, it does not seem that there can be change in something like Beauty or Justice. Immanent life seems to confirm the finding that objects of sensation appear to be all mixed up together. We see justice and truth in varying degrees, as composed in matter, rather than by themselves.  These break, degrade, disperse or scatter. Material things have parts whereas immaterial things do not. Plato's explanation is that the beautiful we experience is beautiful because it participates in the Form of Beauty, not because it is beautiful in itself. Accordingly, if I want to know if a sunset is beautiful, I go to the Form that gives the sunset its beauty.  The relation of the particular sunset to Beauty remains temporary (the sun goes down, although the beauty of the sunset cannot fade). Perception of beauty in this world involves establishing such a relationship between objects of sensation and that which is truly Beautiful. Unlike finite beauty, the Form of the Beautiful has no beginning or end (when we perceive the beautiful sunset as being present, we are soon dissuaded of this reality when we perceive that the facts have changed and are now otherwise once the sun goes down).  


Conventional reality, for Plato, is less than satisfactory and knowledge of this type of reality can be categorized as [[doxa]],the stuff of beliefs and opinions, rather than the act of real knowledge but from this it should not be concluded that Plato rejects all ''doxa''. Including "geometry and the kindred arts," Plato asserts that through the power of dialectic, as he conceives of it reason is able to treat "its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak" (511b)<ref name=Republic/>.
Further, to understand Plato's conception of Reality, we must get around the idea of causality. The Real does not come to be and cease to be in a material causal sense. The scientific cause of the 'appearance' of a sunset, the appearance that the sun moves, for us has to do with the movements of bodies in space but from a Platonic view implies a connection to the Form that is the underlying cause of the sun or of a sunset seen in in our experience. The bond to the Beautiful of the sunset or to the Form of the sun itself ''is'' real, but the objects we think of as sun or sunset do not amount to things in themselves. All we have done in locating these objects is to establish a relation to Reality.


==Model-dependent realism==
Conventional reality, for Plato, is unsatisfactory, and knowledge of this type of reality can be categorized as [[doxa]], the stuff of beliefs and opinions, rather than the act of real knowledge. Yet it should not be concluded that Plato rejects ''doxa''. Including "geometry and the kindred arts," Plato asserts that, through the power of dialectic (as he conceives of it), reason can treat "its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak" (511b)<ref name=Republic/>.


The Platonic approach described above is of very broad scope. A much more restricted concept of "reality" in science is limited to the explanations of observations or measurements, probably a view of reality that Plato would discount. Plato would require that "reality" transcends any feeble attempt to confine it to a particular set of observations, particularly as this reality changes with the introduction of additional observations admitted to explanation as technology evolves.
==Religion==


The "reality" of science, even when restricted to the interpretation of observations and measurements, has been much discussed. [[Pierre Duhem]] (1861-1916) held that while physical theory was no more than an aid to memory, summarizing and classifying facts by providing a symbolic representation of them, the facts of physical theory are to be distinguished from common sense and metaphysics. His views were further developed by [[W. V. O. Quine]] (1908-2000), who suggested "“our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually, but only as a corporate body”. It is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation, but only as part of a system. These two authors were much concerned with how a theory was coupled to concrete observation and measurement, and how it morphed with admission of new data.<ref name=Duhem/><ref name=Quine/>  
Religion commonly ties reality to the notion of the divine. [[Thomas Aquinas]], for example, says that statements about everyday reality are true of God only metaphorically. Similar ideas can be found in Buddhist traditions.
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...to each species belongs its own mode of perfection and being. The same is true of whatever names designate the properties of things, which are caused by the proper principles of their species. Hence, they can be said of God only metaphorically. But the names that express such perfections along with the mode of supereminence with which they belong to God are said of God alone. ... ''Thomas Aquinas''<ref name=Aquinas/>
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To aid in interpretation of these remarks, we have:
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It is not too much to say that, for Thomas, as for Aristotle, the forms in the natural world attain an altogether higher level of reality in our minds – because, as already for Aristotle, the world constitutes an intelligible whole in virtue of its dependence upon the divine mind. ... ''Fergus Kerr''<ref name=Kerr/>
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More recently the connection of theory to reality has been explored by physicists Stephen W. Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. In their book, ''The Grand Design'', they assert that there cannot be a theory-independent , or picture-independent, concept of reality.<ref name=hawkinggrand/>  They point out:
==Model-dependent realism==
 
''See also'' [[Model-dependent realism]].
*that either an earth-centered (Ptolemaic) or a sun-centered (Copernican) picture of reality can be made consistent with the motion of celestial bodies;
*that goldfish physicists living in a curved bowl, though observing curved paths of motion of bodies that we observe as linear, could still formulate predictive laws governing motion as they see it;
*that we cannot know whether we live in a simulated world, a virtual reality, one that the simulators rendered self-consistent.
 
