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The [[United States Department of Defense]] held '''Combatant Status Review Tribunals''' from August 2004 through January 2005, to confirm whether the detainees they had been holding at [[Guantanamo Bay]] were [[combatant|lawful combatants]].
{{TOC|right}}
The United States Department of Defense held '''Combatant Status Review Tribunals''' (CSRT) from August 2004 through January 2005, to confirm whether the detainees they had been holding at Guantanamo detention camp were enemy combatants.
 
In the summer of 2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the detainees would be given an annual Adminstrative Review Board hearing, similar to CSRTs, but with a slightly different mandate.  While the reviews of late 2004, early 2005 were to determine whether the detainees were '''illegal combatants''', the annual reviews would determine if the detainee still represented a threat.


==Background==
==Background==


The [[Geneva Conventions]] obliges belligerents to honor certain rights of [[civilians]] and [[prisoners of war]].  The Geneva Conventions require combatants to fulfill certain requirements in order enjoy the rights of POW status.  But it requires belligerents to continue grant the rights of POW status to those prisoners suspected of failing to fulfill the conditions that would afford them POW status, until the beliigerent had convened a '''competent tribunal'''. to make a determination as to their status.
The [[Third Geneva Convention]] require combatants to fulfill certain requirements in order enjoy the rights of POW status.  It requires belligerents to continue grant the rights of POW status to those prisoners suspected of failing to fulfill the conditions that would afford them POW status, until the belligerent had convened a '''competent tribunal'''. to make a determination as to their status.
 
The Geneva Conventions oblige belligerents to convene the competent tribunals in a timely fashion.
 
The interpretation of the [[George W. Bush|Bush administration]] was that the Geneva Conventions obliged belligerents to convene a competent tribunal to review the combatant status of prisoners only when their status was in any doubt.  Since they didn't doubt that their prisoners didn't qualify for POW status, there wasn't any need for a review.
 
Various legal challenges were mounted on behalf of the detainees.  Most of those legal challenges ruled against the [[Executive Branch]], and when the Executive Branch's opportunities to appeal were exhausted they were finally forced to convene tribunals in early July of 2004.
 
Although the Geneva Conventions oblige belligerents to convene the tribunals in a timely fashion most of the Guantanamo Bya detainees had been held for over two and a half years.  During that time they had not been able to communicate with their families, or have legal advice.


==The manner in which the tribunals were conducted==
==The manner in which the tribunals were conducted==
All the tribunals convened in a room, with space the three officers presiding over the tribunal, a clerk to keep a record, an officer familiar with the detainees case, possibly the detainee and his translator, and up to three three observers.  37 of the 572 Tribunals were observed by a member of the Press.
===The role of the presiding officers===
The DoD kept the identity of the presiding officers, and the rules to guide their decisions, confidential.


Tens of thousands Americans service members, and their families, live at Guantanamo Bay. Guantanamo Bay has been described as being like a small US city. It has lots of structures where the tribunal could convene.
A paper from the Seton Hall University School of Law, entitled "No-hearing hearings", revealed that some Guantanamo captives had second or third Combatant Status Review Tribunals convened when their first Tribunal determined that they had not been enemy combatants after all.<ref name="No-hearing_hearings">
 
{{cite web
In the event all the tribunals convened in a cramped trailer -- so small there was only room for three observers.  Present, in the trailer, there would be the three officers presiding over the tribunal, a clerk to keep a record, an officer delegated to be familiar with the detainees case, possibly the detainee and their translator, and possibly the three observers.
| url=http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf
 
| title=No-hearing hearings
===The role of the presiding officers===
| page=page 17
| author=Mark Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux, David Gratz, John Gregorek, Matthew Darby, Shana Edwards, Shane Hartman, Daniel Mann, Megan Sassaman and Helen Skinner
| publisher=Seton Hall University School of Law
| accessdate=2007-04-02
}}</ref>


