User:Nick Gardner /Sandbox: Difference between revisions

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[[/Timelines#Opposition 1983-97|opposition spokesman]], to gain a position on the party's shadow cabinet.
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{|align="right" cellpadding="10" style="background:lightgray; width:28%; border: 1px solid #aaa; margin:20px; font-size: 92%;"
===Policy toward Greece===
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OUT of the night that covers me,<br>    Black as the Pit from pole to pole, <br>  I thank whatever gods may be<br>    For my unconquerable soul.<br>


In the fell clutch of circumstance<br>          I have not winced nor cried aloud.<br>  Under the bludgeonings of chance<br>    My head is bloody, but unbowed.<br>
:(a) conditional loans at below the market rate of interest;
:(b)sponsorship of a [[restructure (debt)|restructuring]] of the government's debt;
:(c) [[fiscal transfer]]s from other Eurozone countries to Greece;
- in addition to which the Greek government has the option of  


Beyond this place of wrath and tears<br>     Looms but the Horror of the shade,<br> And yet the menace of the years <br>   Finds, and shall find, me unafraid.<br>  
Option (a) would result in the Greek government's [[default (finance)|default]] because, without external support, it would not then be able to repay its maturing debt. (Further borrowing would only be possible at interest rates that would be so high that it would make matters worse). There would in principle be a degree of [[contagion (finance)|contagion]] of the problem by any country with large holdings of Greek government bonds (but it appears that no other country is in that position
<ref>See the exposure data from ''Barclays Capital'', reported in ''The Economist'' [http://www.economist.com/node/18867023?story_id=18867023]</ref>).  There would also be contagion by some of the other ''PIIGS'' countries because the realisation that they could no longer count on financial support from the Eurozone would prompt investors to demand increased [[risk premium]]s. Some contagion by Portugal and Spain has happened in anticipation of a default.<br>
Option (b)serves to avoid immediate default and may provide the Greek government with a long-term opportunity to return to [[Fiscal policy/Tutorials#Sustainability|fiscal sustainability]], depending upon the terms of the loan.<br>
Option (c) offers a similar prospect, depending upon the terms of the renegotiated debt.<br>
Option (d) could enable an immediate return to fiscal sustainability.<br>
Option (e) can be dismissed because it would be so costly for Greece<ref>[http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/economics/article3156724.ece Sam Fleming: ''Devastating price of euro failure'', Times, 7 September 2011]</ref> as to be impracticable.


It matters not how strait the gate,<br>     How charged with punishments the scroll,<br>   I am the master of my fate:<br>   I am the captain of my soul
===Eurozone economic integration===
As the crisis spread from Greece to the other [[PIIGS]] countries, there was widespread agreement that a choice would have to be made between the abandonment of the euro and the adoption of the centralised control of economic policy. Support in principle for the latter option was expressed by
[[Nicolas Sarkozy|President Sarkozy]] and [[Angela Merkel|Chancellor Merkel]] in December 2010<ref>[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/825119d8-0463-11e0-8a3c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz17mftMHoY Gerrit Wiesmann  and Peter Spiegel: ''Merkel and Sarkozy call for deeper union'', Financial Times, December 10 2010]</ref>, and again  August 2011<ref>[http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/16/eurozone-highlights-idUSL5E7JG1YQ20110816 ''Highlights - Merkel, Sarkozy news conference'', Reuters 16 August 2011]</ref>, when they advocated the creation of a "true European economic government" - although they had not reached agreement upon more than a limited initial move in that direction <ref>[http://media.ft.com/cms/1e93f294-c8df-11e0-a2c8-00144feabdc0.pdf ''Letter to President van Rompuy'', Financial Times, 17 August 2011]</ref>. There were mixed reactions from other eurozone countries<ref>[http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/17/us-eurozone-highlights-idUSTRE77F55Y20110817 ''Factbox: Eurozone reaction to Franco-German integration push'', Reuters 17 August 2011]</ref> and there is likely to be strong opposition, both to the eventual replacement of government debts by "eurobonds", and to the centralised control of [[fiscal policy]].


: ''Invictus'' by W E Henley (Nelson Mandela's favourite poem)
|}
<!--
Belief in the supernatural, then, great as were its services
in the early stages of human development, can’t be considered
to be any longer required, either for enabling us to know
what is right and what is wrong in social morality, or for
providing us with motives to do right and to abstain from
wrong.
The usefulness of religion
There is a battle constantly going on between the powers of
good and those of evil. Even the humblest human creature
can take some part in this battle, and even the smallest
help to the right side has value in promoting the very
slow progress by which good is gradually gaining ground
from evil. That progress is often so slow as to be almost
undetectable; but when we compare the state of the battle
at two times that are far apart, the progress of good over
evil becomes visible to us, and that gives us a promise that
the good will win the final victory—quite certainly, though
not very soon.
The most animating and invigorating thought that can inspire a
human creature is the thought of doing something, on even the
humblest scale if nothing more is within reach, towards bringing
this final victory a little nearer. And I am perfectly sure that
it—·the religion of humanity·—is destined to be the religion of
the future, whether or not supernatural sanctions are brought
into it. But it appears to me that supernatural hopes, of the sort
that rational scepticism (as I have called it) is willing to endorse,
may still contribute quite a lot towards giving this religion the
ascendancy it ought to have over the human mind.
41
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Revision as of 12:57, 11 September 2011

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Policy toward Greece

(a) conditional loans at below the market rate of interest;
(b)sponsorship of a restructuring of the government's debt;
(c) fiscal transfers from other Eurozone countries to Greece;

- in addition to which the Greek government has the option of

Option (a) would result in the Greek government's default because, without external support, it would not then be able to repay its maturing debt. (Further borrowing would only be possible at interest rates that would be so high that it would make matters worse). There would in principle be a degree of contagion of the problem by any country with large holdings of Greek government bonds (but it appears that no other country is in that position [1]). There would also be contagion by some of the other PIIGS countries because the realisation that they could no longer count on financial support from the Eurozone would prompt investors to demand increased risk premiums. Some contagion by Portugal and Spain has happened in anticipation of a default.
Option (b)serves to avoid immediate default and may provide the Greek government with a long-term opportunity to return to fiscal sustainability, depending upon the terms of the loan.
Option (c) offers a similar prospect, depending upon the terms of the renegotiated debt.
Option (d) could enable an immediate return to fiscal sustainability.
Option (e) can be dismissed because it would be so costly for Greece[2] as to be impracticable.

Eurozone economic integration

As the crisis spread from Greece to the other PIIGS countries, there was widespread agreement that a choice would have to be made between the abandonment of the euro and the adoption of the centralised control of economic policy. Support in principle for the latter option was expressed by President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel in December 2010[3], and again August 2011[4], when they advocated the creation of a "true European economic government" - although they had not reached agreement upon more than a limited initial move in that direction [5]. There were mixed reactions from other eurozone countries[6] and there is likely to be strong opposition, both to the eventual replacement of government debts by "eurobonds", and to the centralised control of fiscal policy.

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