Each of those concepts of reality are picture- or theory-dependent.
 
Instead, they articulate a view of reality they call ''model-dependent realism'':
 
<blockquote>
<p style="margin-left: 2.0%; margin-right: 6%; font-size: 1.0em; font-family: Gill Sans MT, Trebuchet MS;">we will adopt a view that we will call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical theory or world picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations. This provides a framework with which to interpret modern science.<ref name=hawking/></p>
</blockquote>


In adopting model-dependent realism, "it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation" (p. 46). If two different models agree with the observations, it does not make sense to consider one more true than the other, that one gives a truer picture of reality than the other, though one or the other may be more convenient, or otherwise more advantageous, to employ in a given situation. Some find the ambiguity of reality introduced by alternative equivalent theories to be in itself an argument that such definitions of reality are inadequate.<ref name=Cao/>
Platonic realism described above introduces the idea of the soul and its journey with God&mdash;subjecting Plato's approach to a possible interpretation of supernaturalism.  Some philosophers think that everything that exists we can only apprehend as constructs of our mind, what might be termed an ''anti-realist'' or ''idealist'' point of view, that external perception consists of ideas. In contrast, classical science adopts a ''realist'' point of view, that objects of sense perception have an existence independent of the act of perception. Modern science is somewhat in the middle, proposing reality as indefinite to a degree, governed by chance in some particulars, and becoming definite only upon human observation.
<!--Plato would require that "reality" transcends any feeble attempt to discover it from a particular set of observations, particularly as observations change with the introduction of additional observations admitted to explanation as technology evolves. -->


A model-dependent realist might prefer one model over another if it is thought more 'elegant', if it is found more convenient, if it has fewer arbitrary or adjustable components, if it explains all described and agreed-upon observations, and if it can make predictions that if found not to hold would show the model untenable.<ref name=hawkinggrand/>
The physicists, Stephen W. Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, in their book, ''The Grand Design'', offer a concept called '''model-dependent realism''' that they believe skirts the difficulties arising from those differing views.<ref name=hawkinggrand/>


Again, Hawking and Mlodinow maintain that no concept of reality that we can adopt escapes dependence on a model with elements following a set of rules explaining observations in terms of those rule-bound elements.
A few excerpts from Hawking's and Mlodinow's book describe the basics of model-dependent realism:
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Model-dependent realism short circuits all this argument and discussion between the realist and anti-realist schools of thought. According to model-dependent realism, it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation. If there are two models that both agree with observation,...then one cannot say that one is more real than another. (pp. 45-46)


It should be noted that there is no restriction here of "reality" to observable or measurable constructs. The question:
...model-dependent realism...is based on the idea that our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the world. When such a model is successful at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth...(p. 7)
:"Do unobservable theoretical entities such as [[Quantum chromodynamics|quarks and gluons]] really exist in the physical world, as objective entities independent of human will, or exist merely as human constructions for their utility in organizing our experience and predicting future events?"<ref name=Cao1/>


is meaningless within the approach of model-dependent reality, while it is significant within the Platonic approach.
But there may be different ways in which one could model the same physical situation, with each employing different fundamental elements and concepts. If two such physical theories or models accurately predict the same events, one cannot be said to be more real than the other; rather, we are free to use whichever model is most convenient...(p. 7)


===Theory and reality===
It might be that to describe the universe, we have to employ different theories in different situations. Each theory may have its own version of reality, but according to model-dependent realism, that is acceptable so long as the theories agree in their predictions whenever they overlap, that is, whenever they can both be applied... (p. 117)
The definition of reality given by Hawking and Mlodinow is pretty straightforward if one has in mind a particular set of data to explain. Either the theory explains the data or it doesn't, and if two theories explain the data differently, one cannot claim the concepts employed by either as the more true of "reality", although one might find one set of ideas more pleasing than the other.