The DoD kept the identity of the presiding officers confidential. The instructions the presiding officers used to guide their decisions was confidential. But it could be guessed at by examining some of their decisions.
Lieutenant colonel|Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham came forward and swore an affidavit,<ref name=Affidavit>{{cite web
| url=http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Al%20Odah%20reply%206-22-07.pdf
| title=Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Reserve, June 14th, 2007
| publisher=Supreme Court of the United States
| date=June 14 2007
| accessdate=2007-06-25
}}</ref> describing his experience sitting on Al Ghazzawi's Tribunal.<ref name=Cbs20070623>
{{cite news
| url=http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/06/23/world/main2970288_page2.shtml
| title=Gitmo Panelist Slams Hearing Process: Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham Is First Member Of Military Panel To Challenge Guantanamo Bay Hearings
| date=June 23, 2007
| publisher=CBS
| accessdate=2007-06-23
}}</ref>


===The role of the detainee's representative===
===The role of the detainee's representative===
 
Detainees were informed that the role of the representative was not to serve as their advocate.  Nothing told to him was confidential.  He had no obligation to present their case in the best light.  If the detainee was not present during their tribunal, the representative would present their case without their co-operation.
Each detainee's case file was the responsibility of a detainee's representative.  Detainee's were informed that the role of the representative was not to serve as their advocate.  Nothing told to him was confidential.  He had no obligation to present their case in the best light.  If the detainee was not present during their tribunal, the representative would present their case without their co-operation.
 
===The role of the detainee during the tribunal===
===The role of the detainee during the tribunal===


Detainees who did attend their tribunals were, generally given an opportunity, if they wished, to explain why they should not be considered an unlawful combatant.  However, if they were given this opportunity, they would have to guess why they were being held, in the first place.  Unlike prisoners in the criminal justice system, they were all being held without charge.  The evidence against them was classified.
Detainees who did attend their tribunals were, generally given an opportunity, if they wished, to explain why they should not be considered an unlawful combatant.  They did not have access to specific details of the the classified reasons why they were held, so a precise rebuttal was not likely.   
 
Detainees were not allowed to attend their own tribunals, unless they signed a long, complicated agreement, wherein they agreed to waive rights.  Half or more of the detainees declined to sign the agreement, without independent legal advice.  American military spokesmen described this as the detainee deciding they didn't want to participate in their review.
 
===The role of the observers in the tribunal===
 
The DoD experienced ongoing confusion about the presence of observers.  It now seems that portions of all the tribunals were supposed to be held in public -- public in the sense that representatives from a short list of reporters would be advised of the date of tribunals, and invited to attend.  All of the first several dozen tribunals went unobserved apparently because the DoD had not figured out who was responsible for advising the reporters on the approved list, and issuing them an invitation.  Overlooking the issuing of invitations remained an ongoing problem.  The list of approved reporters was short.  The procedure for getting to the tribunal's trailer was difficult, and many of the tribunals went unobserved.
 
===How the Rules of Evidence differed from those in the Criminal Justice System===
 
The United States has two, parallel criminal justice systems, those for civilians, and a parallel system for those in the military, granting suspects similar rights, in a streamlined fashion.  In the criminal justice system:
*Suspects are entitled to the presumption of innocence
*Suspects are entitled to have legal advice.
*Suspects are entitled to know the evidence the prosecutor has against them, and in their favor.
*Suspects are entitled to call witnesses in their favor, and cross-examine the witnesses against them.
*Suspects are protected from being forced to incriminate themselves
*Evidence acquired through torture cannot be used.
 
The tribunals differed from proceedings under a criminal justice system in that:
*Detainees do not receive the presumption of innocence.
*Detainees do not get access to legal advice.
*Detainees are not entitled to access to the evidence against them, or in their favor.
*Hear-say evidence is allowed to be used against the detainees
*The use of evidence acquired through coercive interrogation is allowed, they were not protected against self-incrimination..
*Evidence acquired through the torture of other suspects was allowed.
 
===Murat Kurnaz, an example===
 
[[Murat Kurnaz]] was a young Turk who was born in, and had grown up, in Germany.  When captured he was close to being granted German citizenship.  He was taken off a tourist bus, and arrested, while on a trip to Pakistan -- not "on the battlefield".
 
The tribunal's determination was that there was enough evidence of Kurnaz had ties to terrorism that he should be held as a unlawful combatant. 
 