The matter is less clear when one considers the selection of just what "data" must be explained. Our senses are limited, and we accept that we cannot see and hear everything that comprises reality. So we supplement the senses, for example, by using a telescope or a microscope. Historically the issue arose as to whether such instruments deceived us, and gradually they have been accepted as extensions of our natural capacities.<ref name=Hofstadter/><ref name=Schacht/>
We make models in science, but we also make them in everyday life. Model-dependent realism applies not only to scientific models but also to the conscious and subconscious mental models we all create in order to interpret and understand the everyday world. (p. 46)


The gathering of "data" supplementing our senses has gone far beyond the primitive telescope to its modern version (for example, the [[Hubble Space Telescope|Hubble telescope]]) and the microscope to its modern version (for example, the [[scanning tunneling microscope]]).<ref name =Hubble/><ref name=STM/> Today experiments may require expensive apparatus not available to all, involving observations not even interpretable by many. Examples are the colliders of high-energy physics,<ref name=collider/> and the sophisticated electronic image acquisition of modern astronomy, guided by elaborate computer processing and filtering.<ref name=CCD/> One might reasonably ask how well the acquisition of "data" is separated from the "theory" that explains how the acquisition process works, and that often suggests where to look for new "data".  The ''process'' by which data is allowed into the theory influences what is incorporated into "reality".
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The gathering of data is complicated by the limited access to these data-acquisition instruments, both in a required training that could be seen as indoctrination (not necessarily deliberate, but ''de facto''), and in limitations upon who, and what investigations, are worthy to use the instruments, as determined by various funding agencies and corporate laboratories. Although censorship is not the motivation directing government and corporate support, a preoccupation with popular and/or commercially attractive projects draws resources and talent away from less conspicuous goals potentially of more significance to a comprehensive "reality".<ref name=BellLabs/><ref name=Wilson/><ref name=Riordan/>  In effect, the expense and expertise of modern research result in blinkers.<ref name=DeSollaPrice/><ref name=Smolin/><ref name=Woit/>
Hawking and Mlodinow assert that argument over the existence or nature of objective reality is pointless, and argument should be focused instead upon models and their success in according with observation and in predicting new observable phenomena. They do agree that such success induces a tendency in scientists to "attribute" to theories the quality of reality, but point out that overlapping theories may use different but equally valid concepts and structures to explain the same observations. Thus, subscribers to model-dependent realism would not assert that models must provide a unique picture of reality (several different pictures of reality may accord with same observations). Nor would they assert that models incorporate every available observation (the totality of observations may require a ''network'' of overlapping models).<ref name=hawkinggrand/>


The analysis as well as the gathering of data is becoming more complicated as our very notion of thinking, even of mathematical proof, is modified by technology, for example, by computers. Theoretical predictions are made by computer simulations that perform calculations beyond human capacity. The concepts entering a model-based reality may be only implicit in a computer programmable code, in open-ended algorithms, and may not be concepts the human mind is aware of directly.<ref name=Colburn/>
The article, [[model-dependent realism]], provides an extended discussion of this topic, and a discussion of the published reactions to it.
<!--First, the concept of a model-dependent reality is introduced to refer to a model or picture consisting of the combination of any set of observations accompanied by theoretical concepts that explain and connect those observations.<ref name=hawkinggrand/> Such model-dependent realism need not provide a unique picture of reality (several different pictures of reality may accord with same observations). of a set of data may work), Nor need it cover every available observation (the totality of observations may require a ''network'' of overlapping models).(p. 58<ref name=hawkinggrand/>)


To a limited degree, the shaping of "reality" based upon modeling of selected data is a public enterprise, with all the foibles that implies. "All theories have metaphorical dimensions...that give depth and meaning to scientific ideas, that add to their persuasiveness and color the way we see reality."<ref name=goodwin2001/> As a result, the public engages at a metaphorical level. An explicitly metaphoric public participation is "eco-consciousness".<ref name=larson2011/> Metaphorical involvement also is evident in arenas such as [[gene]] research and [[Biotechnology#Subgroups_of_biotechnology|genetically altered organisms]], and investigations of [[Stem_cell#Ethical_considerations_regarding_embryonic_stem_cells|stem cell]]s, where the public is actively engaged.<ref name=Pence/> Another example is archaeology and the limitations exerted upon examination of burial sites.<ref name=Thomas/><ref name=Thomas1/> In some cases public participation leads to simple clamor, as in the case of [[global warming]].<ref name=Spencer/><ref name=Hoggan/> This broad public engagement, frequently informed by vested interests and oversimplifications, facilitates manipulation by groups with objectives similar to the censorship found in the times of [[Vesalius]] and [[Galileo]] although lacking the institutional authority.<ref name=White/>
Next, given networks made up of several models, the scientists assume for purposes of guiding research that the network-model represents an aspect of reality.   


==Reality as a system of logically consistent metaphors==
The question of how to compare or to classify competing model-dependent realities that cover the same ground arises, although such issues are independent of the concept itself, and may involve subjective considerations.<ref name=real group=Note/> Hawking/Mlodinov do not address the intuitive qualities of a model, but they do raise the question of what constitutes a good model. They suggest a "good model" has these characteristics:(p. 51<ref name=hawkinggrand/>)
 
#It is elegant
We construct our reality through sociocultural interactions, in part through spoken and written language, perhaps in largest part through that, by the way we use it to interact socioculturally. <ref name=arbibl 986>Arbib MA, Hesse MB. (1986) 'The Construction of Reality". Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521326896.</ref>
#Contains few arbitrary or adjustable elements
 
#Agrees with and explains all existing observations
Language has a foundation of metaphors. Metaphor shapes how we construct our reality, when it builds a metaphorical structure that is logically consistent, as it does in science.
#Makes detailed predictions about future observations that can disprove or falsify the model if they are not borne out.
 
If science arbitrates reality, reality is a system of metaphors that have logical consistency of analogies. This conclusion we reach through a logical argument composed of such a system of metaphors. We invent reality. <ref name=brown2003/>
 
The big question: Does science describe reality, or does it construct reality in so 'describing' it?
 
Other questions: How many are there, systems of metaphors that have logical consistency of analogies? The reality of our constructed cosmos includes the possibility of multiple universes. Are there multiple realities?


These desiderata of a "good model" allow critique of different models that are equal from the stance of model-dependent realism by itself. If these "principles of comparison" have indeed any justification outside of their general acceptance, these lie outside the tenets of model-dependent realism.<ref name=comparison group=Note/>-->


==References==  
==References==  
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</ref>
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<ref name=BellLabs>
<ref name=Aquinas>
 
{{cite web |url=http://www.josephkenny.joyeurs.com/CDtexts/ContraGentiles1.htm#30 |title=Chapter 30: The names that can be predicated of God; §2 |work=Contra Gentiles: Book One: God |editor=Anton C Pegis, translator |author=Thomas Aquinas |accessdate=2011-10-13}}[http://www.josephkenny.joyeurs.com/ Joseph Kenney, O.P. website]}}
For example, even in the very liberal environment of [[Bell Laboratories]] engaged in "fundamental research", experiments following discovery of the [[cosmic background radiation]] by [http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1978/penzias.html Arno Penzias] and [http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1978/wilson.html Robert Woodrow Wilson] were frowned upon. So was much of the research underlying the modern [[integrated circuit]], research that had to be conducted in the wee hours of the morning, so as not to interfere with "important" corporate research.
 
</ref>
 
<ref name=brown2003>Brown TL. (2003) "Making Truth: Metaphor in Science". Urbana: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-02810-4. |
 
[http://books.google.com/books?id=U3ljjHts3bSCidq=n-i3king+truthiiscurce=gbs_navlinkj_s Google Books extract Preface. Chapter I. part of Chapter 2].
 
</ref>
 
<ref name=Cao>
This argument is attributed to [[Thomas Kuhn]]  in {{cite book |title=From Current Algebra to Quantum Chromodynamics: A Case for Structural Realism |author=Tian Yu Cao  |pages=p. 4 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=lPaq8-dZ_L8C&pg=PA4 |isbn= 0521889332 |year=2010 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Cao1>
This question is a close paraphrase of a statement in {{cite book |title=From Current Algebra to Quantum Chromodynamics: A Case for Structural Realism |author=Tian Yu Cao  |pages=pp. 2-3 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=lPaq8-dZ_L8C&pg=PA3 |isbn= 0521889332 |year=2010 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}}
</ref>
 
 
<ref name=CCD>
 
Most telescopic images are collected today using the [[charge-coupled device]] or CCD, and computer processed. See, for example, {{cite book |title=Handbook of CCD astronomy |author=Steve B. Howell |isbn=0521617626 |edition=Volume 5 of Cambridge observing handbooks for research astronomers; 2nd ed |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2006 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=ZZCTqanpsZUC&printsec=frontcover}} In addition, the telescope itself is aimed and adjusted using computer programs.
 