Through a bureaucratic slip-up Kurnaz's file was declassifed.  During the brief window when it was declassified the Washington Post was able to review all the evidence against him, and [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A3868-2005Mar26?language=printer publish a summary.]  [[Joyce Hens Green]], a Washington jurist, bad been able to review both the classified and unclassified evidence.  What Green had found was that Kurnaz's file contained something like 100 pages of documents and reports explaining that German and American investiigator could find no evidence whatsoever that Kurnaz had any ties to terrorism.  Shortly before his tribunal an unsigned memo had been added to his file concluded he was an al Queda member.  Green's comment on the memo was that it:
{{quotation|
"fails to provide significant details to support its conclusory
allegations, does not reveal the sources for its information
and is contradicted by other evidence in the record."}}
 
Eugene R. Fidell, a Washington-based expert in military law, said:
{{quotation|
"It suggests the procedure is a sham, If a case like that can get through, what it means is that the merest scintilla of evidence against someone would carry the day for the government, even if there's a mountain of evidence on the other side." }}


Detainees were not allowed to attend their own tribunals, unless they signed a agreement, wherein they agreed to waive rights.  Half or more of the detainees declined to sign the agreement, without independent legal advice.
==Results==
==Results==
'''NLEC''' is an abbreviation for '''No Longer Enemy Combatant''', a term the George W. Bush Administration used for prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp  whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal determined they should not have been classified as "enemy combatants".<ref name=Afps31063>
{{cite news
| url=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31063
| title=38 Guantanamo Detainees to Be Freed After Tribunals
| author=Kathleen T. Rhem
| publisher=American Forces Press Service
| date=March 30, 2005
| accessdate=2007-09-01
}}</ref>


The tribunal determined that 38 of the detainees had never been combatants, and never should have been held. Four of those 38 detainees have been released.   
Thirty-eight detainees were classified as "NLECs".<ref name=WapoNlec>
[http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/nlec/ Guantanamo Bay Detainees Classifed as "No Longer Enemy Combatants"], ''Washington Post''</ref>
A study from Seton Hall University School of Law said that an additional three Combatant Status Review Tribunals determined that captives should not have been determined to have been enemy combatants, only to have their recommendation overturned.<ref name="No-hearing_hearings" />
None of the detainees who were determined not to have been enemy combatants were immediately released.  Ten of the NLECs were allowed to move to the more comfortable Camp Iguana.  Others, such as Sami Al Laithi, remained in solitary confinement.


==Annual reviews==
The delay in the release of some of the detainees was due to considerations of the detainees safety. Under the ''refoulement'' provision of the Convention against Torture, a country may not send an individual to a country where he may be tortured. 


In the summer of 2004 [[Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]] announced that the detainees would be given an annual review, similar to these status reviews, but with a slightly different mandate.  While the reviews of late 2004, early 2005 were to determine whether the detainees were '''illegal combatants''', the annual reviews would determine if the detainee still represented a threat. 
Some of the detainees could not be returned to their home countries, out of fears of retaliation from their fellow citizens, or the governments of their countries.  Some, like Al Laithi, were returned to their home countries after the U.S. secured a promise that they would not be punished by their home countries.  Others, like five of Uighur detainees in Guantanamo, were released when the U.S. found a third country which would accept them.<ref name=Bbc060506>
{{citation
| url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4979466.stm
| title = Albania takes Guantanamo Uighurs
| journal = BBC
  | date = May 6, 2006
}}</ref>Three further captives who had been determined not to have been enemy combatants, who had been occupants of Camp Iguana since May 2005, were released in Albania in November 2006.<ref name=MiamiHerald061117>
[http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/guantanamo/story/756756.html Pentagon sends Guantánamo captives to Albania], ''Miami Herald'', November 17 2006
</ref>


==References==
==References==
<references/>
<references/>
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The United States Department of Defense held Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) from August 2004 through January 2005, to confirm whether the detainees they had been holding at Guantanamo detention camp were enemy combatants.

In the summer of 2004 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the detainees would be given an annual Adminstrative Review Board hearing, similar to CSRTs, but with a slightly different mandate. While the reviews of late 2004, early 2005 were to determine whether the detainees were illegal combatants, the annual reviews would determine if the detainee still represented a threat.