</ref>
 
<ref name=Colburn>
{{cite book |title=Philosophy and computer science |author=Timothy R. Colburn |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=luF4ElMxqg4C&pg=PA68 |pages=pp. 68 ''ff'' |chapter=Chapter 6: Models of the mind |publisher=ME Sharpe, Inc. |year=2000 |isbn=156324991X }}
 
</ref>
 
<ref name=collider>
{{cite web |url=http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/LHC/LHC-en.html |title=The large hadron collider |publisher=CERN |accessdate=2011-07-26}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=DeSollaPrice>
{{cite book |title=Little Science, Big Science and beyond |author=Derek J.De Solla Price |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=i16EQgAACAAJ |year=1986 |isbn=0231049560 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=0231049560}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Duhem>
{{cite web |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duhem/#Sci  |title=Pierre Duhem |year=2011 |author=Roger Ariew |work=The Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta ed. |accessdate =2011-08-26}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=goodwin2001>
{{cite book |author=Brian Goodwin |edition=Reprint with a new preface of 1994 ed |year=2001 |title=How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity |chapter=The myth behind the metaphors |pages=p. 33  |publisher= Princeton University Press |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=3BLQntp8ifIC&pg=PA33 |isbn=0691088098 }} Title links to Google Books preview.
</ref>
 
<ref name=hawking>
{{cite book |author=Hawking SW, Mlodinow L. |title=cited work|isbn=0553805371 |url= http://www.amazon.com/Grand-Design-Stephen-Hawking/dp/0553805371#reader_0553805371 |pages=pp. 42-43 |chapter=Chapter 3: What is reality?}}
</ref>
</ref>


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<ref name=Hofstadter>
<ref name=Kerr>
Initially, many refused to believe the results of the telescope. Kepler wrote to Galileo that such persons were "stuck in a world of paper" , blind not by force of circumstance but of their own foolish will. {{cite book |author=Dan Hofstadter |title=The Earth Moves: Galileo and the Roman Inquisition |chapter=Chapter 2: The telescope; or seeing |pages=pp. 53 ''ff'' |publisher=W W Norton & Co |year=2009 |isbn=978-0-393-06650-0|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Ybu81FJA3jgC&printsec=frontcover}}
{{cite book |title=Thomas Aquinas: a very short introduction |author=Fergus Kerr |year=2009 |edition=Volume 214 of Very short introductions |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=dqi6Hi0PsdcC&pg=PA61 |pages=p. 61 |isbn=0199556644 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Hoggan>
 
{{cite book |title=Climate cover-up: the crusade to deny global warming |author=James Hoggan, Richard D. Littlemore |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=tQYjQzOkYK0C |isbn= 1553654854 |year=2009 |publisher=Greystone Books}}
 
</ref>
 
<ref name=Hubble>
 
{{cite web |url=http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/hubble/main/index.html |title=Hubble space telescope |publisher=NASA |accessdate=2011-07-30}}
 
</ref>
</ref>
<ref name=larson2011>Larson B. (2011) ''Metaphors for Environmental Sustainability: Redefining Our Relationship with Nature".  Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300151534. | [http://books.google.com/books?id=Ik6E4AD6gloC&dq=brendon+larson&source=gbs_navlinks_s Google Books preview/extracts] | [http://www.sciencemag.org/content/333/6043/700.1.full Science magazine book review].</ref>


<ref name=Oxford>
<ref name=Oxford>
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{{cite book |title=New Oxford American Dictionary |editor=Angus Stevenson and Christine A. Lindberg, eds. |publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2010 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=sZoFRwAACAAJ|isbn=0195392884|edition=3rd ed}}
{{cite book |title=New Oxford American Dictionary |editor=Angus Stevenson and Christine A. Lindberg, eds. |publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2010 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=sZoFRwAACAAJ|isbn=0195392884|edition=3rd ed}}
</ref>
<ref name=Pence>
{{cite book |title=Re-Creating Medicine: Ethical Issues at the Frontiers of Medicine |author=Gregory Pence |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=IUjvd09OEOgC&pg=PA137|chapter=Chapter 7: Recreating nature: Patenting human genes? |pages=pp. 137 ''ff''|isbn=084769691X |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2007}}
</ref>
</ref>


<ref name=Phaedrus>  
<ref name=Phaedrus>  
{{cite book|author=Plato|title=Plato: Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus |publisher=Harvard University Press |edition=Loeb Classical Library ed |year=1999|isbn= 978-0-674-99040-1 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=RglJcAAACAAJ}} Macmillan edition of 1892 at [http://books.google.com/books?id=bLjWAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover Google books].
{{cite book|author=Plato|title=Plato: Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus |publisher=Harvard University Press |edition=Loeb Classical Library ed |year=1999|isbn= 978-0-674-99040-1 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=RglJcAAACAAJ}} Macmillan edition of 1892 at [http://books.google.com/books?id=bLjWAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover Google books].}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Quine>
{{cite web |author=Peter Hylton |title=Willard van Orman Quine|work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta ed. |year=2010 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/quine/ |accessdate=2011-08-26}}  
</ref>
 
 
<ref name=Riordan>Concerning the environment at Bell, see for example, {{cite book |title=Crystal fire: the birth of the information age |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=0bTpcTLCu6MC&pg=PA179 |author=Michael Riordan, Lillian Hoddeson |pages=p. 179|quote=But because they could not get even a small laboratory dedicated to them, they put it on a set of wheels so that it could be rolled into and out of a storage closet in the metallurgical lab. Working on their own time,..., they managed to "bootleg" their crystal growing program into existence.|isbn=0393041247|year=1997 |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company}} Corporate official "history" has glossed over these problems to present a view of great wisdom and encouragement.
</ref>
</ref>


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<ref name=Schacht>
}}[[Category:Suggestion Bot Tag]]
Cautions abound concerning the deceptive nature of the microscope. For example, see {{cite book  |author=Hermann Schacht |title=The microscope: and its application to vegetable anatomy and physiology |quote=''Seeing'', as Schleiden justly observes, is a difficult art, and seeing with the microscope is yet more difficult... |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=_k1JAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA57|pages=p. 57 |year=1855 |edition=2nd ed |publisher=S. Highley}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Smolin>
{{cite book |title=The trouble with physics: the rise of string theory, the fall of a science, and what comes next |author=Lee Smolin |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=d6MIUlxY-qwC&pg=PA261|publisher=Houghton Mifflin Harcourt |year=2007 |chapter=Chapter 16: How do you fight sociology |pages=pp. 261 ''ff'' |isbn=061891868X}}
 
</ref>
 
<ref name=Spencer>
 
For a discussion by a proponent of intelligent design, see for example {{cite book |title=Climate Confusion: How global warming hysteria leads to bad science, pandering politicians and misguided policies that hurt the poor |author=Roy W. Spencer |edition=Paperback version of 2008 ed |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=f5p76GoayfgC&source=gbs_navlinks_s |isbn=1594033455 |year=2010 |publisher=Encounter Books}}
 
</ref>
 
<ref name=STM>
{{cite web |url=http://nobelprize.org/educational/physics/microscopes/scanning/index.html |title= The scanning tunneling microscope |publisher=Nobelprize.org |accessdate=2011-07-30}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Thomas>
{{cite book |title=Skull Wars: Kennewick Man, Archaeology, and the Battle for Native American Identity |author=David Hurst Thomas |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=IWT4_ZQ2grsC&printsec=frontcover |publisher=Basic Books |year=2001 |isbn=046509225X}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Thomas1>
{{cite book |title=Archaeology |author=Robert L. Kelly, David Hurst Thomas |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Nw4eqX0pIt0C&printsec=frontcover |publisher=Cengage Learning|edition=5th ed |year=2009|quote=How can we pursue this laudable goal if the very act of conducting research offends the living descendents of the ancient people being studied? |pages=p. xxxiii |isbn=0495602914}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=White>
{{cite book |title=A history of the warfare of science with theology in Christendom, Volume 2 |author=Andrew Dickson White |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=BQUIAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover|publisher=D. Appleton & Co.|year=1896}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Wilson>
As Wilson gently recalled matters: "local management here decided that we had had our fun doing astronomy and that now we really ought to contribute something to the telephone company too". Quoted in {{cite book |title=Three degrees above zero: Bell Laboratories in the information age |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=N6s8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA208 |year=1987 |author=Jeremy Bernstein |chapter=Chapter 14: Robert Wilson |pages=p. 208 |isbn=0521329833 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}}
</ref>
 
<ref name=Woit>
{{cite book |title=Not even wrong: the failure of string theory and the search for unity in physical law |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=pcJA3i0xKAUC&pg=PA221 |chapter=Chapter 16: The only game in town: the power and the glory of string theory|pages=pp. 221 ''ff'' |isbn=0465092756 |year=2006 |author=Peter Woit |publisher=Basic Books}}
</ref>
 
}}

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The conventional view of reality[1] is grounded upon perceptions of the world as we experience it, and reflection concerning such perception. This view is related to, but not identical with, empiricism. Perspectives depend upon a particular point of view. There could be as many perspectives as there are people. However, because reality relies to some extent on shared understanding concerning individual perceptions, reality falls within convention. Views of reality have greater or lesser degrees of refinement and organization. Some are highly systematized, for example, scientific theories that use specialized methods to verify their findings, and other views are based upon mores or societal institutions.