Background

The Third Geneva Convention require combatants to fulfill certain requirements in order enjoy the rights of POW status. It requires belligerents to continue grant the rights of POW status to those prisoners suspected of failing to fulfill the conditions that would afford them POW status, until the belligerent had convened a competent tribunal. to make a determination as to their status.

The manner in which the tribunals were conducted

All the tribunals convened in a room, with space the three officers presiding over the tribunal, a clerk to keep a record, an officer familiar with the detainees case, possibly the detainee and his translator, and up to three three observers. 37 of the 572 Tribunals were observed by a member of the Press.

The role of the presiding officers

The DoD kept the identity of the presiding officers, and the rules to guide their decisions, confidential.

A paper from the Seton Hall University School of Law, entitled "No-hearing hearings", revealed that some Guantanamo captives had second or third Combatant Status Review Tribunals convened when their first Tribunal determined that they had not been enemy combatants after all.[1]

Lieutenant colonel|Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham came forward and swore an affidavit,[2] describing his experience sitting on Al Ghazzawi's Tribunal.[3]

The role of the detainee's representative

Detainees were informed that the role of the representative was not to serve as their advocate. Nothing told to him was confidential. He had no obligation to present their case in the best light. If the detainee was not present during their tribunal, the representative would present their case without their co-operation.

The role of the detainee during the tribunal

Detainees who did attend their tribunals were, generally given an opportunity, if they wished, to explain why they should not be considered an unlawful combatant. They did not have access to specific details of the the classified reasons why they were held, so a precise rebuttal was not likely.

Detainees were not allowed to attend their own tribunals, unless they signed a agreement, wherein they agreed to waive rights. Half or more of the detainees declined to sign the agreement, without independent legal advice.

Results

NLEC is an abbreviation for No Longer Enemy Combatant, a term the George W. Bush Administration used for prisoners at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal determined they should not have been classified as "enemy combatants".[4]

Thirty-eight detainees were classified as "NLECs".[5] A study from Seton Hall University School of Law said that an additional three Combatant Status Review Tribunals determined that captives should not have been determined to have been enemy combatants, only to have their recommendation overturned.[1] None of the detainees who were determined not to have been enemy combatants were immediately released. Ten of the NLECs were allowed to move to the more comfortable Camp Iguana. Others, such as Sami Al Laithi, remained in solitary confinement.

The delay in the release of some of the detainees was due to considerations of the detainees safety. Under the refoulement provision of the Convention against Torture, a country may not send an individual to a country where he may be tortured.

Some of the detainees could not be returned to their home countries, out of fears of retaliation from their fellow citizens, or the governments of their countries. Some, like Al Laithi, were returned to their home countries after the U.S. secured a promise that they would not be punished by their home countries. Others, like five of Uighur detainees in Guantanamo, were released when the U.S. found a third country which would accept them.[6]Three further captives who had been determined not to have been enemy combatants, who had been occupants of Camp Iguana since May 2005, were released in Albania in November 2006.[7]

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Mark Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux, David Gratz, John Gregorek, Matthew Darby, Shana Edwards, Shane Hartman, Daniel Mann, Megan Sassaman and Helen Skinner. No-hearing hearings. Seton Hall University School of Law. Retrieved on 2007-04-02.
  2. ↑ Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Reserve, June 14th, 2007. Supreme Court of the United States (June 14 2007). Retrieved on 2007-06-25.
  3. ↑ Gitmo Panelist Slams Hearing Process: Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham Is First Member Of Military Panel To Challenge Guantanamo Bay Hearings, CBS, June 23, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-06-23.
  4. ↑ Kathleen T. Rhem. 38 Guantanamo Detainees to Be Freed After Tribunals, American Forces Press Service, March 30, 2005. Retrieved on 2007-09-01.
  5. ↑ Guantanamo Bay Detainees Classifed as "No Longer Enemy Combatants", Washington Post
  6. ↑ "Albania takes Guantanamo Uighurs", BBC, May 6, 2006
  7. ↑ Pentagon sends Guantánamo captives to Albania, Miami Herald, November 17 2006

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