Because of the regress problem, establishing a foundation of truth and reality is a problematic that underlies all disciplines, including mathematics. The regress problem (in a nutshell) is that every proposition rests upon premises, which in turn are based upon underlying premises, and so on. Thus, the underlying reality is subject to regress.[2] The desire to establish an underlying ground of all or part of reality, that is, to say what reality "really is," has been a long-standing preoccupation of philosophy and the sciences.

Platonic Realism

Plato's philosophy concerns the nature of Being itself, "what is" ; it distinguishes between "what is" and material existence. What is Real is "what is" in itself; for Plato, these are the 'Forms'. Here is derived the term "Platonic Realism" which refers to a view of reality that grounds truth (the ultimate Reality) in a Being (the Forms) outside sensible reality, and beyond the Forms in the Good that is beyond Being. The Platonic Theory of Forms does not depend on sensible perception to ascertain truth but on another form of 'seeing' that is only possible for the soul [Ψυχή]. In the myth of the charioteer, Plato argues, "For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being" (249c).[3]

In Plato, Being is itself and nothing but itself. Thus, the Form of Justice is simply Justice itself. To define, we use predicates, but a Form would have no predicates in the usual sense of such things insofar as a Form's definition would give you something that has the same thing on either side of the equation such that Justice=Justice. No matter what predicates you add to a thing itself [the Form], for Plato, it remains the same. On the other hand, when we say that Mary has blue eyes and Bill has brown eyes, we refer to items pertaining to sensibility and particular biological traits. It is a trait of sensible reality to be changeable. Plato holds to the idea of an unchangeable reality that underlies the world of experience.

Given his definition of Reality, it is easier to see why, for Plato, knowledge is not 'acquired', but involves anamnesis, that is, the recollection of the Ideas, which the soul had known in a previous existence, especially by means of reasoning. Real knowledge involves a vision of the shining of the Beautiful, its Eidos. For one thing, how would we bring something immutable into material life, such that we could acquire it? For another, would we acquire the Being of the Beautiful or merely another image of the Beautiful? Conversely, the objects of immanent, sensible experience remind us of the things themselves: we see a bed, and this evokes the Idea of a bed, and so on. Knowledge is the extent to which you can connect the bed of experience to the immutable Form of the bed (597a-598b).[4]

So there is a Form of the relation between numbers, the Form of specific numbers, and the Form of the abstraction of 'number' itself. In immanent existence, these forms are all mixed up in matter and predicates abound. But what of the varying degree to which some of us are able to make these relations, to gain knowledge? I may see a beetle climbing on a branch and think about bugs. If I am no entomologist I may not go to the specific Form of 'beetle', only the form of a beetle in general. My inability to understand the intricacy of number does not prevent me from a vision of the form of 'number' in general or its abstraction, but may prevent me from seeing the intricacy of their relationships.

Because the Forms are external to the sensible copies of reality, it does not seem that there can be change in something like Beauty or Justice. Immanent life seems to confirm the finding that objects of sensation appear to be all mixed up together. We see justice and truth in varying degrees, as composed in matter, rather than by themselves. These break, degrade, disperse or scatter. Material things have parts whereas immaterial things do not. Plato's explanation is that the beautiful we experience is beautiful because it participates in the Form of Beauty, not because it is beautiful in itself. Accordingly, if I want to know if a sunset is beautiful, I go to the Form that gives the sunset its beauty. The relation of the particular sunset to Beauty remains temporary (the sun goes down, although the beauty of the sunset cannot fade). Perception of beauty in this world involves establishing such a relationship between objects of sensation and that which is truly Beautiful. Unlike finite beauty, the Form of the Beautiful has no beginning or end (when we perceive the beautiful sunset as being present, we are soon dissuaded of this reality when we perceive that the facts have changed and are now otherwise once the sun goes down).

Further, to understand Plato's conception of Reality, we must get around the idea of causality. The Real does not come to be and cease to be in a material causal sense. The scientific cause of the 'appearance' of a sunset, the appearance that the sun moves, for us has to do with the movements of bodies in space but from a Platonic view implies a connection to the Form that is the underlying cause of the sun or of a sunset seen in in our experience. The bond to the Beautiful of the sunset or to the Form of the sun itself is real, but the objects we think of as sun or sunset do not amount to things in themselves. All we have done in locating these objects is to establish a relation to Reality.

Conventional reality, for Plato, is unsatisfactory, and knowledge of this type of reality can be categorized as doxa, the stuff of beliefs and opinions, rather than the act of real knowledge. Yet it should not be concluded that Plato rejects doxa. Including "geometry and the kindred arts," Plato asserts that, through the power of dialectic (as he conceives of it), reason can treat "its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak" (511b)[4].

Religion

Religion commonly ties reality to the notion of the divine. Thomas Aquinas, for example, says that statements about everyday reality are true of God only metaphorically. Similar ideas can be found in Buddhist traditions.

...to each species belongs its own mode of perfection and being. The same is true of whatever names designate the properties of things, which are caused by the proper principles of their species. Hence, they can be said of God only metaphorically. But the names that express such perfections along with the mode of supereminence with which they belong to God are said of God alone. ... Thomas Aquinas[5]

To aid in interpretation of these remarks, we have:

It is not too much to say that, for Thomas, as for Aristotle, the forms in the natural world attain an altogether higher level of reality in our minds – because, as already for Aristotle, the world constitutes an intelligible whole in virtue of its dependence upon the divine mind. ... Fergus Kerr[6]

Model-dependent realism

See also Model-dependent realism.

Platonic realism described above introduces the idea of the soul and its journey with God—subjecting Plato's approach to a possible interpretation of supernaturalism. Some philosophers think that everything that exists we can only apprehend as constructs of our mind, what might be termed an anti-realist or idealist point of view, that external perception consists of ideas. In contrast, classical science adopts a realist point of view, that objects of sense perception have an existence independent of the act of perception. Modern science is somewhat in the middle, proposing reality as indefinite to a degree, governed by chance in some particulars, and becoming definite only upon human observation.

The physicists, Stephen W. Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, in their book, The Grand Design, offer a concept called model-dependent realism that they believe skirts the difficulties arising from those differing views.[7]

A few excerpts from Hawking's and Mlodinow's book describe the basics of model-dependent realism:

Model-dependent realism short circuits all this argument and discussion between the realist and anti-realist schools of thought. According to model-dependent realism, it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation. If there are two models that both agree with observation,...then one cannot say that one is more real than another. (pp. 45-46)

...model-dependent realism...is based on the idea that our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the world. When such a model is successful at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth...(p. 7)

But there may be different ways in which one could model the same physical situation, with each employing different fundamental elements and concepts. If two such physical theories or models accurately predict the same events, one cannot be said to be more real than the other; rather, we are free to use whichever model is most convenient...(p. 7)

It might be that to describe the universe, we have to employ different theories in different situations. Each theory may have its own version of reality, but according to model-dependent realism, that is acceptable so long as the theories agree in their predictions whenever they overlap, that is, whenever they can both be applied... (p. 117)

We make models in science, but we also make them in everyday life. Model-dependent realism applies not only to scientific models but also to the conscious and subconscious mental models we all create in order to interpret and understand the everyday world. (p. 46)

Hawking and Mlodinow assert that argument over the existence or nature of objective reality is pointless, and argument should be focused instead upon models and their success in according with observation and in predicting new observable phenomena. They do agree that such success induces a tendency in scientists to "attribute" to theories the quality of reality, but point out that overlapping theories may use different but equally valid concepts and structures to explain the same observations. Thus, subscribers to model-dependent realism would not assert that models must provide a unique picture of reality (several different pictures of reality may accord with same observations). Nor would they assert that models incorporate every available observation (the totality of observations may require a network of overlapping models).[7]

The article, model-dependent realism, provides an extended discussion of this topic, and a discussion of the published reactions to it.

References

  1. ↑ The New Oxford American Dictionary gives this definition of reality: 1. the world or the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them: he refuses to face reality | Laura was losing touch with reality. | 2. (Philosophy) existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. (2010) Angus Stevenson and Christine A. Lindberg, eds.: New Oxford American Dictionary, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195392884. 
  2. ↑ Scott Aikin (2011). Epistemology and the Regress Problem, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 0415878004. 
  3. ↑ Plato (1999). Plato: Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library ed. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-99040-1.  Macmillan edition of 1892 at Google books.}}
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Plato (2005). Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds: The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters, Bollingen Series LXXI. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-09718-3. 
  5. ↑ Thomas Aquinas. Anton C Pegis, translator:Chapter 30: The names that can be predicated of God; §2. Contra Gentiles: Book One: God. Retrieved on 2011-10-13.Joseph Kenney, O.P. website}}
  6. ↑ Fergus Kerr (2009). Thomas Aquinas: a very short introduction, Volume 214 of Very short introductions. Oxford University Press, p. 61. ISBN 0199556644. 
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Hawking SW, Mlodinow L. (2010). The Grand Design, Kindle edition. New York: Bantam Books. ISBN 978-0-553-90707-0. 
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